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Abstract 
 
Nonviolent collective action emerged during the last century as a potent tool for democratization 
and the pursuit of freedom and human rights. Yet the phenomenon remains somewhat 
understudied, and our understanding of its dynamics far from complete. The paper attempts to 
address the lack of understanding by identifying causal factors that can explain the success or 
failure of nonviolent protest. It approaches this question through a combination of three 
comparative methodologies – in-depth qualitative case studies, Boolean comparison (Qualitative 
Case Analysis) and statistical analysis – examining a total of 29 cases of nonviolent action 
throughout the 20th century (with a brief foray into the 21st). The data set is constructed from 
extant case studies and other secondary sources. The study investigates the causal impact of 
regime legitimacy, regime and protest group violence, mass media freedom, and religious 
authority on protest outcome and identifies legitimacy and protest violence as particularly 
decisive. A discussion of the implications of these findings for protest organizers is offered, and 
predictions on their basis are made for the outcome of recent protests in Burma/Myanmar and a 
hypothetical Palestinian protest movement against the West Bank Wall. 
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1 - Introduction 
Violence is nature’s way of sorting out conflicts. The strong survive by preying on the weak, 
and where there is a disagreement an aptitude for mortal combat generally holds the day. Our 
human species has spent most of its evolutionary history living much like other species – in a 
constant fight for survival – and it should come as little surprise that we have for the most part 
retained nature’s way of solving disputes until this day. Human history is a history of violence, 
and the century we recently left behind was maybe the most violent of them all. 
 
Yet as the 20th century lumbered on through its world wars and genocidal excesses, a counter-
trend of nonviolent action was slowly establishing itself. Although by no means a new 
invention, it did during this century come into its own as a potent tool of political agency. Its 
founding moment was the Gandhi-led overthrow of the British rule in India, inspiring in turn the 
American civil rights movement, the South African fight against apartheid, and, during the past 
three decades, a growing number of transitions to democracy. Poland, the Philippines, Chile, 
Serbia and Georgia are all examples of countries that embarked on a democratization process 
largely via nonviolent mass action. 
 
Nonviolent action is essentially an attempt to change the rules of the power game. Its aim is to 
deny those with the means of violent repression the use of such means, turning the principle that 
‘might makes right’ on its head. Where violent insurgency seeks to destroy the opponent’s 
physical capability to act, nonviolence leaves the apparatus of repression intact but seeks to 
render its use impossible. When successfully applied, the opponent will retain his police and 
military forces, but will not dare to use them – fearing mutiny among his troops, or a backlash 
from civil society or other pillars of support for the regime.  
 
The fundamental insight behind the strategy of nonviolent action is that the maintenance of 
power on a political level requires legitimacy (Sharp 1973). An authoritarian ruler – to take a 
common opponent for nonviolent struggle – is dependent upon a degree of international 
recognition, the implicit acceptance of his rule among the general populace, loyalty from his 
apparatus of repression, and finally an ability to justify his rule in his own eyes. Not all 
necessarily depend on all of these, but none can maintain power over time simply on the basis of 
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raw force. The aim of the resistance movement is to deprive the dictator of those sources of 
legitimacy most vital to the continuation of his rule. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate and seek an understanding of the outcome of 
nonviolent resistance. Why did the events at Tiananmen Square in 1989 lead to a massacre, 
while German women protesting in 1943 Berlin on behalf of their Jewish husbands succeeded in 
imposing their will on the Nazi regime? The findings of this study suggest the following: 
 
1. Nonviolent struggle will tend to succeed when it skillfully exploits weak points in its 
opponent’s claim to legitimacy of power. 
2. A nonviolent campaign turning to violence will avail its opponent to a legitimate excuse 
for violent repression and result in an overall loss of strength for the resistance 
movement. 
3. Unjustified violent repression from the regime or opponent will tend to strengthen the 
campaign of nonviolent resistance insofar as the latter started with a strong claim to 
legitimacy vis-à-vis its opponent.  
4. The presence of a free mass media or of well-established underground media networks 
will serve both as an organizational tool and as a disseminator of news regarding regime-
sanctioned atrocities and thus facilitate protest success. 
5. A movement possessing a degree of religious authority will find it easier to mobilize 
popular support and to bridge social divides between its supporters, and may thus be able 
to present a strong united front to its opponent. 
 
The title of this paper is a quote from Sun Tzu’s Art of War, a 2000-year old Chinese book of 
military strategy that extols “those who render others’ armies helpless without fighting” (Sun 
Tzu and Cleary 1988:67). Rather than overcoming his enemies on the battlefield, the superior 
general infiltrates their ranks, uncovers their secrets, fosters discontent and disharmony and 
destroys their alliances, thus eroding their willingness to fight. In a context of this paper, of 
course, ‘winning without fighting’ also refers to overcoming the opponent by the use of 
nonviolent methods. The aim of the paper is to combine nonviolence with Sun Tzu’s devious 
means, and thus to suggest ways in which one can indeed be both ‘harmless as doves and wise 
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as serpents’. With a clear understanding of the opponent’s needs and motivations – what drives 
him, what excuses he makes for himself, what kind of support he needs from society and the 
world – a strategy may be developed for the purpose of trimming down his range of responses, 
rendering his police forces and armies effectively helpless. 
1.1 Terminology 
In this paper it will be assumed that nonviolent resistance is a form of political action aimed at 
changing policy of state actors. The forms of protest here discussed do in other words all belong 
to the realm of the political, and the protest objective is frequently to change the political regime 
itself. Many instances of nonviolent action, notably labor strikes, which relate primarily to 
economic rather than political issues, are thus not covered by this discussion. 
 
The protesters will be referred to interchangeably as the resistors, the opposition, the movement 
or the protest group. Names for their opponents are the authorities, the regime, the government 
and the state. The act of protest itself may be known as a campaign, a demonstration or a 
nonviolent offensive. 
1.2 Program 
The program for this paper is as follows. Chapter 2 outlines a number of relevant insights from 
different strands of research literature, and uses this as the basis for the formulation and 
elucidation of the hypotheses that are to be tested. Chapter 3 thereupon describes the three 
methodologies that will be employed in testing these hypotheses. Chapter 4 presents the data, in 
the form of four in-depth case studies for the qualitative comparison and 11 brief summaries 
justifying the coding of the data set to be utilized with Boolean and statistical methods. (These 
15 national movements translate into 29 cases for the Boolean and statistical analyses.) Chapter 
5 provides their respective findings, and Chapter 6 discusses the general implications of these 
findings and estimates the potential for nonviolent protest in present-day Burma/Myanmar and 
Israel-Palestine. It finally discusses how further research can improve upon the present study. 
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2 - Theory 
2.1 Nonviolence 
In essence we may speak of two main schools of nonviolence: the pacifist and the pragmatic. 
For the former, nonviolence is a principle of life and also a great definitional challenge, and 
those of the pacifist persuasion has spilled much ink attempting to demarcate the precise border 
between violence and nonviolence. Galtung’s (1965) discussion of various types of nonviolence 
does for instance include at its extreme end the happily termed ‘vacuous’ nonviolence, which 
deems even the attempt to change a person’s mind as violence. Readers of Gandhi’s (2001 
[1929]; 2001 [1951]) work may also observe how he sought to align his campaigns of social 
disobedience with his philosophy of nonviolence, ever alert for the sort of tactics that would 
infringe upon his principles.   
 
From the more pragmatic perspective, however, nonviolence is simply that which does not seek 
to cause any bodily harm. Pragmatic activists use nonviolence not because of any fundamentally 
pacifist persuasion but on the basis of its potency as a political weapon. This is a more 
contemporary view of nonviolence, championed most famously by Sharp (1973; 2005), and 
according to Johansen (2007:145) it is today more prevalent than pacifism. 
 
Pragmatic nonviolent action nevertheless builds on the work of theorists with undeniably 
positivist views regarding its application. Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King count 
among the latter, who base their philosophies of nonviolence on spiritual ideas such as the 
Hindu and Buddhist ahimsa, the Christian ‘turning of the other cheek’, and, as Abu-Nimer 
(2000-2001) has amply demonstrated, Islamic precepts like social justice and the equality of 
mankind. Gandhi’s fundamental philosophy was, in the words of Flinders (1997:156), to 
“transform the opponent, drawing him in as a participant and beneficiary in the solution.” To 
this point of view, nonviolent resistance works most importantly by making its opponent realize 
the errors of his ways and helping him overcome old tendencies of hatred and violence. While 
commendable, this approach to conflict resolution is probably not very common, and will 
undoubtedly sound very naïve and ineffectual to many people – particularly those who are 
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currently engaged in bitter and protracted conflict with entrenched opponents. Furthermore, one 
can always question motives and argue over who was ‘really’ of a nonviolent persuasion and 
who merely used nonviolence as a means to an end. For these reasons, it will not be required 
that you ‘love thine enemy’ to be counted as nonviolent in the context of this study, only that 
you employ nonviolent methods. This paper will thus regard nonviolent resistance as something 
like a residual category, encompassing any form of macro level collective political action that 
does not employ violent sanctions. Few cases of political struggle are purely nonviolent, 
moreover, and methods both violent and nonviolent are often forced to coexist. This tends to 
weaken the impact of the nonviolent struggle, but does not exclude a case from analysis unless 
the violence reaches such proportions so as to constitute the main form of resistance. 
2.1.1 Nonviolent action 
With a pragmatic view of nonviolence, nonviolent action is undertaken simply for the reason 
that it may in some contexts “be more effective than violent action in promoting social and 
political change” (Schock 2005:37). At the most general level, the term nonviolent action may 
thus encompass any and all political agency that refrains from violent attacks on groups and 
individuals. It is however common to exclude more institutionalized forms of politics such as 
election campaigns or referenda in established democracies from the term, and to emphasize 
collective rather than individual actors (Schock 2003). 
 
According to Sharp (2005:39), nonviolent action is fundamentally “a technique of action by 
which the population can restrict and sever the sources of power of their rulers or other 
oppressors and mobilize their own power potential into effective power.” This technique is 
delineated into three broad classes of methods: 1) protest and persuasion; 2) noncooperation; 
and 3) nonviolent intervention. The first aims essentially at communication and awareness-
raising, making the regime and the populace aware not only of the existence of an alternative 
point of view but also the extent to which it is held. Demonstrations, rallies and mass meetings 
are the classic means of such communication, but it would also include mass campaigns via 
print, broadcast or electronic media. 
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Methods of noncooperation involve the withdrawal of cooperation or participation in selected 
areas of political, economic or social life with the intention to disrupt its daily continuation. 
Labor strikes and consumer boycotts seek to disconcert capital interests and thus perhaps cause 
a split between political and economic elites; social ostracism of regime collaborators seeks to 
upset social life and force people to reconsider their priorities; and civil disobedience aims at the 
direct interruption of political life. Sharp (ibid:55-61) counts a total of more than one hundred 
specific methods of noncooperation. 
 
Finally, the methods of intervention take a step further, seeking to disrupt normal operations not 
by withdrawal of participation but by active interposition. This is a rather more confrontational 
form of political agency, accomplishing its task either by blocking the operations of existing 
institutions via sit-ins, land occupation and perhaps sabotage, or by developing parallel 
institutions like street courts and local governments. 
2.2 Nonviolent dynamics 
Having established what nonviolent action is, I now turn to the rather more complex question of 
how it works. The starting point is that campaigns of nonviolent political action achieve their 
aims through a transformation of the dynamics of power. Unlike violent insurgency, it does not 
attempt to challenge the “monopoly of violence” inherent to the state apparatus (Rokkan 1987), 
but rather to enforce a change of the battlefield. When successfully applied, it will force the 
regime to meet its challenge in a battle where the decisive factor is not military power but 
legitimacy, and where the application of violent repression is often useless and sometimes worse 
than useless.1 
 
Sharp (2005:415-421) describes four basic routes to victory for nonviolent activists: conversion, 
accommodation, nonviolent coercion and disintegration. Conversion works, in true Gandhian 
fashion, by bringing the opponent to change his mind so as to agree with his challengers. Having 
been confronted with the overwhelming moral force of the protesters he loses his self-legitimacy 
                                                 
1 This change of battlefield, of course, is generally not in the interest of the regime, which tends to hold a strong 
hand in any contest involving military force. Thus it must be expected that any opponent challenged by nonviolent 
action will attempt to negate this introduction of a new battlefield. “Because of the special difficulties of repressing 
a nonviolent resistance movement,” says Sharp (1973:586), “the opponent may seek to ease them by attributing 
violence to the nonviolent actionists.” 
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and is thus no longer able to justify his grasp on power to himself. This may seem overly 
optimistic to any observer of international realpolitik, and it is indeed not a very frequent 
outcome. There are however cases where such a dynamic may be pointed to, and it invariably 
leads to profound changes. 
 
Accommodation is the outcome where the regime realizes it is in its own interest to negotiate 
with its challengers. This may often involve a regime yielding on certain bread-and-butter issues 
as a means of deflecting demands for regime change, but it may also lead to a pacted transition 
of power, where the political elite via negotiations reserves the right to certain privileges or 
immunities. This outcome is possible when the regime observes that it has lost much of its 
popular and international legitimacy, and realizes that a violent clampdown would only make 
matters worse. 
 
Nonviolent coercion goes one step further: here the disruption of public life and the defiance of 
the regime’s authority reach such proportions as to make the regime powerless in the face of the 
protesters’ demands. Ordering the army or riot police to crack down on protesters is thus no 
longer a viable option, as it would most likely lead to widespread mutiny. Finally, Sharp’s 
fourth route to success is when the pressures from the nonviolent sanctions cause the regime’s 
power structure to simply disintegrate.  
 
In addition to these four paths to success, however, there are also a number of paths leading to 
the opposite outcome. This brings us closer to the research question for this paper, which is to 
explain why some movements walk down the paths to victory and others those to defeat. Before 
discussing the set of hypotheses that will be tested in this paper, I will briefly outline some 
perspectives obtained from extant literature. 
2.2.1 Social movement theory 
The study of nonviolent action is in many respects a subfield of the literature on social 
movements. Tarrow (2003 [1998]:2) defines social movements as “sequences of contentious 
politics that are based on underlying social networks and resonant collective action frames, and 
which develop the capacity to maintain sustained challenges against powerful opponents”. To 
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succeed, a campaign of nonviolent resistance must first of all become a social movement; in 
other words, it must succeed in mobilizing popular support.2 For a movement to emerge, it must 
have a cause to fight for, and the most fundamental requirement is thus the existence of a 
political, social or economic conflict. Tension and discontent do not in themselves suffice, 
however: there must be a channel or mobilizing structure through which they can flow into 
manifestation as a movement. This is the focus of resource mobilization theory, which sees 
movements as rational, purposeful and organized actions (Tilly 1978) that will succeed to the 
extent that they “are able to organize discontent, reduce the costs of action, utilize and create 
solidarity networks, share incentives among members, and achieve external consensus” (della 
Porta and Diani 2006:15). 
 
Both material resources like work and money and nonmaterial resources like authority and 
moral engagement need to be mobilized. As Schock (2005:27) puts it: “For the oppressed to 
engage in collective action, there must first be cognitive liberation, that is, a diminution of 
fatalism coupled with a perception that conditions are unjust, yet subject to change through 
collective action”. Analysis of this symbolic dimension often utilizes Goffman’s (1974) notion 
of frames or ‘schemata of interpretation’, and through the process known as frame alignment the 
fledging movement must link its activities, goals and ideologies with the public’s sentiments and 
interests (Snow, Rochford, Worden and Benford 1986). Frame alignment necessarily requires 
that the movement communicates with the public, and mass media access is for this reason a 
crucial factor.3 When successful, the public will find itself in normative agreement with the 
goals of the movement and find it worthwhile to sacrifice their time, money and perhaps 
personal safety in order to support it. 
 
An emerging social movement is also dependent on favorable social and political contexts. If a 
state is known to crack down on protest with ruthless violence, this obviously raises the cost of 
participation and complicates the organization of a movement. A typical opportunity for 
successful protest is thus when a regime is trying to mend its ways by introducing measures of 
                                                 
2 This is not exactly true: sometimes – although rarely, and under special circumstances – nonviolent protest may 
succeed simply due to its threatening potential of becoming a social movement. 
3 Tarrow (2003 [1998]:53) identifies the rise of print media and literacy – along with new forms of association – as 
a major cause of the flourishing social movements from the 18th century onwards. 
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liberalization, as it will then be less inclined to use violent means of dispersing protest. Tarrow 
(2003 [1998]:73-76) uses the example of the late 1980s Soviet Union, where Gorbachev’s 
liberalization of the regime resulted in a surge of contentious politics. In the literature on 
democratic transitions, regime liberalization is regarded as a primary and perhaps even 
necessary precondition for a transition from autocracy to democracy (Przeworski 1992). Other 
significant political opportunities may include splits in the political elite, breakdown of 
international alliances or emerging support from third parties.  
 
Religion is one often neglected factor of social movement emergence. According to Smith 
(1996:9), the perhaps “most potent motivational leverage that a social-movement can enjoy is 
the alignment of its cause with the ultimacy and sacredness associated with God’s will”. Along 
with nationalism it is a common source of movement frames, as both provide useful symbolism 
and are reliable sources of mobilizing emotion (Tarrow 2003 [1998]:111-112). Religion is also a 
source of organizational resources and charismatic leadership (Smith 1996:13-17). 
2.2.2 Nonviolent action literature 
Theorists on nonviolent action have tended to emphasize strategic choice as the factor 
determining protest outcome. Seeing the protest movement as the nonviolent equivalent of a 
military campaign, they have sought to establish strategic guidelines that facilitate a successful 
outcome. The undisputed leader of this field is Gene Sharp (1973; 2005) – known as the ‘von 
Clausewitz of nonviolent warfare’ – and his fundamental point is that political power cannot be 
maintained over time solely on the basis of violence. He recognizes that authority or legitimacy 
is one of the most important sources of political power, and that the need to maintain such 
legitimacy is a point of vulnerability. Identifying where its opponent has a weak claim to 
legitimacy and focusing on that point is thus conducive to success for the nonviolent movement. 
 
The basic point in Sharp’s manual of strategy thus relates to the classic maxim of military 
strategy: attack where the enemy is weak. “Campaign strategies need to be designed to utilize 
the strengths of the resisters to expose and attack the opponents’ vulnerabilities and weaknesses, 
while avoiding engagement of the opponents at their strongest and most defensible points” 
(2005:482). Choosing nonviolent over violent methods of action is in itself an application of this 
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maxim, for most governments have well-funded institutions assessing security threats and 
planning military responses, and are generally competent at handling such matters. Their forces 
have air support, armored divisions, training and combat experience. Combating armed 
insurrections is as such something they do well, but nonviolent resistance constitutes the choice 
of a battlefield outside their area of expertise.  
 
Violence from the resisters will weaken their cause, claims Sharp. It will legitimize their 
opponent’s use of violent repression against the resistance movement and erode the movement’s 
stature in the eyes of society and the world. The use of violence causes a shift of attention away 
from the broader issues at hand and toward the violent acts themselves. “If the nonviolent group 
switches to violence, it has, in effect, consented to fight on the opponent’s own terms and with 
weapons where most of the advantages lie with him” (Sharp 1973:601). 
 
Violence on the part of the opponent may often have a similar effect. “When brutal repression is 
inflicted on strictly nonviolent resisters, this can cause the opponents to be exposed in the worst 
possible light” (Sharp 2005:406).4 Rather than destroying the resistance movement, the 
brutalities may inflame it. One possible consequence is thus an increased support for the 
movement both locally and globally, and possibly even within the regime or opponent group. 
This dynamic does not take place when the protesters use violent means themselves, however: 
according to Coser (1966:17), regime violence may be condoned “when there exists, or seems to 
exist, a rough equivalence between the means used by both sides.” 
 
Sharp’s theories have been criticized for their emphasis on agency and voluntarism and their 
neglect of structural fundamentals (see Schock 2005 for an overview of this critique).5 In his 
own study of nonviolent movements, which compares four successful cases with two failures, 
Schock elaborates on Sharp’s work by integrating structural and agency-related factors, 
emphasizing both the extent of globalization and the media situation as causally important. The 
                                                 
4 Coser (1966:16) concurs, finding that “violent tactics of suppression tend to be much less successful when used 
against people who are publicly committed to the principle of nonviolence.” 
5 This in contrast to social movement theory, which provides mainly structural explanations for the emergence of 
social movements and has been criticized as being overly deterministic. “While most would agree that there is a 
constantly evolving process by which movements respond to and shape the political context, the social movement 
literature has tended to emphasize the former and neglect the latter” (Schock 2005:35). 
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integration of a state into the international system of states may give foreign actors enough 
leverage to influence its actions, and open media channels enable a movement to “produce and 
receive accurate information”, thus increasing its capacity to sustain repression (Schock 
2005:154-156).6 Note that in both cases there remains a window for ‘voluntarism’, in the sense 
that even if a state is highly isolated a social movement within that state may seek to embed 
itself in transnational networks, and in the absence of a free media one may develop 
underground media channels. 
 
Schock’s (2005:144) research also indicates that a protest movement is less susceptible to 
repression if it combines a variety of protest methods rather than relying exclusively on one or 
two.  This makes the movement less predictable and “diffuses the state’s repression, thereby 
lessening its effectiveness”. 
2.2.3 Democratization literature 
Nonviolent mass agency has during the past decades become an increasingly important vector 
for the establishment of democratic regimes, and it seems plausible that the causes of successful 
democratization identified in the transitions literature are relevant to the study of movement 
outcomes. Generally speaking we may identify three generations of democratization studies, the 
first of which emphasized structural factors, particularly those relating to the economy. 
Modernization theory thus predicted economic growth as a facilitator for democracy via such 
factors as increased education, an expanded middle class etc. (Lipset 1959). 
 
Theorists of the second generation broke away from this tendency towards structural 
determinism. Their focus was on political agency, seeing strategic interactions and pacts 
between the elites of the regime and the opposition as a primary path to democratic success 
(e.g., O'Donnell and Schmitter 1986). Finally, as Hegelians would predict, the third generation 
of explanations have sought to synthesize or integrate factors of structure and agency so as to 
explain the phenomenon of democratization more fully (Mahoney and Snyder 2000 provide a 
list of references for this literature). The perspective here is that long-term structural factors set 
                                                 
6 Martin and Varney (2003:213) similarly find that “Communication is central to the effectiveness of nonviolent 
action”. 
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the stage for a possible ‘opening’ of the regime, which must in turn be acted upon by skillful 
players – individuals and organizations – to result in a transition.  
 
In general, the literature on democratization has tended to disparage mass action and extol the 
efficacy of elite pacts. Giugni (1998:xii) finds democratization to be a surprisingly poorly 
studied outcome of social movements, and according to Collier (1999:8, emphasis in original) 
the dominant framework of democratization analysis “has tended to privilege certain kinds of 
actors: individual elites rather than collective actors, strategically defined actors rather than 
class-defined actors, and state actors more than societal actors”. The traditional understanding 
of how mass action influences a transition to democracy, as summed up by Haynes (2001:25-
26), is that “while authoritarian regimes may be overthrown by mass mobilization, this is not 
likely to result in their replacement by stable liberal democratic regimes.” This view is however 
based on the third wave of transitions taking place for the most part in Southern Europe and 
Latin America during the Cold War, and is perhaps somewhat outdated.7 McFaul (2002:222) 
compared those transitions with the fourth wave democratizations in postcommunist countries, 
finding that the “mass actors so damaging to democratization in the third wave were 
instrumental in its success in the fourth wave.” In my own view the observed discrepancy is 
symptomatic of a disregard for the impact of contextual factors. During the Cold War mass 
uprisings were probably in large part linked with class action and the communist enemy, and 
resulted as such in a demand for repression both from national elites and from Washington (and 
Langley). In post-Soviet republics, by contrast, the troll of communism would seem rather less 
intimidating and there would be more room for the exercise of ‘people power’. 
 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the factors which contribute to the destruction of one political 
regime do not necessarily serve to guarantee the stable implementation of another. O’Donnell 
and Schmitter (1986:65) warn that “an active, militant, and highly mobilized popular upsurge 
may be an efficacious instrument for bringing down a dictatorship but may make subsequent 
                                                 
7 According to Wood (2000:16), “the initial cases of the ‘third wave’ occurred in Latin America and southern 
Europe in the wake of military rule and were largely cases of elite-led democratization, in contrast to later 
transitions in Eastern Europe and Africa, where popular protest played a much more significant role. This led to an 
initial emphasis on elite bargaining not borne out by the later expanded universe of cases.” 
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democratic consolidation difficult”, and the point is well taken for cases like Thailand and the 
Philippines that once underwent transitions to democracy via nonviolent collective action. 
 
Finally, several transition scholars have noted that election fraud in pseudodemocratic regimes 
may serve as a rallying point for pro-democracy protests (Thompson and Kuntz 2004). 
According to Fairbanks (2004:114), “Students of democratization should attend more closely to 
instances of election fraud as moments when prodemocratic forces can expose the underlying 
illegitimacy that plagues pseudodemocracy”.  
2.2.4 The psychology of authoritarianism 
A fourth literature that serves to inform this study is that on psychological authoritarianism. The 
focus of this literature is the human tendency of submission to people of authority and power – 
an inclination going back perhaps to the animal instinct of subservience to the ‘alpha male’ of 
the group. This tendency has been demonstrated most famously by Milgram (1974), and 
constitutes an obvious obstacle to the manifestation of a successful political opposition 
movement. 
 
Theorizing on the question of why people so eagerly submit to authority goes back at least as far 
as Kant (1991 [1784]), who pointed to the convenience of conformity. Rather than thinking for 
oneself, people lazily put their trust in authorities and thus relieve themselves both of the 
responsibility of their actions and of the effort involved in figuring things out on their own. This 
leads to a vicious circle wherein the authorities take the people’s lack of ‘maturity’ or autonomy 
as a justification for withholding civil liberties, thus reinforcing the tendency of immaturity. In 
effect, a psychological attachment to authority is instilled in the populace, making it “difficult 
for each separate individual to work his way out of the immaturity which has become almost 
second nature to him. He has even grown fond of it and is really incapable for the time being of 
using his own understanding, because he was never allowed to make the attempt” (ibid:54). 
 
In the 20th century, the pioneers of psychological research on authoritarianism sought in 
particular to explain the Nazi rise to power within a framework of social psychology (Adorno, 
Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson and Sanford 1950; Reich 1970 [1933]). Emphasizing the effects 
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of authoritarian socialization, one argued that times of crisis would actualize the potential for 
authoritarian behavior inculcated via socialization and so bring people in line with the political 
right. 
 
Contemporary research has refined these early theories, positing authoritarianism as a syndrome 
of personality traits inherent to those whose childhood stunted the development of the ability to 
cope individually with stressful situations. Such individuals find security and comfort in taking 
refuge in authorities, internalizing the latter’s norms and value systems (Oesterreich 2005:283-
286). Psychological authoritarianism is often delineated into three main dimensions: (1) 
Submission to authorities; (2) Aggression towards people deviating from in-group norms; and 
(3) Conventionalism and conformity8 (Altemeyer 1988; Duckitt 1989). In quiet times the trait 
may lie dormant, only to be awakened by the emergence of more hostile circumstances. 
 
Threat, say Stellmacher and Petzel (2005:248), “seems to activate authoritarian behaviors in 
persons who already possess authoritarian dispositions”. This is what Inglehart (2000:69) calls 
the ‘Authoritarian Reflex’, where “insecurity is conducive […] to a need for strong authority 
figures to protect one from threatening forces”. The exact nature of such threat may vary, one 
obvious example being challenges to the security of the state. More generally, the existence of 
deviant social or political groups may be perceived as threatening and thus activate the 
authoritarian response – and so, according to Feldman (2003:50), may any behavior challenging 
“the government’s ability to enforce compliance with social rules and regulations.”  
 
To sum up, there will in most societies be segments of the populace disposed towards 
authoritarian behavior and thus inclined to support the regime for no other reason than its being 
in power.9 Social or international conflict will actualize this behavior. For the nonviolent 
resistance movement, these are factors it must take into consideration as significant influences 
on its chances for success. Times of conflict will reduce its mobilization potential, and while the 
                                                 
8 It is debatable whether this third dimension should be seen as integral to the concept of authoritarianism or as a 
correlate to it (see Feldman 2003). 
9 “The authoritarian believes that authorities should be trusted to a relatively great extent and that they are owed 
obedience and respect. […] Authoritarians would ordinarily place very narrow limits on people’s right to criticize 
authorities. They tend to believe that officials know what is best and that critics do not know what they are talking 
about” (Altemeyer 1988:4). 
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movement cannot directly influence or change social tension, it can at least strive to present 
itself in as non-threatening a manner as possible. An adherence to nonviolence is obviously 
helpful in this regard, and when conducting protest activities one may perhaps also be advised to 
restrain tendencies toward blatant deviations from social norms and rules that will alienate more 
conventional members of the public that might otherwise have been sympathetic to the protest. 
2.2.5 The theory of Winning Without Fighting 
In nature, might makes right. In human society the opposite sometimes holds: those who are 
perceived to speak the truth, and whose demands are deemed legitimate and righteous, may gain 
popular and international support and become mighty. This is the fundamental factor in 
determining the success or failure of nonviolent struggle: the organizers must have a cause or 
grievance on which they can mobilize, and the opponent must be perceived as lacking 
legitimacy and authority. Where the opponent enjoys widespread recognition and the resisters 
lack a good cause, their offensive is doomed: they will fail to gain much support, and when they 
make their stand, few in numbers, the police will put them away with no particular difficulty and 
to no one’s great alarm. 
 
Having briefly outlined those literatures most relevant to explaining the outcome of nonviolent 
protest, I will now proceed to integrate their respective insights into a general theory of what 
makes nonviolent action work. Note that part of this variance in outcome is clearly random: one 
disgruntled soldier firing a first shot may set off a massacre, or one soldier refusing to fire set 
off a mutiny. The basic hypothesis of this paper is however that some of the variance may 
indeed be predicted. Every act of collective protest takes place within a specific social and 
historic context: the protest group has a reason for its action, and the opponents have a need to 
maintain a degree of legitimacy, limiting their range of available responses. History sets 
precedents and geopolitical situations impose needs. Some strategies have a history of success, 
while others have repeatedly failed. Note that I will not specifically address the issue of why 
nonviolent movements emerge, which is commonly the focus of social movement theorists.10 
                                                 
10 Social movement theory focuses on emergence rather than outcome partly for the reason that it in large part 
concerns itself with vast and amorphous movements with diffuse objectives, such as women’s and gay rights 
movements etc. In the present study, by contrast, the focus is on political opposition movements with clear and 
precise demands relating to changes of policy or political regime. 
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This study takes the existence of a social movement with strong nonviolent components for 
granted, explaining only its likely outcome. 
 
Nevertheless it is clear that the factors contributing to the emergence of a social movement also 
contribute to its outcome. The first requirement for successful nonviolent political action is thus 
the presence of political conflict to which the budding movement can offer a convincing 
solution. In one way or another the movement must mobilize public support and thus gain the 
leverage over its opponent that it requires in order to achieve its objectives. There is, of course, 
an endless variety of means through which this may be accomplished, and no general hypothesis 
of what serves to mobilize popular support can be attempted. What one can however say is that 
mobilization requires communication, and that the fledgling movement cannot succeed without 
finding a way to disseminate its message to the public.  
 
Social movement theorists teach us to emphasize the political context in which a movement 
emerges. No movement is an island; rather it emerges as a response to a specific political 
situation and must be understood on that basis. The nonviolent action literature emphasizes the 
other side of the equation: movements are not only puppets at the strings of the overarching 
structural context, but may also serve to reshape that context. These two perspectives to some 
extent resemble the first and second generations of democratization research, and the integrative 
approach of the third generation provides the solution that will be employed in this paper. 
 
On the contextual side, we learn from the democratization literature to emphasize the economy 
as an explanatory variable. From nonviolent action theory we learn that authority or legitimacy 
is perhaps the most important source of power – and, as will be argued below, economic 
performance is a primary source of political legitimacy. Also of importance is the international 
context and the media situation. Finally, the research on authoritarianism teaches us that social 
conflict may activate the ‘authoritarian reflex’, and that high-threat conflict situations do as such 
constitute a poor context for successful nonviolent action. 
 
Regarding strategic choice, nonviolent action scholars predict negative results from the use of 
violence, particularly on the part of the opposition movement. The political context, if favorable, 
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must be exploited through intelligent strategies, or its impact may remain dormant. If 
unfavorable, it may to some extent be reshaped and transformed through the actions of the 
movement, or otherwise a way must be found to work around it. 
 
Based on the above insights into the efficacy of nonviolent action campaigns, I will designate 
the following five variables as predictors of protest outcomes: 1) regime legitimacy; 2) protest 
group violence; 3) regime violence; 4) mass media penetration; and 5) religious authority. Their 
predicted influence is as follows: 
 
1) Regime legitimacy. This is the primary structural variable of the study, and is constructed as 
an index of several of the abovementioned causally relevant contextual factors. A thorough 
delineation of the sources of regime legitimacy is offered below, but three core components are 
the political mythology of the regime, its performance with regard to the economy and in 
relations with other states, and the degree of support it enjoys among the international system of 
states and trans-state actors. Legitimacy is regarded as a strong predictor of protest success, as a 
political regime lacking legitimacy facilitates opposition mobilization and is constrained in its 
range of viable responses.  
 
2) Protest group violence. Theorists on nonviolence all seem to agree that outbreaks of violent 
attacks in the midst of a nonviolent campaign will serve to weaken that campaign. For Galtung 
(2000:85), the outbreak of hostilities is an obvious opportunity for the authorities to introduce 
some violent sanctions of their own. According to Sharp (2005:390), resistance violence will 
legitimize their opponent’s use of violent repression against the resistance movement and erode 
the movement’s stature in the eyes of society and the world. The use of violence causes a shift 
of attention away from the broader issues at hand and toward the violent acts themselves. In a 
similar vein, Ackerman and Duvall (2000:457-468) denounce the ‘mythology of violence’ 
which presumes that violence can serve as an agent for popular empowerment and freedom. 
Altemeyer’s (1988:308) experimental research on authoritarianism finds that “Violent left-wing 
threats will drive people considerably to the right, making them more authoritarian-aggressive in 
particular,” observing a similar but smaller effect for right-wing threats. Finally, from a 
perspective of social movement theory, Tarrow (2003 [1998]:95) finds that violence “turns into 
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a liability when potential allies become frightened, elites regroup in the name of social peace, 
and the forces of order learn to respond to it.” Rarely if ever in the course of the 20th century has 
an armed popular insurgency resulted in lasting freedom and democracy;11 rather common, 
however, is the ‘symbiotic relationship’ between governments and guerillas pointed to in early 
1980s Chile, where “Pinochet’s tenure ensured terror from the far left, and violence gave him 
the excuse to enforce that tenure” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:289). 
 
3) Regime violence. The use of violent suppression through military force may have 
contradictory effects on the protest outcome depending on other factors. In some cases, a violent 
clampdown will succeed in scattering the protest movement to the winds, effectively 
terminating its campaign. One example of this outcome is the Tiananmen Square incident of 
1989. In other cases, however, the clampdown succeeded only in inflaming the populace (and 
the world) and thus weakening the regime’s position. This is what Sharp (2005:47) calls 
‘political jiu-jitsu’, where repression ends up weakening not the protesters but the repressive 
regime itself.12 It is a dynamic discernible in all the epic nonviolent action campaigns of the 20th 
century, among them the independence movement in India, the US civil rights campaign and the 
South African struggle against apartheid. According to Barkan (1984, in Schock 2005:43), civil 
rights activists in the American south “were more likely to succeed when whites responded with 
violence to nonviolent protest, especially when the violence was reported nationally.” 
 
The last part of Barkan’s statement hints at one factor which can explain why violent repression 
is sometimes an effective and other time a countereffective regime strategy: the media situation. 
If the regime can clamp down on protesters without the general population or the world 
knowing much about it, the repression will probably be successful.13 A second factor relates to 
regime legitimacy: Should a regime whose legitimacy is in question clamp down violently on 
                                                 
11 Unless one counts the self-proclaimed democratic republics of communist states. The above statement refers to 
violent insurgency ‘from below’; elite-controlled violence has a mixed track record and has proven to work in at 
least some cases, such as the allied-imposed post-WWII democracies of Germany and Japan and the rare 
democracy-inducing military coup in Portugal 1974. 
12 Altemeyer (1988:310) calls it the ‘Gandhi trap’, finding that “When governments try to suppress peaceful protest 
movements with force, they appear to trigger a backlash against themselves.” 
13 Coser (1966:16) observes that in the US civil rights movement “modes of control involving the extralegal uses of 
violence worked well as long as the acts in question could be committed with a minimum of publicity and visibility. 
They became suicidal when they were performed under the glare of television cameras and under the observation of 
reporters for national newspapers and magazines.” 
 21 
nonviolent protesters this may serve as a ‘last straw’ for many people and thus galvanize support 
the protest. A regime with a high level of legitimacy will by contrast find it much easier to brand 
the protesters as troublemakers and thus gain the explicit or implicit support for a crackdown 
both in society and abroad. 
 
4) Mass media penetration. As noted for item 3 above, a way of spreading the news is necessary 
to avoid letting the regime get away with murder. A generally free media situation obviously 
suffices, as does an established network of underground media. Without such independent lines 
of communication, however, regime atrocities may fail to incense the populace and the world 
for the simple reason that they remain unknown. 
 
More generally, nonviolent action does in many respects center around a battle for legitimacy. 
The opposition movement claims that the regime or its policies are illegitimate and seek to 
publicize this claim as widely as possible in order to mobilize support. The regime, in turn, will 
question the legitimacy of the protests and attempt to brand its critics as traitors and 
troublemakers. Popular legitimacy is essentially a question of public perception, and where the 
regime has full control of the official media and the protest movement fails to establish a 
functional alternative, the political struggle will certainly be an uphill one. Mass media access is 
thus predicted as contributing to protest success. 
 
5) Religious authority. A cursory overview of the history of nonviolent action will readily 
divulge the fact that religion has often played a pivotal part. Gandhi was a Hindu reformer and 
saint, Martin Luther King Jr. a Christian preacher and Desmond Tutu an Anglican Archbishop, 
and the Solidarity movement in Poland was in large part set off by a visit from Pope John Paul 
II. It seems obvious that religious leaders come more easily to a measure of charismatic 
authority than do those of a secular office, and furthermore the religion itself may serve to 
bridge social divides between groups of disparate standing and interests. Appealing to an older 
social order, such as Hinduism in British-run India and Catholicism in communist Poland, gives 
credence to the idea that the present social order may be a temporary aberration. Religion may 
also provide a movement with the moral authority which can persuade the public that its 
demands are legitimate (frame alignment), and which can convince protest participants to 
 22 
maintain nonviolent discipline. In the words of Sharp (1973:577-578, emphasis in original), “If 
the goals and means of struggle are, or can be, related to deep religious or philosophical 
convictions already held by the participants and the wider population, their resolve and morale 
are likely to be stronger.” 
2.3 Political legitimacy 
The fundamental insight behind the strategy of nonviolent action is that power on a political 
level requires legitimacy. An analysis of the roots of political legitimacy is as such a central 
concern for this project, and the following section will discuss various definitions of the concept 
of legitimacy, as well as its sources and the mechanisms through which it may be gained. 
2.3.1 Delineation 
As a point of departure we may say with Kraus (2004:195) that “Political legitimacy is a kind of 
public illusion, a shared and often fragile understanding that a regime is somehow appropriate, 
fitting, and in some vague sense a part of the natural order of things.” For a typology of political 
legitimacy, the natural starting point is Weber’s (1964 [1947]:328) famous classification of 
legitimacy into three basic types: traditional, charismatic and legal-rational. This typology is of 
course much debated (Stillman 1974; Grafstein 1981), and authors such as Matheson (1987) 
have expanded upon Weber’s work, identifying eight sources of legitimacy: convention, 
contract, universal principles, sacredness, expertise, popular approval, personal ties and personal 
qualities. 
 
Weber’s typology deals specifically with popular legitimacy, but we may also regard legitimacy 
as residing in varying extent among different levels of social systems. Stillman (1974:42) 
identifies four such levels of systems that must be taken into consideration, including in addition 
to society itself the international system and groups and individuals within society, while 
Hjellum (1997:4-5) speaks of self-legitimacy (within the regime), popular legitimacy (in 
society) and external legitimacy (in the international system of states). A regime lacking popular 
legitimacy may thus nevertheless find a sufficient level of support via its international 
connections, and similarly it may enjoy a high degree of legitimacy in the eyes of its own 
bureaucracy and military apparatus.  
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The following exposition of regime legitimacy is an adaptation of Hjellum’s typology, which 
intersects the three levels of social systems with three general sources of legitimacy: political 
mythology, institutionalization of myths and political performance.  
2.3.2 Political mythology 
Political mythology gives a regime a legitimate claim to power through the ideas or myths that it 
represents. Thus the ‘democratic myth’ is that political power should somehow represent the 
will of a majority of the people; the ‘communist myth’ that the political elite is the vanguard of 
the revolution and caretaker of workers’ rights and needs; and the ‘fascist myth’ would require 
from rulers that they provide strong leadership in uncertain times, along with a nationalist 
component demanding the exaltation (or restoration) of the nation’s glory.14 These myths are not 
uncommonly combined, with autocratic rulers holding carefully controlled elections in attempt 
to gain some democratic credentials, or presidential candidates assuming the airs of ‘the great 
leader’ in order to benefit from latent authoritarian and nationalist tendencies in the electorate 
(O'Donnell 1994 describes such tendencies in Latin American 'delegative democracies'). 
 
We may also speak of an aura of mythology surrounding the inception of a political regime. The 
democratic regime of the USA, for instance, clearly possesses a strong myth of inception in the 
heroic struggle for independence from the British Empire and the drafting of its constitution. 
The bravery of the budding political elite in the face of danger and adversity can easily become 
‘the stuff myths are made from’, serving both present and future governments within the 
political regime with a mythological basis for  staying in power. The availability of enemies 
both past and present greatly facilitates the construction of such a mythology, increasing the 
historical drama and allowing the elite to recount and publish widely their heroic struggle 
against evil forces finally defeated through immense hardship and bravery (see Volkan 1985 for 
the psychological benefits of having enemies). Most preferably the evil forces should somehow 
have survived their defeat so as to continue to pose a threat in the present day, allowing the elite 
of the regime a perpetual enemy against whom they may mobilize the nation for an epic 
                                                 
14 Cf. Duckitt (1989:78): “[S]ocial movements such as fascism, characterized by an authoritarian identification with 
the society or nation, should tend to be particularly likely to emerge after humiliating military defeats or during 
crises seriously threatening the integrity or status of the nation or society”. 
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struggle. Newfound enemies may however suffice as a substitute, especially if they somehow 
function as an extension of the original enemy.15 
2.3.3 Institutionalization of myths 
Institutions provide the manifestation of political myths in practical terms. Without such 
institutionalization the regime’s claim to legitimacy via mythology may not seem very 
convincing, as many autocrats holding rigged elections in search of democratic legitimacy have 
discovered. Thus a democratic regime has a claim to legitimate power by providing 
governments with a mandate from a majority or plurality of the voting population in free and 
fair elections, and a fascist regime by maintaining powerful military forces that can serve to 
guard the nation from its enemies. Communist regimes did for a while enjoy some legitimacy 
through the institutionalization of the international workers’ struggle (known during its main 
period as the Cold War), but generally suffered a legitimacy problem for the reason that its myth 
of the workers’ paradise lacked a strong foundation as institutional reality. The rise of Solidarity 
in Poland made this discrepancy between mythology and reality clear to all, and was for this 
reason a crippling blow to communist legitimacy. 
2.3.4 Performance 
A third source of regime legitimacy relates to the political achievements of the regime. This is a 
claim to legitimacy of power based not on any inherent right to govern, but simply on the fact 
that one does a good job of it. Performance legitimacy rests perhaps most importantly on the 
state of the economy: as long as unemployment is down and wages are up, people enjoy their 
increasing wealth and may be inclined to regard themselves as stakeholders in the regime. 
Performance in wars or other power games on the international stage may also significantly 
affect the perception of a regime’s legitimacy. 
  
Some authors contend that regimes will only gain performance legitimacy from social 
improvements that take place as a direct consequence of their policies. Shue (2004:29), 
discussing specifically the present-day Chinese regime, insists it can only claim to have imposed 
the stability in which the economy can thrive, rather than being responsible for the economic 
                                                 
15 An example would be Soviet communists first overcoming capitalist enemies at home and thereupon extending 
the fight to capitalists abroad. 
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boom itself. While this is a valid point, I believe it is quite beyond the capabilities of most 
citizens to determine who is really responsible for economic upturns. Come election time, no 
politician of a democratic country ever fails to claim responsibility for a booming economy, and 
the electorate for its part undoubtedly punishes the government for rain and rewards it for 
sunshine. Whether good results obtain from luck or skill is as such largely immaterial from a 
legitimacy perspective. 
2.3.5 Elite legitimacy 
The perhaps most vital component to the maintenance of a political regime is the belief of the 
political elite itself that its hold on power is in some way legitimate. A regime may survive a 
lack of popular recognition of its claim to legitimacy, but if the regime stops believing in its own 
virtue it will soon enough collapse (Di Palma, in Thompson 2001:65). Self-deception being 
however an easily attained skill, self-legitimacy is for the most part readily available and hard to 
lose; often it may require little more than a generous measure of autobiography. As an example, 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986:34) speak about the notorious Latin-American caudillos who 
“cannot imagine that the country could do without their services”.  
2.3.6 Popular legitimacy 
The legitimacy of the political regime in the eyes of the general populace is the most commonly 
observed aspect of regime legitimacy, and is what Weber (1964 [1947]) emphasized in his 
famous analysis of authority. Popular legitimacy is achieved in full when the regime succeeds in 
‘selling’ its grand narrative of origin and destiny to the masses, builds institutions and makes 
policies to fulfill its mission, and has successes to boast of.  
 
Psychological authoritarianism may also contribute to the legitimacy of an authoritarian regime. 
First of all, people with strongly authoritarian instincts may effectively see political power as 
self-legitimizing, in the sense that those in power are regarded as legitimate rulers who should 
be obeyed simply for the reason that they wield political power. More importantly, in situations 
of conflict with external actors, the ‘authoritarian reflex’ often causes a nation tends to ‘rally 
around the flag’, which translates into an increase in regime legitimacy. In the presence of social 
conflict – between ethnic, religious or economic groups – an authoritarian leader will usually be 
able to play one against the other and mobilize support from the groups he belongs to or is 
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perceived as a protector of. Thus, says Duckitt (1989:78), “one would expect authoritarian 
regimes and the more ready acceptance of such regimes in societies with severe internal 
divisions and/or external threats”. 
2.3.7 External legitimacy 
Support from abroad is an increasingly important component of regime legitimacy. The world is 
becoming ever more interconnected in economic, cultural and political terms, and a regime able 
to establish itself as a necessary cog in the machinery of the stable global order will inevitably 
gain a measure of external legitimacy. On the level of political mythology, regimes support each 
other because of compatible ideology or – perhaps more importantly – common enemies. 
During the Cold War, Latin American dictatorships gained the support of Western democracies 
because of their usefulness in containing the spread of communism, and similarly the Musharraf 
regime in Pakistan and the monarchy of Saudi Arabia have gained Western support from 
participating in the war on terrorism.16 
 
Global trade may also serve to legitimize political regimes, as regime change and social 
upheaval invariably threatens the stability and predictability in which business thrives. Trade 
may from this perspective function as a conservative influence, and regimes wishing to clamp 
down on destabilizing social movements may thus find support for such a policy in the global 
business community. In the present day, a prolonged general strike in China or an oil worker 
strike in Saudi Arabia would have a highly toxic effect on the global economy, and the 
respective regimes might be quickly forgiven for putting an end to it by any means. Should the 
global community be willing to sacrifice some trade income for the purpose of exerting political 
pressure, however, a state intimately entwined with the global economy would clearly be quite 
susceptible to economic sanctions. 
 
                                                 
16 Thus we have Franklin D. Roosevelt’s immortal (but apocryphal) words on the notorious Nicaraguan dictator: 
‘Somoza may be a son of a bitch, but he's our son of a bitch.’ 
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3 - Methodology 
The basic approach of this study is to compare a global range of cases of nonviolent political 
action and thus gain insight into its dynamics as a general phenomenon not limited to particular 
cultural or historical contexts. This is what Przeworski and Teune (1970:39) call a ‘most 
different systems’ design, where one “eliminate[s] factors differentiating social systems by 
formulating statements that are valid regardless of the system within which observations are 
made”. Context is not ignored, however: rather an attempt is made at systemizing the contextual 
impact on protest outcome so as to make it comparable across a widely divergent set of cases. 
The aim is thus to divest from particularized explanations of causes and effects and to 
understand in a broader and more general sense what makes nonviolent protest successful. 
 
Comparing large-scale sociopolitical events over a broad range of cases does however present 
obvious methodological challenges. This paper will attempt to overcome these challenges by 
utilizing three different comparative approaches. Each has its own particular strengths and 
weaknesses, and together they may serve to balance each other out and to present an overall 
perspective on the causal processes involved in the outcome of nonviolent political action. 
 
The three methodologies are: 1) comparative case study; 2) Boolean or Qualitative Case 
Analysis (QCA); and 3) logistical regression.17 Before I move on to describe their specific 
application to my research question, I will briefly outline their respective virtues and flaws. The 
strength of the comparative case study is that it treats each case as a whole rather than risking an 
oversimplified analysis focused exclusively on an extract of isolated variables. It does as such 
never lose sight of the overall context and can encompass an open-ended gamut of causal 
interactions. This strength is however also a weakness, as this methodology imposes few if any 
constraining guidelines on the comparative analysis and is as such in the eyes of some people 
insufficiently rigid and systematic. One may thus be suspected of performing a study based on 
an ‘impressionistic’ use of data that takes only into account those facts that happen to support 
one’s analysis. For a dozen or so cases this method is furthermore rendered entirely unwieldy. 
                                                 
17 The original intention was to include a fourth line of inquiry as well, which would build on one of my earlier 
works (Johnstad 2007a) where I applied the principles of game theoretic modeling to nonviolent protest. Spatial 
constraints unfortunately leave no room for such modeling in this paper. 
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QCA is presented by its inventor Ragin (1987) as a bridge between case- and variable-oriented 
analyses. It can handle a large amount of cases, and while it does reduce cases to sets of 
variables it also allows these variables to interact in a manner that serves to maintain the 
integrity of the cases. In Ragin’s words (ibid:122) it is “both holistic and analytic; it examines 
cases as wholes and as parts”. The limitations of this method include a low tolerance level for 
the number of variables and the need for dichotomization. It furthermore presupposes that one 
can isolate a set of necessary and sufficient causes for the respective outcome within the set of 
independent variables in the study, which is clearly over-optimistic for such an open-ended 
variable as protest outcome. This also causes the method to disregard variables which are 
neither necessary nor sufficient for the given outcome but which may still contribute to its 
likelihood of taking place.  
 
Statistical regression is in many ways the complete opposite of case studies: it is exclusively 
variable-oriented, has no regard for context (except as encoded by a separate variable in the 
analysis) and concerns itself only with linear (or polynomial) causal influence. It is however 
undeniably rigid and mathematically precise, and through statistical control it achieves a good 
measurement of the average influence of a variable irrespective of contextual influences. One of 
its benefits is thus to offer insight into how much the different independent variables influence 
the dependent variable, allowing the researcher to compare their causal importance. Statistical 
methods are superbly capable of discerning patterns in large datasets, and do indeed require a 
high number of cases to work properly. The limited number of cases in this study thus serves to 
undermine the effectiveness of logistical regression somewhat, but it nevertheless offers a clear 
indication of the causal dynamics of nonviolent protest. 
3.1 Case selection 
The four cases chosen for the in-depth analysis are the Indian independence movement, the 
American civil rights campaign, the rise of Solidarity in Poland, and the student movement in 
1989 China. These are all deemed crucial cases, three being highly influential successes and the 
fourth a devastating failure. No claims are made regarding their being representative for the 
population of nonviolent resistance campaigns as a whole, however. Case selection for the 
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Boolean and statistical analyses, on the other hand, has been performed with the aim of 
obtaining a representative set. Care was taken to avoid the traps of selection bias, and cases of 
nonviolent struggle pertaining to both positive and negative outcomes are included in the 
analysis. A secondary objective was to cover as much variation as possible, filling out the truth 
table of Boolean analysis with all the information that can be obtained. 
 
Note that the perspective on what constitutes a case differs between the case studies and the 
dataset utilized for the Boolean and statistical analyses. In the former, each of the national 
movements is regarded as one case, although they mostly span long periods of time and might 
conceivably be divided into any number of separate units of analysis. In the latter, each of the 
major campaigns of the overall protest movement is taken as a separate case. This is for the 
reason that both contextual and agency variables tend to change over time, and a single coding 
of the movement as a whole would thus be impossible. As a positive side effect the analyses 
also gain an increased number of cases. 
 
The cases of this study are furthermore of two general types. The first and most common are 
protest movements aiming at regime change, while the second have the somewhat lower 
ambition of changing policy. One challenges the political regime of the state; the other 
challenges a specific policy regime. In the latter case the analysis of regime legitimacy must be 
modified by the legitimacy of the specific policy in question.18 
3.2 Comparative case study 
The general format for case presentations is as follows. First an outline of the political and 
cultural context as relevant to the issue of regime legitimacy is given. This is followed by a 
summary of the main events taking place during the campaign, with a focus on the respective 
strategies of the protest movement and its opponent and their impact on the conflict. A final 
section sums up the case in the analytical terms utilized in the Boolean and statistical analyses. 
 
                                                 
18 For elaborations on the concept of policy legitimacy see George (1980) and Smoke (1994). Policy legitimacy in 
their eyes rests on normative and cognitive components, the first relating to the desirability of the policy and the 
latter to its feasibility. 
 30 
The aim of these four case studies is not only to identify causes and outcomes but also to 
establish the causal chain between the two. This is akin to what George and Bennett (2005) call 
‘process-tracing’, whereby one not only determines the covariance of independent and 
dependent variables but also elucidates the intervening causal processes. To take an example, I 
do in the analysis of the American civil rights movement point to the covariance of regime 
violence with a successful outcome, and also point to the causal means by which the former 
contributed to the latter. 
 
In addition to the four main case studies, each case utilized in the data set for the Boolean and 
statistical analyses is, in order to justify its encoding, given a separate case presentation. No 
consistent use of process-tracing is however undertaken for these cases, and they are as such, at 
least according to George and Bennett, not proper case studies; their claim to causality lies 
simply in the demonstration of covariance. 
3.3 Boolean or qualitative case analysis 
QCA is essentially an extension of Mill’s method of agreement and indirect method of 
difference systematized through the use of Boolean algebra. It codes each case over a set of 
dichotomized variables and thus reduces it to a string of binary data. This string effectively 
constitutes a logical path towards its given outcome, and cases pertaining to the same logical 
path may be merged together. QCA does not cope well with contradictions, as each logical path 
must uniquely determine one outcome. There is, unlike for methods of statistical regression, no 
mechanism in Boolean analysis for dealing with exceptions, and such cases must thus be 
accounted for separately. All logical paths should furthermore correspond to at least one 
empirical case, and where such data is unavailable one is effectively forced to conjecture. 
 
By listing each logical path as a row we thus gain the ‘truth table’ of Boolean analysis (available 
in chapter 5 as Table 4). What remains at this point is simply to eliminate the redundancy of the 
truth table via the operations of Boolean logic until a parsimonious solution is obtained. 
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Before I proceed with a discussion of the construction of the data set utilized in the Boolean 
analysis, I will briefly sum up Wickham-Crowley’s (1991) influential paper, which has served 
as inspiration for this part of my study. Seeking to explain revolutionary success in Latin 
America, Wickham-Crowley employed a Boolean analysis on a data set of 28 cases and 
obtained five necessary and (in convergence) sufficient conditions: 1) a guerilla attempt; 2) 
peasant (or worker) support; 3) guerilla military strength; 4) a patrimonial praetorian regime 
(‘mafiacracy’); and 5) the withdrawal of US support. Note that the second, fourth and fifth of 
these may be translated into a lack of regime legitimacy. Peasant or worker support for guerillas 
would indicate a regime with a low level of ‘popular’ legitimacy; a praetorian mafia-regime 
would seem to indicate low economic growth and a lack of legitimacy among business and 
economic elites19; and the lack of support from the regional hegemon constitutes a low 
international legitimacy. In none of Wickham-Crowley’s cases did a guerilla movement gain 
substantial military strength without possessing peasant or worker support, and we might thus 
interpret the findings of his study as the following: low popular regime legitimacy enabled 
opposition movements to mobilize public support, and an additional lack of economic 
performance legitimacy and international support created the conditions where a popular 
movement could oust the regime and assume political control. 
3.3.1 Constructing the data set 
The primary challenge in utilizing Qualitative Case Analysis lies in the construction of the data 
set, summarized in Tables 2 and 3 on page 37-38. Particularly difficult is the dichotomization of 
variables, which leaves no room for in-between cases as each variable must be coded 
exclusively as either present or absent. The world, of course, does not always lend itself to such 
clear-cut classification, and the researcher is forced to make what amounts to subjective 
judgments. This cannot be avoided, but I will make special notice of those cases that I consider 
to be debatable, and the rationale behind my choices is justified in the case presentations of 
Chapter 4. All variables are encoded according to information obtained from extant case 
                                                 
19 Average annual per capita economic growth for the country-periods Wickham-Crowley designates as praetorian 
are -0.09% for Argentina 1974-78, -0.86% for Nicaragua 1971-79, -0.28% for Panama 1985-89 and 0.16% for 
Paraguay 1958-59; the in-between case of Nicaragua 1958-63 has average growth of 1.51% and the long 1960-88 
Paraguay case an average growth of 2.44% (Heston, Summers and Aten 2006). The World Bank (2008) gives an 
averaged per capita growth of -1% for Haiti 1961-69. No data is available for Cuba 1956-59. 
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literature. Note that I have been unable to obtain reliable data for the media variable and have 
thus been forced to drop this variable from the dataset and the Boolean and statistical analyses. 
 
The issue of in-between cases is particularly salient with regard to the dependent variable, as it 
may not always be obvious what constitutes success or failure in a campaign of nonviolent 
action. Confrontations between nonviolent protesters and the regime’s apparatus of repression 
sometimes takes the form of ‘losing the battle and winning the war’, where the protest is 
suppressed in the short term yet emerges as the victor after a few years. Repressing nonviolent 
protesters may have a high cost in legitimacy and does sometimes in itself constitute the 
undoing of the regime, although this dynamic of political ju-jitsu often takes several years to 
manifest. These issues are clarified in the individual case presentations. 
 
Regarding the coding of variables, the minimum requirement for the presence of violence is set 
as serious bodily injury or widespread rioting; minor scuffles are ignored. Religious authority is 
regarded as present if movement leaders had positions of authority within a religious 
establishment, or if important religious groups came out in open support of the movement. For 
regime legitimacy I construct an index of those components deemed of primary importance, 
which is then dichotomized on a heuristic basis. The construction of this index is discussed in 
the section below. 
3.3.2 Regime legitimacy index 
The optimal method of studying the influence of regime legitimacy upon the outcome of cases 
of nonviolent protest would perhaps be to code each major component of legitimacy as a 
separate variable. This would however flood the Boolean analysis with variables, and to avoid 
this problem I construct an index of regime legitimacy which incorporates what I deem its four 
major components: economic growth, political mythology, international support, and threat 
level. The coding rules are summarized in Table 1. 
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Table 1:  Legitimacy index weights 
The utilization of these four indicators and the exclusion of 
other aspects of political legitimacy may seem arbitrary, and 
requires a brief explanation. Economic growth is a primary 
indicator of performance legitimacy20 and its inclusion in the 
index is also supported by the fact that, at least for cases 
after 1950, precise growth data are readily available. I use 
the average of the three preceding years to indicate the 
score, although major wars and other calamities may 
complicate matters and thus require special treatment. A 
separate entry for other aspects of performance legitimacy 
has been considered, but was rejected for the reason that two 
performance indicators might serve to overemphasize performance at the expense of other 
sources of legitimacy. The more obvious aspects of non-economic performance legitimacy, such 
as loss or victory in warfare, would furthermore be irrelevant to most of the cases in this study – 
and the less obvious are hard to operationalize. 
 
While economic growth gives an objective indication of performance legitimacy, the 
measurement of political mythology necessarily requires interpretation. I will emphasize the 
following factors: the evolving geopolitical situation and zeitgeist and the correspondence 
between claims to democratic, communist, fascist or other myths and their institutionalization in 
actual politics.21 Where a regime claims the democratic legitimacy of a popular mandate or the 
fascist legitimacy of strong leadership and vigilance against national enemies, but is caught 
cheating at elections or shows itself demonstrably weak by losing battles or wars, its political 
mythology rating suffers. Regimes are also regarded as losing legitimacy if they have gained a 
reputation for using excessive and unjustified violence to repress opponents.22 
 
                                                 
20 Thus Bill Clinton’s famous quip “it’s the economy, stupid”. 
21 This item in the index thus combines two sources of legitimacy in Hjellum’s typology. 
22 Regime violence in response to protest is thus an agency variable for that specific case and an influence on 
regime legitimacy for subsequent cases. The India 1919-1921 case is an example, with the massacre at Amritsar 
justifying a coding of presence for the regime violence variable but not influencing legitimacy for that case.  
Economic Growth (per capita)  
• Decline -1 
• Low (< 3%) 
• Moderate (3-5%) 
0 
1 
• High (>5%) 2 
Political Mythology  
• Low -1 
• Moderate 0 
• High 1 
International Support  
• Low -1 
• Moderate 0 
• High 1 
Threat level  
• Low  
• Moderate  
• High  
0 
1 
2 
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The measurement of international support necessitates an analysis of the regime’s position in the 
international system of states. The presence of allies and trading partners influences the score 
positively, while factors such as international sanctions and lack of conformity with global 
standards subtract. This item may seem to overlap with that relating to political mythology, but I 
will reserve the latter specifically for domestic audiences and furthermore emphasize factors 
relating to realpolitik – such as military alliances and vested business interests – for this item. 
The final item in the index relates to the threat level of the society in question at the given point 
of time. Wars and civil wars are the primary indicators, counting as moderate if they do not 
threaten the survival of the state and high if they do.23  
 
This index of regime legitimacy is designed primarily for those cases where protest is aimed at 
changing the regime. For cases where the protest objective is a more limited policy change that 
would allow the political regime to continue, the following coding rules hold. The political 
mythology and international support items are taken to refer to the legitimacy of the policy in 
question rather than of the overall political regime. The coding of economic growth is 
maintained without change, with the justification that economic success makes governments 
popular and thus better able to defend and maintain unpopular policies. With regard to threat 
level the coding rule is that if the discontinuation of the policy in question does not directly 
influence the regime’s ability to deal with the specific threat, the score for this item is reduced 
by one level (from high to moderate to low).  
 
The weighting scheme of this index is determined partly on an intuitive basis of what seems 
right and partly on a heuristic basis of what seems to work with the data I am using. As far as I 
am aware, there is no extant theory available that might provide guidelines as to how much 
importance should be assigned to the various components of a legitimacy index. While there 
have certainly been attempts to measure legitimacy before (e.g., Weatherford 1992), these use a 
highly divergent approach to the concept of political legitimacy from the one taken in this paper. 
 
My approach to index construction is inspired in part by that of Jaggers and Gurr (1995) in their 
construction of the Polity democracy index. They are in turn criticized by Munck and Verkuilen 
                                                 
23 The Cold War codes as moderate; high threat level is reserved for actual ongoing warfare. 
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(2002:26) for lacking a theoretical justification for their weighting scheme, and a similar critique 
may obviously be directed at my scheme. In response I would say that this is essentially an 
exploratory analysis, and my weighting scheme has no pretensions of being the final word on 
the matter. It does however provide a starting point and seems to model the cases I am using 
reasonably well. 
 
The resulting regime legitimacy score lies in the bracket of [-3, 6], and for the Boolean analysis 
a cut-off point is required to divide the score into a dichotomy of low and high. In Table 3 we 
can observe that, with one exception, all cases scoring zero or below on the regime legitimacy 
index result in success, while scores above zero all predict failure; a natural cut-off is thus zero, 
with [-3, 0] indicating a lack of legitimacy and [1, 6] indicating its presence.24 
3.4 Statistical analysis 
This part of the study utilizes the same data set as the Boolean analysis, with the exception that 
the regime legitimacy index is not dichotomized. The main challenge with regard to this 
methodology is that the data sample used in this study is rather small, which makes it difficult to 
gain significant results while maintaining statistical control in a multivariate analysis. While the 
study does fulfill minimum requirements for statistical regression, which has been given as a 
sample size of 20 with a ratio of 5 observations per variable (Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson and 
Tatham 2006:197), it is to be expected that with a multivariate setup the independent variables 
will to some extent measure the same variation in the dependent variable and thus cancel each 
other out.  
 
One benefit of statistical analysis over QCA is that it can integrate exceptions and contrary cases 
directly into the analysis. QCA does by contrast operate with necessary and sufficient causes 
and has no obvious mechanism for dealing with exceptions beyond excluding them. While the 
dataset of this study has no clear exceptions to the general rules, we can observe in Tables 2 and 
3 that some scores have an attached question mark indicating that they are to some extent 
debatable. While I stand by my original coding, these cases are more easily subject to criticism 
than others, and to pre-empt any censure on this account it would be helpful to recode those 
                                                 
24 We may also observe that the mean of this variable is 0.03 and its median -1, and that my choice of cut-off 
divides the dataset into 18 cases of low legitimacy and 11 cases of high legitimacy.  
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questionable scores that favor my analysis into contrary cases. The relevant scores are: 1) the 
outcome of the India 1942 case; 2) protest violence in South Africa 1987; and 3) regime 
legitimacy in Georgia 2003. These are marked with an asterisk in Tables 2 and 3. For the 
statistical analysis I will thus recode these as respectively a successful outcome, a presence of 
protest violence and a regime legitimacy score of 1. 
 
One problem with using logistical regression to investigate the hypotheses of this project is that 
the independent variables are predicted to have a somewhat complex logical inter-relationship. 
The problem is, as Ragin (1987:63) succinctly states it, that “To the extent that comparative 
researchers are more interested in the effect of a variable in different settings or in different 
types of cases – and less interested in its average, net effect in a population of observations – 
techniques of statistical control produce findings of unknown value”. This is indeed the case for 
the regime violence variable, which is hypothesized as a positive contributor to protest success 
if and only if there is no protest violence, the regime possesses a low level of legitimacy, and 
there is a sufficient degree of media coverage of this violence. While this latter variable of 
media penetration has been dropped from the analysis because of a lack of reliable data, it 
remains predictable that statistical procedures, which do not easily model causal complexity, 
will fail to divulge the true causal impact of regime violence on protest outcome. 
 
It should be noted that the regime legitimacy variable, which has a possible range of [-3, 6] and 
an empirical range with the current dataset of [-2, 4], is on the ordinal rather than interval level 
of measurement. This technically violates the requirements for logistical regression analysis. 
Such violations are however frequently ignored for ordinal scales with a sufficiently high 
number of values, such as the Freedom House (2007) political rights and civil liberties indices.  
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Table 2: Overview of regime legitimacy 
Case Economy Political 
mythology 
International 
support 
Threat 
level 
Total 
India 1919-1921 1 0 1 0 2 
India 1930-1931 Salt March -1 -1 0 0 -2 
India 1942 Quit India 0 -1 1 2 2 
India 1945-1947 0 -1 -1 0 -2 
      
USA 1955-1956 Montgomery 0 -1 0 0 -1 
USA 1960 Nashville 0 -1 -1 0 -2 
USA 1961 Freedom Rides 0 -1 -1 0 -2 
USA 1963 Birmingham 0 -1 -1 0 -2 
      
Poland 1976 2 -1 1 1 3 
Poland 1980-1981 -1 -1 1 1 0 
Poland 1988-1989 0 -1 0 0 -1 
      
China 1978-1979 Democracy Wall 1 1 0 1 3 
China 1986 2 1 0 1 4 
China 1989 Tiananmen Square  2 1 0 0 3 
      
Russia 1905 0 -1 0 0 -1 
      
Nazi Germany 1943 -1 -1 0 1 -1 
      
El Salvador 1944 1 -1 0 0 0 
      
Guatemala 1944 -1 -1 0 0 -2 
      
South Africa 1960 Sharpeville 0 0 0 1 1 
South Africa 1976 Soweto 0 0 0 1 1 
South Africa 1987 Strike movement -1 -1 -1 2 -1 
South Africa 1994 -1 -1 -1 2 -1 
      
Chile 1983 -1 0 1 1 1 
Chile 1988 1 -1 -1 0 -1 
      
The Philippines 1986 -1 -1 -1 1 -2 
      
Israel-Palestine 1987-1990 1 0 1 1 3 
      
Burma/Myanmar 1988-1989 -1 0 1 2 2 
      
Serbia 1999-2000 -1 0 -1 1 -1 
      
Georgia 2003 0?* -1 0 0 -1?* 
 
Note: Scores marked with ?* are regarded as somewhat debatable. According to World Bank (2008) data, economic 
growth in Georgia should be coded as high (score:2), and the total legitimacy score would thus be 1. I will use this 
contrary coding for the statistical analysis. 
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Table 3: Overview of cases 
Case Regime 
legitimacy 
Protest 
violence 
Regime 
violence 
Religious 
authority 
Outcome 
India 1919-1921 2 1 1 1 0 
India 1930-1931 Salt March -2 0 0 1 1 
India 1942 Quit India 2 1 1 1 0?* 
India 1945-1947 -2 0 0 1 1 
      
USA 1955-1956 Montgomery -1 0 1 1 1 
USA 1960 Nashville -2 0 1 1 1 
USA 1961 Freedom Rides -2 0 1 1 1 
USA 1963 Birmingham -2 0 1 1 1 
      
Poland 1976 3 1 1 1? 0 
Poland 1980-1981 0 0 1 1 1 
Poland 1988-1989 -1 0 0 1 1 
      
China 1978-1979 Democracy Wall 3 0 0 0 0 
China 1986 4 0 0 0 0 
China 1989 Tiananmen Square 3 0? 1 0 0 
      
Russia 1905 -1 1 1 0 0 
      
Nazi Germany 1943 -1 0 0 0 1 
      
El Salvador 1944 0 0 1 0 1 
      
Guatemala 1944 -2 0 1 0 1 
      
South Africa 1960 Sharpeville 1 1 1 0 0 
South Africa 1976 Soweto 1 1 1 0 0 
South Africa 1987 Strike movement -1 0?* 1 1 1 
South Africa 1994 -1 0 0 1 1 
      
Chile 1983 1 0 1 1 0 
Chile 1988 -1 0 0 1 1 
      
The Philippines 1986 -2 0 0 1 1 
      
Israel-Palestine 1987-1990 3 1 1 0 0 
      
Burma/Myanmar 1988-1989 2 1 1 1? 0 
      
Serbia 1999-2000 -1 0 0 0 1 
      
Georgia 2003 -1?* 0 0 0 1 
 
Note: Scores marked with ? are regarded as somewhat debatable. Scores marked with * are debatable cases whose 
recoding would impact the analysis in my disfavor. For the statistical analysis I will use the contrary scores of 1 for 
outcome in India 1942, 1 for protest violence in South Africa 1987 and 1 for regime legitimacy in Georgia 2003. 
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4 - Case presentations 
This section presents the four major cases of this study as well as the 29 cases of protest 
campaigns used in the Boolean and statistical analyses. Note that the four cases subject to proper 
case studies also translate into 14 of the 29 latter cases. Each set of cases is presented in 
chronological order. Before I embark on these case presentations, however, I will briefly outline 
certain geopolitical developments in the 20th and 21st centuries that influence the political 
mythology of the cases in this study. 
4.1 Preamble: the evolving legitimacy of racism and political regimes 
It would not be difficult to argue that there was no democracy anywhere at the beginning of the 
20th century. Women everywhere lacked the power of the vote, and the disfranchisement of men 
without property or with non-European ethnic origins was widespread. No country in the world 
was anywhere near fulfilling Dahl’s (1971) democratic criteria of participation and contestation. 
Yet the world was undergoing huge changes, and in the West, at least, there was certainly a 
strong momentum toward democracy. There were also two other great political waves taking 
place at this time, however – fascism and communism – and during the first four decades of the 
century, each of these possessed valid claims to legitimacy; only the anciens régimes of kings 
and emperors, mired in anti-modernity, were becoming historically illegitimate.  
 
In the Second World War, communism and democracy joined forces against fascism, and the 
latter, particularly as it started losing the war and thus proved less strong than what it had 
claimed to be, lost much of its mythological claim to legitimacy of power. Soon enough, 
however, the Cold War pitted democracy against communism, and fascism was rehabilitated as 
a means of keeping the communist advance at bay. As communist parties might sometimes win 
elections, the United States often favored fascist regimes it could trust over democratic regimes 
susceptible to communist subversion.  
 
By the détente of the 1970s, the Cold War tensions started to relax and the geopolitical situation 
was once again ripe for democratic experiments. Communist legitimacy had rotted from within, 
with workers’ paradises proving themselves distinctly un-paradisiacal, and as Gorbachev took 
 40 
office in 1985 the fascist allies of the democratic West quickly became more of a liability than 
an asset. The end of history was proclaimed, and a new wave of democracy ensued.  
 
For a few years the world was without any overarching global conflict, and religious extremism 
in Muslim parts of the world was predominantly of regional concern. In 2001, however, history 
remerged to prove the rumors of its death had been greatly exaggerated: as Islamist terrorists 
attacked the USA mainland, a new global war – against terror, specifically Islamist terror – was 
commenced, and autocracies in Islamic countries gained a new lease to life as allies of this 
struggle. Radical Islamic parties had a proven ability to win elections – for instance in Algeria 
1991 – and the prospect of democratization in the Islamic world thus became a potential threat 
to Western national security concerns.  
 
The legitimacy of racism follows a similar trajectory to that of political regimes. In the Western 
world racist myths did, on the whole, enjoy widespread recognition until World War II.25 The 
myth of white supremacy was supported by fashionable pseudo-sciences like eugenics, 
phrenology and anthropometry, and popular interpretations of Darwin’s evolution of species 
invariably placed the colored races a few steps lower on the evolutionary ladder than the white 
master race. Racism was also an obvious and necessary foundation for the European colonial 
empires (Arendt 1973 [1951]). 
 
While racist myths enjoyed strong support in most parts of Europe, Nazi Germany embraced 
them with an intimacy and ferocity not seen before. The Nazis took the ideas of white 
supremacy and racial purity to their logical – and horrible – conclusion, and succeeded in 
merging the two ingredients of autocratic rule and racism to a dish so unpalatable that both 
suffered devastating post-war falls from grace. Through their actions they demonstrated that the 
white race was perhaps not so superior after all, and their intimate embrace of racism created a 
conceptual link between their own regime and the practice of institutionalized racism that 
                                                 
25 “Hitlerism exercised its strong international and inter-European appeal during the thirties because racism, 
although a state doctrine only in Germany, had been a powerful trend in public opinion everywhere” (Arendt 1973 
[1951]:158). Davies (1996:760) similarly speaks of colonialism as being “once seen as a great step forward for all 
concerned”; the implication being that it was regarded as beneficial for ‘backward’ races and nations to come under 
enlightened European governance. 
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rendered the latter inherently suspect to the post-war world.26 The European colonial empires, 
whose maintenance necessitated both autocracy and institutionalized racism, were thus facing 
obvious difficulties and soon started to collapse. 
 
While institutional racism did by no means disappear after the war, the public espousal of racist 
myths was no longer respectable. The 1950s and 1960s saw an explosion of independent 
African states, and black people thus gained an official voice in the international system. The 
legitimacy of racism was now in terminal decline, and its bastion in the US south disintegrated – 
at least as an official institution – within a decade. The last holdout of a politically endorsed 
racism was the regime of South Africa, long subject to international sanctions and widely 
regarded as an anachronism. 
4.2 India: independence movement 1919-1947 
Through the familiar imperial practice of divide et impera, the British raj had by the 1850s 
consolidated its hold over the Indian subcontinent, bringing political unity to an extent never 
before realized.27 India was the crown jewel of the British Empire, and the raj plundered India’s 
wealth but also constructed roads, railways and harbors and founded a well-functioning judicial 
system and police service. Representing the forces of modernity, the British rulers humbled the 
Indian nation with their superior technology and statecraft, and the fact that a few thousand 
administrators could effectively impose their rule on a nation of three hundred millions long 
seemed clear evidence of the white man’s inherent superiority.  
 
The British justified their rule by what may be called the mythology of colonialism, best defined 
in Kipling’s “White Man’s Burden”. They perceived themselves as forces of order and progress, 
providing the just and moral governance without which India would descend into chaos.28 It 
was, in many ways, a view not entirely without justification, and the combined benefits of 
                                                 
26 “Since the defeat of nazism there has been general agreement in the international community on the odiousness 
of a political system based upon racial classification and stratification” (Price 1991:5). 
27 General references for this section are Ackerman and Duvall (2000:61-111), Easwaran (1997), Gandhi (2001 
[1929]), Gandhi (2001 [1951], Rudolph and Rudolph (1983 [1967]) and Sharp (2005:101-112). The case 
presentation builds on an earlier work of mine (Johnstad 2006). 
28 James, in Arendt (1973 [1951]:130), speaks of colonial administrators who, “despite their genuine respect for the 
natives as a people, and in some cases even their love for them… almost to a man, do not believe that they are or 
ever will be capable of governing themselves without supervision”. 
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modernization, nascent industrialization and the ‘Pax Britannica’ that the raj brought with it 
legitimized the British rule in the eyes of many Indians.29 At the same time, of course, Britain 
was extracting vast amounts of wealth from India, which may explain the latter’s rather dismal 
rate of economic growth: annual per capita growth has been estimated at 0.7% from 1871-1911 
and as virtually stagnant from 1911-1946 (Heston and Summers 1980:97).30 
 
During the early days of the Indian independence movement, then, the raj possessed at least a 
modicum of legitimacy. The cultural onslaught and forced confrontation with modernity made 
many Indians question the value of their historical heritage. Some started viewing the Hindu 
religious tradition as a hopeless mire blocking India’s progress, and chose to abandon Hinduism 
in favor of the ideals of the European Enlightenment. One admired the modernity of the British 
rulers and implicitly paid tribute to the mythology of their colonialism. 
 
There were however several trends that contributed to a steady decline to the legitimacy of the 
British raj. In its encounter with Christianity and the ideals of the European Enlightenment, 
India underwent something of a religious revival, with a strong line of reformers bringing the 
Hindu traditions back to the forefront of public life (Jacobsen 2003). After centuries of 
stagnation under the Delhi sultanate and Mughal dynasty rulers, who all tended to favor Islam, 
Hinduism flourished under the raj, and was even becoming fashionable in certain circles in 
Europe. It was an era of renewed cultural confidence that some have called the ‘Hindu 
Renaissance’, and it brought with it a resurgent nationalism that regarded the British exploitative 
rule as the very height of injustice. Gandhi was the last and most important of this lineage of 
Hindu reformers, and he very much emphasized – and even embodied – the idea that India was 
more than sufficiently competent to handle its own affairs. 
 
A second trend was the evolving process of political reform and democratization that Britain 
herself was undergoing. The fledgling democracy on the British Isles and her dominions stood 
                                                 
29 One is tempted to quote the famous Monty Python skit from “The Life of Brian” where John Cleese, playing the 
part of a budding Jewish rebel leader, asks rhetorically of his compatriots “What have the Romans ever done for 
us?” Their answer is that the Romans have brought aqueducts, roads, public baths, education, wine, irrigation, 
public order – and peace! 
30 This did however coincide with an apparent population boom from 1921 onwards, producing an upsurge in 
young people who would not contribute to the economy for a decade or two. 
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in sharp contrast to imperial practice in the colonies, and in retrospect it seems obvious that the 
combination of democracy and imperialism was untenable and heading for collapse. After the 
British had fought the encroaching fascist domination during WWII partly with India’s help, it 
became increasingly difficult to justify a continuation of British domination, and the legitimacy 
of colonial rule reached rock bottom.31  
 
Finally, a third trend of de-legitimization was the product of the strategic interactions between 
the raj and the Gandhi-led independence movement. Before Gandhi there was no significant 
challenge to the British rule – except the occasional riot that one could legitimately clamp down 
upon in the name of public order – and the British rulers were able to retain a semblance of 
benevolence and civility. Only because of Gandhi’s campaigns of nonviolent action did it 
become plain to all that the British were indeed willing to hang onto power through any means 
necessary. Gandhi was a master strategist who effectively forced their hand: when responding to 
his offensives, the British could no longer be both benevolent and rulers. They had to choose, 
and their choice was to stay in power even if this should require an occasional massacre, as in 
Amritsar (see below). Their true nature was thus revealed to the Indian public, and their 
legitimacy eroded. These three trends of de-legitimization of the raj served to greatly expand the 
independence movement’s capacity for mobilizing support. 
4.2.1 Agency 
The Indian National Congress was founded in 1895 with the moderate objective of reforming 
colonial rule so as to make more room for educated Indians. At the same time Mohandas K. 
Gandhi (1869-1948) was initiating a civil rights campaign in South Africa, utilizing an evolving 
methodology of nonviolent mass protest and civil disobedience. Gandhi returned to India during 
the First World War as a something of a hero, and gradually emerged as the de facto leader of 
the Congress. Transforming the party “from an organization catering to anglicized elites to a 
cadre-led mass organization” (Rudolph and Rudolph 1987:127), Gandhi applied his method on 
the behalf of landless farmers and serfs in the state of Bihar and soon gained nationwide fame, 
                                                 
31 The Atlantic Charter signed by Churchill and Roosevelt in 1941 established a number of common principles, 
among them “the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they live” (quoted in Davies 
1996:1027). It may have been intended to counter nazi and fascist aggression in Europe, but it seems hard to 
explain why Britain should not be held up to the same standard. 
 44 
with particularly the poor masses taking him to heart. They named him mahatma – great soul – 
and revered him as a religious teacher, and the authority Gandhi thus gained gave his word 
lasting influence among the Indian masses. 
 
The stage was now set for a nonviolent independence campaign of truly epic proportions, and its 
baptism of fire was the 1919 Jalianwala Bagh massacre in Amritsar. It was a city torn by street 
fighting and violent strife, and to teach people a lesson, General Dyer, the British commander of 
the area, converged with troops and armored vehicles upon a gathering of nonviolent protestors, 
among them numerous women and children, opening fire indiscriminately and without warning. 
Having murdered between 379 (official British estimate) and 1500 (Indian estimates), Dyer 
emerged as something of a hero to parts of the British public, receiving no significant official 
censure. India, by contrast, was incensed, and the raj’s legitimacy took a plunge from which it 
never recovered. For Gandhi it was a turning point: “Having earlier held out hope that India 
could achieve swaraj [self-rule] within the British constitutional structure, he now viewed the raj 
as ‘satanic’ and ‘dishonest’” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:74). 
 
A nonviolent offensive was initiated. The problem, however, was that not all participating in 
Gandhi’s movement and the spontaneous protest it inspired was as committed to nonviolence as 
he wanted. The offensive was thus abruptly called off in February 1922 after a massacre of 
twenty-two police constables in Uttar Pradesh, as Gandhi decided that India was not yet ready 
for mass campaigns. 
 
Mass protest reemerged with the salt march of 1930-1931. The march was organized as a protest 
against a much-maligned British monopoly and tax on salt – an issue picked by Gandhi as an 
example of how colonial exploitation affected ordinary Indians. Rather than speaking in grand 
terms of liberty and self-rule, Gandhi wanted to present the idea of independence as something 
directly benefiting even the most poverty-stricken of the Indian masses. The march took Gandhi 
and around seventy trusted companions on a long walk through the Gujarat countryside towards 
the beach at Dandi, where they would deliberately break the monopoly on salt production by 
hauling salt out of the sea. Along the road they held mass rallies attended by tens of thousands, 
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and through national and international media they gained widespread attention.32 The result was 
an outbreak of nonviolent resistance all over India: besides challenging the salt monopoly, 
Indians picketed liquor and foreign cloth shops and withheld tax payments, causing a significant 
strain on imperial coffers. The salt march ended with a negotiated settlement between Gandhi 
and the British viceroy, Lord Irwin, which generally favored the British side. More important to 
Gandhi than the substantial issues was the feeling of empowerment that the campaign had 
inculcated in ordinary Indians. In the eyes of Brits and Indians alike, it was now clear that India 
did indeed possess the power to challenge her imperial overlord. “The Indian movement had 
proved that when India refused to cooperate, Britain could not continue to rule India as she had 
done” (Sharp 2005:110).  
 
Following the settlement between Gandhi and Lord Irwin, political reforms expanded the 
powers of elected provincial legislatures and encouraged the Congress to conduct its campaign 
within the constraints of the political system. This process was however halted with the outbreak 
of the Second World War, and Gandhi somewhat optimistically launched the ‘Quit India’ 
offensive in 1942. It was a campaign plagued by unprecedented levels of violence, and the 
British authorities clamped down on it with ruthless efficiency. Britain was at this point still 
hard-pressed by the Axis forces, facing Japanese invaders on the very doorstep to India, and 
they clearly felt justified in dealing with Indian rioters with a hard hand. Neither journalists nor 
the British and American publics had much concern for protesting Indians at this point in time, 
and the movement petered out within a few months. 
 
At the end of the war, the hard-line Winston Churchill lost an election and the new British 
government must have realized that their colonial domination of India had lost all remaining 
shreds of legitimacy. There was growing unrest among the Royal Indian Armed Forces, upon 
which the colonial regime obviously depended, and one may also question how much appetite 
the British public, having endured an exhausting war against fascist domination, would have for 
further strife on behalf of continuing British domination. The Republic of India gained its 
                                                 
32 Gandhi was himself a journalist and newspaper editor, published his newspapers Young India from 1919 to 1931 
and Harijan from 1931 to 1942, and American journalists in particular contributed to his success in reaching a 
Western audience. Time Magazine (1931) made Gandhi ‘Man of the year 1930’. 
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independence in 1947, with the Indian National Congress taking office and remaining in power 
until 1977. 
4.2.2 Analytical summary 
For the Boolean and statistical analyses, the Indian independence movement will be delineated 
into four separate cases: the first offensive of the early 1920s, the Salt March of 1930-31, Quit 
India in 1942, and finally the post-war negotiated independence (which was not so much an 
offensive as the threat of an offensive). The economy, as we have seen, was generally stagnant 
throughout this period, though the following remarks may be added: during World War I 
“industrialists benefited from windfall profits to such an extent that they were overcome by a 
veritable euphoria of investment once the war ended and investment goods could be imported 
again” (Rothermund 1993:66). The war also contributed to an inflation that made life difficult 
for the poor, but it seems fair to code the economic growth context of the first protest offensive 
as ‘moderate’. The Great Depression resulted in a serious fall in prices of agricultural produce 
which spurred North Indian peasants to join Gandhi’s salt campaign (ibid: 99); the economy for 
this case is coded as declining. The Second World War initially had the same effect on the 
Indian economy as the First, but “[t]his time, however, there was no spurt of economic growth” 
(ibid:115). Growth during Quit India is thus encoded as low. 
 
The political mythology of the British colonial regime started out as moderate but contested, and 
declined throughout the following decades not least because of the Amritsar massacre. The level 
of international support started as strong, dropped (particularly in America) during the Salt 
March of 1930-31, bounced back during WWII, and finally evaporated after the war, as 
institutionalized racism and autocratic domination were now deemed suspect. When low, it 
served to constrain the range of responses available to the raj against the independence 
campaign. Threat level is high for the 1942 case, with Japanese forces occupying Burma. As for 
outcome, the first offensive was aborted due to emerging violence and is thus deemed a failure. 
The Salt March is by contrast a clear success, forcing the British authorities to the negotiating 
table and giving Gandhi’s movement international recognition as well as the stature of a 
respectable partner; it eventually resulted in constitutional reform that paved the way for 
independence. The Quit India campaign is regarded as a failure that was successfully repressed 
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and which did not contribute significantly to the already well-developed process towards 
independence. 
4.3 USA: civil rights movement 1955-1963 
The Jim Crow regime of the American South was a set of laws and customs that enforced 
segregation between white and black Americans and effectively deprived the latter of civil 
rights and full citizenship.33 It was built on the mythology of white supremacy that had 
previously buttressed the practice of slavery, and its continuation was obviously in the economic 
interest of white Southerners. Psychologically, segregation afforded white people an easy access 
to feelings of superiority and inflated self-images, and many undoubtedly had an emotional 
investment in maintaining the racist regime. 
 
After World War II, however, international opinion started turning against institutionalized 
racism, and the fall of colonialism seemed to herald the fall of segregation too. “With the 
breakup of the old colonial empires,” says Vander Zanden, “the world was no longer ‘a white 
man’s world’” (1963:545).34 White Americans outside the southern states increasingly saw the 
Jim Crow laws as an embarrassment quite unworthy of the self-proclaimed leader of the free 
world, and black Americans must certainly have started to wonder why black people could be 
free from white domination almost everywhere in the world – but not in the ‘land of the free’ 
itself. White supremacy had lost both its mythological and international legitimacy, and the 
stage was set for the American civil rights movement. 
4.3.1 Agency 
The civil rights movement had its ideological and institutional foundation in the black church, 
which provided an organized mass base of participants, competent leadership and a financial 
base (Morris 1996:29). It gained a charismatic leader in Martin Luther King Jr. (1929-1968), a 
Baptist pastor inspired by Gandhi’s independence movement in India. “Because nonviolence 
was presented to [people] as a simple expression of Christianity in action,” he later explained, 
                                                 
33 General references for this section are Ackerman and Duvall (2000:305-333), Branch (1988), Paulson (2005b), 
Vander Zanden (1963) and Wirmark (1974). 
34 In 1957 Vice President Nixon visited Ghana, the first of the many sub-Saharan countries to gain its independence 
after World War II, and according to Branch (1988:214), “was shrewd enough to recognize that the joy he 
witnessed at the birth of Ghana was part of an imminent world change”. 
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“they were willing to use it as a technique” (King, in Paulson 2005b:161). The movement went 
through a series of distinct phases, and did in the end succeed in abolishing officially sanctioned 
segregation and discrimination in the USA. 
 
The first major use of nonviolent mass action was the bus boycott in Montgomery, Alabama 
1955-56. City buses were segregated, and for blacks it was a matter of routine to be asked to 
vacate their seats on behalf of boarding whites. On December 1, Rosa Parks calmly refused to 
give up her seat, was hauled off to prison – and became the cause of a bus boycott. Montgomery 
blacks made up more than 70% of the city’s bus-riding population, and via mass rallies in 
church and King’s dynamic leadership, the budding movement succeeded in implementing a 
near-total boycott (Paulson 2005b). The white authorities responded with heavy-handed legal 
measures, but failed to break the boycotters’ resolve. Indeed, it had the opposite effect of 
reinvigorating a somewhat stalled campaign, as the brutality of the police in arresting King over 
a minor issue resulted in national media reports (Branch 1988:239-240). A bombing of King’s 
house could also not bring the campaign to halt, and when an armed mob of angry blacks 
appeared at the scene threatening retaliatory violence against whites, King managed to calm 
people down. Violent rioting was avoided, and the boycott achieved its victory when the U.S. 
Supreme Court declared Alabama’s bus segregation laws unconstitutional. 
 
The next phase of the movement was the sit-in campaign that started in Oklahoma City in 1958 
and spread throughout a number of southern cities by 1960. The campaign aimed at the 
desegregation of commercial establishments, and one of its highlights was the Nashville sit-in at 
lunch counters. Black students, after undergoing training in nonviolent tactics and discipline, 
walked into segregated restaurants, bought a small item and took a seat. They followed a 
carefully designed strategy, each step being “meticulously planned, executed, and evaluated, 
with an eye toward isolating behavior and controlling response” (Branch 1988:260). The white 
establishment was flabbergasted at first, but soon responded with predictable violence. 
Segregationists influenced Nashville’s mayor to pull the police out of the downtown area during 
protests, leaving the black students open to attacks from white thugs. These attacks neither 
dislodged the activists nor provoked their violent response, however, and when the police later 
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returned to arrest the black students, reinforcement squads quickly took their place. Refusing 
bail, they flooded the city’s prisons and were released after a few days. 
 
Building on the momentum of the student sit-ins, Nashville’s blacks organized a general 
commercial boycott of segregated stores. White supremacists retorted with a bombing, which 
was however regarded by the black students more as an opportunity than a threat: they “guessed 
that black adults would go further now in confronting the city’s establishment and that many 
white leaders would be shocked by the bombing” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:325). They 
followed up with a street march, and were soon engaged in negotiations with store owners and 
city officials. Ackerman and Duvall (2000:328-329) sum up the protest’s dynamics as follows: 
 
By making audacious and highly visible demands for equal treatment, student activists inspired 
broader protests from black communities. By creating street disturbances and sometimes sparking 
consumer boycotts, they put economic pressure on merchants. And by provoking assaults from 
zealous segregationists, they upset the moral complacency of at least a part of the white population. 
As a result business establishments in nearly 100 southern towns were integrated by the end of 1961. 
 
The Freedom Rides of 1961 followed on the heels of the sit-in campaign. A recent Supreme 
Court ruling had required the desegregation of interstate bus terminals, and the Freedom Riders 
were integrated teams of activists that tested the compliance with this ruling by embarking on 
long bus treks through the Deep South. They were met with near-murderous brutality from the 
police and white mobs, and thus gained the attention of the national media. This in turn forced 
the hand of the federal authorities, and U.S. Attorney General Robert Kennedy intervened by 
providing federal marshals as bodyguards for the Freedom Riders. Eventually he “petitioned the 
Interstate Commerce Commission to mandate the desegregation of all interstate bus terminals,” 
thus giving the Supreme Court ruling teeth, and by the end of 1961 the bus terminals of the 
Deep South were becoming integrated (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:331). 
 
The final campaign that I will mention here is the 1963 protest in Birmingham, which was in 
many ways the watershed moment of the Civil Rights Movement. Birmingham was at the time a 
veritable bastion of segregation, and the movement leaders thought that the ripple effect of a 
victory here would weaken segregation everywhere. Drawing on WWII mythology they referred 
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to the start of the protest as B-Day, and the protesters used the familiar methods of sit-ins and 
demonstrations. The Birmingham authorities respond with mass jailings and legal injunctions 
forbidding demonstrations. For a while the campaign struggled to keep the momentum, as it 
failed to draw significant national media attention, but this changed as the campaign moved into 
its second phase, the launching of which was referred to as D-Day. 
 
On D-Day, thousands of black schoolchildren took to the streets. The police maintained their 
heavy-handed methods, using dogs to intimidate the children and ending up giving three 
teenagers bites that required hospital treatment. This was captured on photograph by journalists, 
and the images soon found their way to the front pages of the national media and “struck like 
lightning in the American mind” (Branch 1988:761). They also reached an international 
audience, and became a source of considerable embarrassment for President Kennedy, as the 
Soviet Union used the Birmingham debacle for propaganda purposes.35 Violence from the 
authorities was thus a critical key to success, playing right into the hands of the movement 
(Tarrow 2003 [1998]:118). There was at times a danger of an outbreak of violence among the 
protesters, but vigilance from the movement leaders kept this largely under control (Branch 
1988:768). 
 
After a federal intervention, the Birmingham campaign ended with negotiations and the gradual 
desegregation of public accommodations. It inspired an outbreak of new campaigns, gave 
Martin Luther King Jr. the status of a national media star,36 spurred President Kennedy to 
introduce the Civil Rights Act37 and generally heralded the fall of the Jim Crow regime. 
                                                 
35 “Intelligence reports noted that the Soviet Union broadcast 1,420 anti-US commentaries about the Birmingham 
crisis during the two weeks following the settlement [...] When President Kennedy sent a message on May 21 to a 
summit conference of the independent African nations, stressing the importance of unity in the free world, Prime 
Minister Milton Obote of Uganda replied with an official protest against the fire hoses and ‘snarling dogs’ of 
Birmingham” (Branch 1988:807). 
36 He was named ‘man of the year’ by Time Magazine (1964) and also won the 1964 Nobel Peace Prize. The media 
– and particularly the emergence of on-site television news-casting – was instrumental to the Civil Rights 
Movement’s success for a number of reasons, as Tarrow (2003 [1998]:115) explains: “first, television brought 
long-ignored grievances to the attention of the nation, and particularly to viewers in the North; second, it visually 
contrasted the peaceful goals of the movement with the viciousness of the police; third, television was a medium of 
communication for those inside the movement. It helped diffuse knowledge of what the movement was doing by 
the visual demonstration of how to sit-in at a lunch counter, how to march peacefully for civil rights, and how to 
respond when attacked by police and fire hoses.” 
37 It was sent as a bill to Congress in June 1963 and signed into law in July 1964. 
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4.3.2 Analytical summary 
For the Boolean and statistical analyses, each of the campaigns described above is designated as 
a separate case. They are however, in the analytical terms of this study, near-identical. With 
regard to the growth of the economy, it would seem preferable to use regional rather than 
national data, but I have been unable to obtain reliable indices of state-by-state GDP growth. 
Overall US per capita growth was 1.47% for the years 1954-56, 0.82% for 1958-60, 2.01% for 
1959-61 and 2.82% for 1961-63 (Heston, Summers and Aten 2006); all code as low.38 The 
mythology of the Jim Crow regime is regarded as low for all cases because of the emerging 
consensus on the depravity of institutionalized racism, and its international support disappeared 
with the emergence of independent black states in Africa. The Cold War was at its height, but as 
the maintenance of the segregation regime was not helping the US in its wrestle with the Soviet 
Union (rather the opposite was the case), the threat level of all cases is reduced from moderate 
to low.  
4.4 Poland: Solidarity 1980-1989 
Communist rule never did enjoy much legitimacy in Poland.39 Of all the East and Central 
European states controlled by the Soviet Union at the end of World War II, Poland and 
Czechoslovakia were the only two that had not fought along with the Germans, and there was as 
such no particular justification for Soviet control. The Poles had furthermore gained their 
independence from the Soviet Union after the Polish-Soviet War of 1919–1921, and generally 
perceived national sovereignty in terms of nondependence on Moscow.40 Stalin himself 
regarded the introduction of communism in Poland like putting a saddle on a cow (Garton Ash 
1991:6), and it was the only communist state where farmers largely remained in control of their 
land. 
 
As the Polish regime was not endogenous, the only heroics attributable to its inception would 
belong to the Red Army. While the Nazi occupation was undoubtedly horrendous and its demise 
thus worthy of bestowing a degree of legitimacy upon the liberator, the political regime installed 
                                                 
38 The World Bank (2008) only has data for 1961-63, its average for this period being 3% (2.7% before round off). 
39 General references for this section are Ackerman and Duvall (2000:113-174), Garton Ash (1991), Mason (1989), 
Modzelewski (1982) and Paulson (2005d). The presentation builds on an earlier work of mine (Johnstad 2007b). 
40 Davies (1996) describes anti-Russian rebellions in Poland in the years 1768, 1794, 1830, 1863, 1905 and 1919. 
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under Stalin’s auspices did not of itself possess a salient myth of heroic origins.41 Furthermore, 
any myth of an ongoing grand struggle with capitalist enemies would probably fail to persuade 
many Poles, whose nation is closely entwined with Western Europe both culturally and 
historically. Under the détente of the 1970s such notions were at any rate surely dead and 
buried. 
 
By the end of the 1970s, the Polish economy had started contracting, leading the government to 
introduce unpopular austerity measures, including a rise in food prices.42 This clearly broadened 
Solidarity’s potential for mobilizing popular support. Externally, the Polish regime obviously 
enjoyed the full support of the Warsaw Pact states, but it was also depending on investment 
flows and loans from the West. The Red Army served as a guarantor of the regime’s survival, 
and this ironically provided the regime with a measure of popular legitimacy as well: the Poles 
understood that if they pushed the regime too far, they risked a repetition of Hungary 1956 or 
Czechoslovakia 1968. With the only apparent alternative to the present regime being a military 
invasion, it thus enjoyed the position as the lesser of evils. By 1980 this may indeed have been 
its sole remaining claim to legitimacy of power.  
 
For the political elite itself, however, communist ideology and its corresponding Polish 
institutions would still serve as a source of self-legitimacy, allowing the regime to think of itself 
as the protector of workers and the common people. It is doubtful whether this ideological 
legitimacy reached anywhere outside the elite circles and certain well-pampered military units, 
however, and – as will be argued below – it was in any case shaken to its core by the rise of 
Solidarity. 
4.4.1 Agency 
There is a delicious irony to the rise of the Solidarity movement in Poland. Here we have a 
group of workers organizing themselves against exploitation from a regime that justifies its very 
existence on being the protector of the rights and interests of workers. The organization of an 
                                                 
41 Those who become rulers through the power of others, says Machiavelli (1988 [1513]:22), “achieve that rank 
with little trouble, but experience great difficulty in retaining it.” The Soviet Union did furthermore occupy Eastern 
Poland during the years 1939-41 and was thus a dubious liberator in 1944-45. 
42 The Penn World Tables (Heston et. al. 2006) give a per capita economic growth of 1.73% for 1978, -3.51% for 
1979, -6.37% for 1980 and -9.87% for 1981. The World Bank has no data for this period. 
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independent labor union in a communist regime states in clear language what people already 
knew but dared not say aloud: the regime’s claim to represent the interests of workers is simply 
a blatant lie. While worker protest reached its climax in 1980 and 1981, its inception goes back 
to earlier years. In 1970, workers rallied in large numbers on the streets of Gdansk, vented their 
anger through rioting and finally set fire to the Communist Party headquarters; the regime 
responded with a violent clampdown that put an end to the protest (Modzelewski 1982; 
Ackerman and Duvall 2000:116-119). These events repeated themselves in 1976, this time with 
the Party headquarters in Radom as the target (Garton Ash 1991:19). 
 
By 1980 the organizers behind the worker protest had understood that new tactics were required. 
Unleashing the workers’ fury on the streets invariably resulted in violent clashes, and gave the 
regime a perfect excuse for bringing in the military. This time around, the workers stayed inside 
their factories, and the general strike became the weapon of choice. Their demands included 
wage increases and other material benefits, but most important was the demand for independent 
unions. During the first year, at least, the movement was also carefully self-limiting, avoiding 
outright calls for regime change. With a few exceptions, the movement remained nonviolent 
throughout its career (Modzelewski 1982:114). 
 
At its height, Solidarity organized not only the vast majority of Polish workers (as many as 90% 
according to Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994:237), but also a large contingent of farmers 
through its sister organization Rural Solidarity. In addition it had important links with students 
and intellectuals like Jacek Kuroń via KOR, the Workers’ Defense Committee. A fourth leg of 
support was provided by the Catholic Church, which enjoyed widespread support among Poles 
and whose influence served to unite the sometimes disparate interests of the various factions of 
the movement. According to Osa (1996:73), “the Roman Catholic Church was crucial in the 
emergence and sustenance of the Solidarity movement. […] The Church elaborated master 
frames, provided organizational resources, developed co-optable social networks, and created a 
repertoire for strategic opposition”. Garton Ash (1991:32) emphasizes in particular the visit of 
the ‘Polish Pope’ in 1979, finding that “John Paul II left thousands of human beings with a new 
self-respect and renewed faith, a nation with a rekindled pride, and a society with a new 
consciousness of its own essential unity”. An independent media network of underground 
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newspapers such as the famous Robotnik (The Worker) provided channels for communication 
beyond the reach of state censors, and the movement was widely reported on internationally.43 
 
After a year of astounding success, Solidarity had established itself as a major player in Polish 
politics and had forever deprived the regime from any legitimate claim to represent workers’ 
interests. It had also gained a substantial measure of international support, especially among 
Western European labor unions. In 1981, partly as a consequence of this success, the self-
imposed limitations gradually disappeared and Solidarity found itself advocating regime change. 
General Jaruzelski responded with a well-planned and executed coup, but “the unprecedented 
necessity for calling on a military leader to head the government demonstrated the collapse of 
the Communist Party’s authority” (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994:237-238), and it succeeded 
essentially only in delaying the inevitable. According to Gorbachev (1995:479), “Martial law 
under Jaruzelski did not put an end to the reforms; in its own way, it facilitated them”, and 
Shevardnadze similarly “came to the conclusion that imposition of martial law in 1981 did not 
end but rather stimulated the internal ferment” (Koslowski and Kratochwil 1994:238).44 
 
For a few years after Jaruzelski’s putsch the Solidarity movement went underground, focusing 
its energies on constructing a self-sufficient and independent civil society. According to Laba 
(in Tarrow 2003 [1998]:85) “books and articles by Solidarity writers continued to be published 
even during the martial law period”. During the mid-1980s the economy was seeing growth 
figures of around 4-5%, but by the end of the decade a new decline was in progress (Heston et 
al. 2006) and worker unrest resurfaced. At this point the Polish regime also had new signals 
from Moscow to deal with,45 involving a clear loss of external legitimacy for military 
crackdowns. In 1988 roundtable discussions between Solidarity and the regime were initiated, 
and by August 1989, after winning a landslide electoral victory, a coalition led by Solidarity 
formed a new government.  
                                                 
43 Lech Wałęsa, like Mohandas Gandhi and Martin Luther King Jr. before him, was named ‘man of the year’ by 
Time Magazine (1982). He also won the Nobel Peace Prize in 1983. 
44 Davies (1996:1108) calls Jaruzelski’s coup “the hollowest of victories” and goes on to say that “History must 
give the Poles the principal credit for bringing the Soviet bloc to its knees.” 
45 As the above quotes from Gorbachev and Shevardnadze suggest, the new viewpoint in Moscow may in part have 
been informed by the events in Poland. “Gorbachev’s strategy,” suggest Koslowski and Kratochwil (1994:217), 
“was to counteract the loss of legitimacy of the Communist Party in the Eastern Bloc as well as the Soviet Union”. 
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4.4.2 Analytical summary 
Solidarity’s rise to power is delineated into the following three cases: the unsuccessful violent 
riots of 1976, the years of emergence in 1980-81, and the assumption of power in 1988-89. Per 
capita economic growth was 8.12% for the years 1974-76, -2.72% for 1978-80 and 2.80% for 
1986-88 (Heston et al. 2006). The political mythology of the communist regime and its Kremlin 
overlords was unconvincing throughout the three cases, and the international support for 
Poland’s regime was strong until Gorbachev removed the Red Army as a prop for the regime, 
and moderate thereafter. It is debatable whether religious authority was present for the 1976 
protest, which took place before Pope John Paul II’s visit and may not have been supported by 
ecclesiastical authorities. Both protesters and the regime were violent in 1976, whereas in 1980-
81 the only major violence was Jaruzelski’s putsch.46 Threat level is coded as moderate for the 
1976 and 1980-81 cases due to the ongoing Cold War.47 
4.5 China: student movement 1989 
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) underwent a long and arduous struggle on its way to 
power, fighting off both the Japanese invaders and the Guomintang.48 Its triumph in 1949 
marked the start of a new era for the Chinese nation, and to have taken part in this brave struggle 
– to have ‘revolutionary credentials’ – was long a primary source of legitimacy for the political 
leadership. Neither the Japanese nor the Guomintang saw fit to disappear, of course, the latter 
retreating to Taiwan to pose a lasting thorn in the side to China’s communist regime. During the 
following decades both underwent remarkable economic resurgences under the auspices of that 
very quintessence of capitalism, the USA, who on account both of its anti-communism and its 
military hegemony in the Pacific region quickly became China’s primary strategic rival.  
 
                                                 
46 Paulson (2005d:226), quoting Garton Ash, reports several hundred wounded people and at least ten deaths. 
47 This complies with the coding rules but is to some extent against better judgment. On the other side of the Cold 
War divide, for instance in Latin American military dictatorships, the threat from communism no doubt seemed real 
both to the political elite and segments of the public because of communism’s subversive nature. The threat was 
that communist ideology could somehow permeate the poor and ignorant masses much like a disease, and thus 
undermine the very foundations of society. There were also the communist guerillas to deal with. Capitalism, by 
contrast, would appeal primarily to capital interests, which in communist countries were the nomenklatura and 
political elites themselves, and the threat – at least by the time of the 1970s détente – was far less credible. 
48 General references for this section are Ackerman and Duvall (2000:421-426), Hong (1990), Nathan and Link 
(2001), Paulson (2005f), Saich (2004) and Schock (2005:91-119). The case presentation builds on an earlier work 
of mine (Johnstad 2007b). 
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In addition to all of this the CCP may also boast of having finally rid China from meddling by 
European imperialists. The political mythology of the Chinese Communist Party thus involves 
not only a noble liberation by arms of destitute Chinese farmers enthralled by Guomintang 
bourgeois capitalists, Japanese invaders and European empires, but also the continued need for a 
struggle against all three – with the emerging superpower of the USA taking the place of the 
declining European powers. Surrounded by enemies, China was in desperate need of gaining 
strength both in military and industrial/economic terms, and the regime thus had a strong case 
for mythological self-legitimacy as the saviors of farmers and workers in particular and the 
Chinese nation in general. Restoring the elevated position of China in the world is an issue that 
“a nation with a psychology that emphasizes the superiority of Chinese culture” (Saich 
2004:308) would readily respond to, and the stage was thus set for an epic struggle upon which 
the regime could mobilize the masses. 
 
A further point relating to the mythological legitimacy of the regime may be obtained from the 
influence of Confucianism on Chinese culture. Confucian ideology is famously hierarchical and 
patriarchical, leaving little room for subjects to question their masters. Ling (1994) argues along 
these lines that a Confucian rhetoric of parental governance influenced Chinese state elites to 
regard dissenters as irresponsible deviants that the parent-state has a moral obligation to clamp 
down on. “We must deal with the students as parents to children, being strict when necessary,” 
said Yao Yilin at a Politburo meeting during the protests of 1989 (Nathan and Link 2001:136). 
 
By the 1980s the Chinese regime had moved into a posttotalitarian (as defined by Linz 1975) 
phase under Deng Xioaping, losing some of the charismatic legitimacy inherent to the Mao era. 
Deng soon enough developed a certain charismatic appeal of his own, however, and the 
discontinuation of Cultural Revolution-style politics was undoubtedly a popular move. 
Economic liberalization furthermore improved growth to miracle levels, although this did bring 
with it the familiar growing pains of price hikes and an uneven distribution of the newfound 
wealth, making life difficult for some citizens.49 According to Schock (2005:98-99), “Students 
                                                 
49 The Penn World Tables (Heston et. al. 2006) give an average annual per capita growth of 9.35% from 1982 
through 1988. 
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and intellectuals in particular were adversely affected by the economic reforms”, seeing their 
standard of living and social status declining in comparison with uneducated entrepreneurs. 
 
On the international front, Deng’s policy of liberalization enjoyed a substantial degree of 
support in the West. Time Magazine (1986) famously proclaimed Deng the ‘man of the year’, 
reflecting the American approval of his break with Mao-era economics.50 A rapprochement with 
the Soviets was furthermore in its final stages. Communist ideology itself had however suffered 
a sharp loss of legitimacy because of the events in Eastern Europe, and Gorbachev’s policy of 
perestroika was well known among Chinese students and intellectuals, inspiring them toward 
demanding similar policies at home.51 It seems likely, however, that the knowledge of global 
developments and the corresponding change in sentiment regarding communist ideology had 
penetrated urban areas – and in particular the student population – to a much higher degree than 
the countryside. This discrepancy between the urban and rural population with regard to the 
mythological-ideological component of the regime’s legitimacy probably contributed in large 
part to the former supporting the student-led protests and the latter ignoring them.52 
4.5.1 Agency 
Democratization activists in the People’s Republic of China made their first important 
appearance during the “Beijing Spring” of 1978-1979. The Democracy Wall movement – a 
strictly urban affair confined to Beijing – did however peter out after a regime clampdown. In 
1986, with economic reform well in progress, students demonstrated for an increasing pace of 
corresponding political reforms, although few went as far as to advocate outright regime change 
(Saich 2004:66). The protests failed to influence regime policy in any significant way. 
 
In 1989, protests reemerged in full. The catalyst was the death and burial of the popular 
reformer Hu Yaobang, as well as concerns about inflation and government corruption. Starting 
in Beijing, the protests soon spread to other major urban centers, although they did remain 
                                                 
50 Deng was also ‘man of the year’ in 1977. 
51 “[It] is clear that much of the inspiration for the students derived from reforms in Poland and Hungary and from 
the reform programme launched by Gorbachev in the Soviet Union.” (Saich 2004:210). 
52 The Chinese rural population also vastly outnumbered the city-dwellers: according to World Bank (2008) data, 
73% of the 1989 Chinese population lived in rural areas, with 59% of the total workforce being employed in 
agriculture. Urban isolation has been presented as a key to explaining the successful suppression of the 1989 
democracy movement (Seldon, in Thompson 2001:67). 
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confined to cities with universities. Unlike the protests of 1986, the student demonstrations this 
time around “quickly found resonance with large numbers of the urban citizenry” (Saich 
2004:71). Workers did not initiate any major campaigns on their own, however.53 Students 
occupied the Tiananmen Square in Beijing and held street rallies on a nationwide basis; with 
time a mass hunger strike involving thousands of students became the nucleus of the movement. 
The protests seem to have been largely spontaneous, and while a number of different 
organizations took control over different initiatives, the movement did not have an overall 
leadership, a fact which complicated negotiations with the authorities as well as decreasing the 
movement’s resilience in the face of a regime crackdown (Schock 2005:104).54 Another 
problem for the movement was its inability to gain media access and establish lines of 
communication, as the regime, after some initial wavering, successfully jammed international 
radio broadcasts, cut off access to fax machines and imposed strict censorship on the domestic 
media (ibid:116-118). 
 
The Chinese regime suffered a split in its leadership over how to deal with the protests, and its 
initial response was quite restrained.55 After more than a month of dithering, the regime elders 
eventually decided to impose martial law, causing the students to arm themselves (Nathan and 
Link 2001:365-398). What had hitherto been a predominantly nonviolent movement did as such 
end with violent rioting – a fact which was perhaps inevitable given the lack of overall 
leadership and the hotheadedness of the youthful protesters. The regime, which had all along 
                                                 
53 Zhao Ziyang summed up the situation to Deng Xioaping on May 13: “The workers are unhappy about certain 
social conditions and like to let off steam from time to time, so they sympathize with the protesters. But they go to 
work as usual and they aren’t striking, demonstrating, or traveling around like the students” (Nathan and Link 
2001:149). 
54 In the eyes of the Politburo, however, the protests were undoubtedly organized by hidden manipulators. 
According to Li Ximing at a Politburo meeting Apr 24: “The students themselves would not be able to come up 
with this kind of power. Black hands and provocateurs are behind them” (Nathan and Link 2001:57). Similar 
assertions are repeated by Li Peng, Deng Xioaping and Yao Yilin at several occasions (ibid: 72-73, 88, 136, 225), 
and may be regarded as a means of preserving self-legitimacy. By demonizing the protests in this manner, defining 
them as ‘enemy action’, the Politburo members provided a justification to themselves for eventually cracking down 
on the movement. Only Zhao Ziyang, who was soon ostracized, expressed doubts about the existence of this ‘tiny 
minority’ of manipulators and enemy agents (ibid: 117). 
55 Even remarkably so. If we are to believe the minutes detailing the discussions among the Politburo Standing 
Committee and the ‘elders’ on this issue, there was widespread and seemingly genuine concern regarding how to 
avoid bloodshed. Yang Shangkun, speaking to the Central Military Commission on May 20 reportedly stated that 
“even if troops should be beaten, burned, or killed by the unenlightened masses, or if they should be attacked by 
lawless elements with clubs, bricks, or Molotov cocktails, they must maintain control and defend themselves with 
nonlethal methods. Clubs should be their major weapons of self-defense, and they are not to open fire on the 
masses. Violators will be punished” (Nathan and Link 2001:242). 
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been trying to brand the protests as ‘unrest’, was thus to a degree proven right, and gained an 
excuse for their actions: clamping down heavily on violent riots is, after all, quite a different 
thing from brutalizing nonviolent protesters. In any case, the regime proceeded to clear 
Tiananmen Square and soon brought an end to the nationwide demonstrations. It remains in 
power to this day. 
4.5.2 Analytical summary 
Besides the protests of 1989, the Democracy Wall movement of 1978-79 and the student 
protests of 1986 are coded as separate cases. Per capita economic growth was 4.42% for the 
years 1976-78, 11.19% for 1984-86 and 5.11% for 1987-89 (Heston et al. 2006).56 The two 
former cases were both without any major violence, and when the police eventually moved in to 
crack down on the protest they simply arrested and jailed those deemed to have crossed the line 
without causing a violent confrontation. Despite ending up in a violent riot, the student 
movement of 1989 was also predominantly nonviolent throughout its career and is encoded as 
such. It does however constitute an in-between case. Threat level is coded as moderate for the 
1978-79 and 1986 cases because of the Cold War and China’s strategic rivalry with the USA.57 
4.6 Russia 1905 
1905 was a difficult year for the Russian Empire.58 Discontent with Imperial misrule had been 
building up for decades, with a motley crew of bourgeois liberals, destitute peasants, union 
builders, students, Bolsheviks, Mensheviks and anarchists demanding political and social 
reforms. In East Asia the Empire had suffered a series of humiliating defeats in the war with 
Japan, serving to discredit its armed forces and government alike. Although a spurt of 
industrialization took place in the 1890s, the rate of per capita economic growth never exceeded 
25% per decade (Gregory 1972:433).59 And while political reforms were taking place over much 
of Europe, Tsar Nicholas II clung tenaciously to his autocratic powers. Russia was entering the 
20th century with a regime hopelessly stuck in the past, and this fact was becoming clear to 
increasing numbers of its people. 
 
                                                 
56 The World Bank (2008) has 4% for 1976-78, 11% for 1984-86 and 8% for 1987-89. 
57 See however footnote 47 for a critique of this coding. 
58 General references for this section are Ackerman and Duvall (2000:13-59) and Sharp (2005:71-89). 
59 Calculated for compound interest, this equals a 2.25% annual growth. 
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Early in the year, more than one hundred thousand protesters marched towards the royal palace 
in St. Petersburg demanding representative government and social rights. As they approached 
the palace the police started firing into the crowds, dispersing the protesters – and setting off a 
year of unprecedented unrest in every corner of the Russian Empire. The Tsar had at last shown 
his true colors, and his position as the benign father and protector of the nation – a cherished 
notion particularly among the poor masses – was irredeemably tarnished (Ackerman and Duvall 
2000:31; Sharp 2005:74). The method of the general strike was born during this struggle, and 
the following months saw repeated large-scale strikes. Underground newspapers had long 
espoused views critical of the regime, but the press now took the liberty of openly reporting and 
commenting on events as they saw fit. There was however little strategy or leadership behind 
the campaign, which took both liberals and socialists by surprise; and for the most part workers 
would strike spontaneously, sometimes for economic and sometimes for political reasons, and 
often in sympathy with other strikers. Sharp (2005:80) quotes 1,000,000 factory workers, 
700,000 railroad workers and 50,000 government employees as being on strike during the heady 
October days, and the combined efforts of railroad and telegraph workers largely succeeded in 
paralyzing communications within the empire.  
 
Adding to the chaos were violent right-wing groups carrying out pogroms against Jews and 
other ethnic groups, and eventually a growing urge for violent insurgency among some resisters 
themselves. The Bolsheviks in particular encouraged the workers to take up arms, believing that 
nothing short of a violent revolution could lead to lasting political changes. In the event of an 
armed confrontation, they insisted, the military forces would join forces with the uprising; and 
in fact there had been widespread unrest and several cases of mutiny both among soldiers and 
sailors during the previous months.  
 
In mid-October the Tsar released a manifesto promising a liberalization of the regime. The 
concessions included a guarantee of civil rights as well as a modest increase of the powers of the 
Duma, and seem to have succeeded in splitting the already fragmented protest movement. Some 
extolled the October Manifesto for introducing a new democratic order, while others claimed it 
did not go far enough. This caused a split in the protest movement, with moderates refraining 
from further initiatives and revolutionaries taking charge of what remained of the movement. 
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Soon an armed militia under Bolshevik auspices entrenched itself in a Moscow neighborhood, 
sniping at any police or military personnel crossing its path. Thus they played right into the 
hands of the government, as the loyalty of the army to the Tsarist regime was now ensured 
(Seton-Watson, in Sharp 2005:87). Rather than facing a nebulous and unmanageable cloud of 
noncooperating workers, the government now had a more conventional kind of enemy that it 
could fight directly, and which furthermore helped to discredit the whole resistance movement. 
The armed insurrection was rapidly and brutally defeated, and – as Lenin himself admitted 
(quoted in Sharp 2005:88) – deprived the resistance of its momentum. Its outcome was thus a 
slightly liberalized regime, and the revolutionary ferment subsided and lay dormant until 1917 – 
which was another case of a nonviolent uprising that took the Bolsheviks by surprise but which 
they eventually succeeded in subverting and assuming control of. 
4.7 Nazi Germany 1943 
By 1943 the tide of war had turned against the Axis powers.60 The German attack on Stalingrad 
had been repelled at huge cost to both sides, and was a turning point of the war in Europe. 
Closer to home, Allied bombers rained death and destruction on German cities.61 Economic 
hardship was also intensifying as Albert Speer tried to put every aspect of the economy on a war 
footing. The Nazi regime was no longer delivering what it had promised, and “Wartime morale 
had never been lower” (Stoltzfus 2005:146). 
 
In an attempt to exorcise the demons from the stunning defeat at Stalingrad, the Nazi leadership 
embarked on a policy of purification: Berlin, the center of Nazi power, was to be made 
Judenrein. It was the final roundup of the capital’s Jews, many of whom were men married to 
German women and had for this reason so far been spared arrest. As their husbands failed to 
return from work, 600 to 1,000 wives gathered in spontaneous protest to get them back from the 
SS. The women protested in front of the internment building in Berlin for one week, at which 
point Goebbels ordered the release of the 1,700-2,000 Jews that had been arrested, some of 
whom had already been transferred to Auschwitz. Efforts to intern German Jews married to non-
                                                 
60 General references for this section are Ackerman and Duvall (2000:236-239) and Stoltzfus (2005). 
61 And by fortuitous coincidence, the first major bombing of Berlin took place just as the protests described in this 
section were beginning (Stoltzfus 2005:145). 
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Jews were discontinued, and after the war this group constituted 98% of the surviving German 
Jews that had not been driven into hiding (Stoltzfus 2005:147). 
 
This may sound rather too good to be true: it is hard to imagine a more brutal regime than that of 
the Nazis, and it seems inconceivable that they should give in to the demands of a relatively 
small nonviolent protest, on an issue that they regarded with such fanatic concern, after only a 
week.62 Had the protesters been Polish women in Warsaw, or Ukrainians in Kiev, the SS would 
surely, after so many massacres, not have thought twice about killing them by the hundreds. The 
difference is thus that these were German women, and that their protest constituted a challenge 
from the German people to its self-proclaimed guardians, whose propaganda machine required 
the illusion of mass conformity and the non-existence of dissent. While there was a faction of 
the Nazi security apparatus that wanted to solve the problem through brute force, Goebbels was 
apparently wary of inflaming the situation.63 The protesters had no media access on their own, 
but nevertheless reached an international audience via the foreign diplomats, journalists and 
spies in Berlin, and London radio reported on their protest (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:237). 
 
In coding this case, the hardship brought by the war-time economy is taken to justify this case as 
one of economic decline, even though the production of military hardware was certainly a 
growth industry. Note that this case is one where protest is directed at a specific policy regime 
rather than the political regime itself. The question of political mythology is somewhat difficult 
(not to say controversial), but while anti-Semitism was rife in Germany it seems fair to assume 
that most Germans did not support its institutionalization as industrialized genocide.64 
International support was obviously a mixed bag,65 and threat level was high but is reduced to 
                                                 
62 Towards the end of the war, Nazi Germany famously gave trains carrying Jews to concentration camps priority of 
passage before trains carrying reinforcements to the front. 
63 After the war, Goebbel’s deputy Gutterer (in Stoltzfus 2005:147) stated that “The police could have arrested [the 
protesting women] and sent them to a concentration camp, but that wasn’t handled that way because the people 
openly made public that they weren’t in agreement with what was happening”. 
64 Ackerman and Duvall (2000:236) indicate that the genocide against Jews had so far been kept secret, and that 
one reason why the protesting women were considered a danger was that they threatened to expose this secret, and 
thus – perhaps – unleash a wave of outrage among the German people. 
65 Note that the Italian fascists did not share the Nazi preoccupation with Jews, nor were they – or the other allies of 
Nazi Germany, with the possible exception of the Finns – part of the ‘Aryan race’ in the Nazi understanding of that 
phrase; still, many were happy enough with shipping off their Jewry to the German camps.  
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moderate as the discontinuation of the genocide policy would not threaten Nazi Germany’s 
ability to fight its enemies. 
4.8 El Salvador 1944 
Coffee was the main cash crop in El Salvador, and the rich coffee elite had long controlled the 
country’s political system.66 The early 1930s were tumultuous times, however, with the 
worldwide economic depression causing a collapse of coffee prices and a subsequent increase in 
social unrest. This brought General Martínez, a social and economic outsider, to power. Inspired 
by the strengthening military regimes in Europe at the time, Martínez courted fascists and Nazis 
alike, receiving war planes from Italy and using Germans to train his officer corps. This caused 
a major loss of face when the United States entered the war in 1941, and El Salvador ended up 
joining the other Central American countries in a declaration of war on the axis powers. The war 
does however seem to have been something of an economic blessing, bringing an influx of loans 
and trade with the United States (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:248). 
 
By 1941 president Martínez had succeeded in extending the customary two terms of presidency 
and was well into his third period. The popularity that he had once enjoyed was however fast 
diminishing, and in early 1944 an attempted coup was defeated and the president was becoming 
increasingly paranoid. He introduced harsh repressive measures whose violence shocked and 
angered the Salvadoran population. University students in the capital San Salvador took the 
initiative by starting a strike, opting for a stay-at-home tactic that would give the regime no one 
to aim their weapons on. The student strike set off a wave of strikes among workers as well as 
professionals, serving as a channel for the popular anger at the president. The government tried 
to defuse the situation by releasing prisoners from the earlier coup attempt, and they used state-
controlled newspapers to discredit the strike movement as “rich and powerful people who 
neglect […] the needs of the poor” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:259). 
 
President Martínez did not willingly initiate a violent repression of the strike organizers, but an 
incident where a nervous police officer opened fire on a gathering of youths resulted in the 
                                                 
66 General references for this section are Ackerman and Duvall (2000:241-265) and Williams and Walter (1997:13-
36). 
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killing of an American citizen and brought angry protesters out on the streets. It was the last 
straw: government ministers started to resign, and within days the president was ousted from the 
country. During a last meeting with his administration, Martínez stated that “against the people, 
I am not going to take any violent measure. If the people now want me to retire, I am willing to 
do it without difficulty” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:262). 
 
The nonviolent resistance in El Salvador 1944 was an unqualified success, but was aimed more 
at removing the sitting president than at a reform of the regime. A window of political openness 
was created, but within half a year a military coup brought any hopes of democratization to an 
end. As Ackerman and Duvall (2000:265) sum it up, “A force more powerful than violence 
brought Martínez down, but it did not automatically create conditions for a stable civilian, 
democratic regime.”  
 
In coding this case, the political mythology is regarded as low because of the Second World 
War, which – at least by 1944 – made self-styled fascist dictators look like a thing of the past. 
The protest movement used the war as a cover, with the press quoting pro-democracy speeches 
from Churchill and Roosevelt as implicit criticism of El Salvador’s dictatorial regime.  
4.9 Guatemala 1944 
General Jorge Ubico was elected president of Guatemala in 1931.67 The elections were 
uncontested and victory thus assured, although the reason for this seems to be that the 
opposition lacked viable candidates who could challenge the popular General (Grieb 1979:10-
11). Ubico was a dynamic leader who initiated large infrastructure projects and performed well 
on behalf of the economy, and he was for many years quite popular. As his term in office neared 
its end, he held a successful plebiscite68 to suspend an article of the constitution barring 
reelection, and received continued tenure until 1943.  
 
                                                 
67 General references for this section are Grieb (1979) and Sharp (2005:149-155). 
68 Note, however, that ”Under standard Guatemalan voting procedures, citizens were required to sign their ballots” 
(Grieb 1979:121). 
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Ubico was strongly pro-American, but like his counterpart Martínez in neighboring El Salvador 
he also had an affinity for the emergent fascist dictators in Europe.69 He joined the USA in the 
war against his ideological compatriots in the Axis powers, but the war nevertheless “caused 
considerable strain between Guatemala and the United States” (Grieb 1979:248). The US press 
repeatedly characterized Ubico as pro-fascist, and the presence of a strong German community 
in Guatemala resulted in US demands that the General should confiscate their property. Ubico 
was thus in an unhappy position, and while he belatedly initiated the requested policies and 
thereby lost all support from the German community, his foot-dragging also served to annoy 
Washington. This move furthermore damaged the economy, and the war thus had “drastic 
economic consequences” for Guatemala, its economic impact being “more serious in Guatemala 
than in other Latin American republics” (Grieb 1979:261, 264). 
 
As his second term in office neared its end, Ubico manipulated the National Assembly to grant 
him a third, this time without a plebiscite. This move demolished whatever democratic 
legitimacy he may once have had, and by this time Ubico’s strong-man fascist credentials were 
at best problematic, as fascists were now not only the official enemy but also one facing 
worldwide defeat. His claim to performance legitimacy was shattered by the economic 
problems, and he had strained relations with much of the urban bourgeoisie as well as with the 
USA. Then, in the spring of 1944, a nonviolent revolt in neighboring El Salvador (see above) 
ousted General Martínez and inspired Guatemalans to act. 
 
Students and lawyers took the initiative. The latter published a series of critical articles in a 
major newspaper (Sharp 2005:150), and the former distributed leaflets and organized 
demonstrations. Army units fired into the crowd, killing a female schoolteacher and thus 
providing the movement with a martyr. Being warned that further protests would be fired upon, 
the movement retreated from the streets and focused its energies on a general strike. Supported 
by labor groups, a substantial portion of the middle class and the capital’s businessmen, the 
economic shutdown paralyzed Guatemala City, and Ubico soon tendered his resignation. 
                                                 
69 “[F]ascism’s emphasis on strongman rule, militarism, and nationalism endowed it with considerable appeal in 
Guatemala […] Ubico personally admired Benito Mussolini, and viewed his actions favorably” (Grieb 1979:248, 
249). 
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Another strongman tried to take his place, but after renewed protest and a rare pro-democracy 
coup, fair elections were held and Guatemala embarked on a decade of democratic rule. 
4.10 South Africa 1948-1994 
Since the first arrival of Dutch colonists in the 17th century, racism had been a primary social 
organizing principle in South Africa.70 After World War II – in defiance of, or perhaps in 
preparation for, the emerging black liberation movements in Africa and the USA – South 
African racism crystallized into the system of apartheid, which served to enforce segregation 
policies and turned the country into a veritable citadel of white supremacy ideology. In an even 
stronger and more formalized manner than before, the apartheid laws systematically deprived 
colored people of their civil rights and made them subject to severe economic exploitation. They 
also, however, served to galvanize a black resistance movement. 
 
The emerging protest movement, initiated by the African National Congress (ANC) in 
cooperation with other organizations, was inspired by Gandhi’s earlier campaigns of nonviolent 
action but suffered the familiar problem of protests turning into violent riots. The ANC 
leadership furthermore committed the strategic mistake of allying itself with South African 
communists and, somewhat later, accepting military training and financial support from 
communist countries (Wood 2000:131). This turned the struggle against apartheid into a Cold 
War frontline and guaranteed a measure of Western support for the South African regime until 
the fall of communism. The regime for its part passed the Suppression of Communism Act in 
1950 and proceeded to try ANC and other activists under its statutes.  
 
Until the Sharpeville massacre of 1960, the anti-apartheid movement was still by ideology, if 
not always in fact, adhering to nonviolent tactics. Sharpeville was a target of a ‘jail-in’ 
campaign, where 5,000 protesters appeared at the police station in defiance of law, expecting to 
be taken into custody. A long standoff ensued, and after a few hours the police started firing into 
the crowd, killing dozens. This massacre resulted in a nationwide outburst of protest and riots, 
                                                 
70 General references for this section are Ackerman and Duvall (2000:335-368), Borer (1996), Price (1991), Schock 
(2005:56-90), Wood (2000:111-208) and Zunes (1999b). 
 67 
widespread international condemnation71, a government ban on opposition organizations like the 
ANC, and a change of strategy among the ANC leadership. Nelson Mandela (1918-), a long-
standing advocate of armed action, now received a mandate to form Umkhonto we Sizwe (Spear 
of the Nation) as the armed wing of ANC. A campaign of sabotage against government 
buildings was initiated, and did, despite a policy of avoiding human casualties, result in the 
death of some people. The campaign was suppressed within a few years, and the resistance 
movement was largely laid low for the rest of the 1960s. 
 
A new generation of protesters emerged in the early 1970s to organize the Black Consciousness 
Movement. Its leader, Steve Biko (1946-1977), believed that “emancipation had to originate in 
the minds of individuals” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:341) and called for black people to free 
themselves from a brainwashing school system whose primary intent was to prepare them for 
subservience to the white establishment. The movement culminated in the Soweto protest of 
1976, where students marched in opposition to a new policy of teaching classes in Afrikaans. 
The police cracked down on the march with tear gas and eventually live ammunition, killing a 
thirteen-year old boy. Rioting ensued, first in Soweto and then nationwide, and by the time it 
ended ten months later, 1,149 people were dead72 – five of whom were white. Steve Biko died in 
police custody, and Black Consciousness had run its course. Internationally, the brutality of the 
South African regime incurred significant condemnation, including two resolutions from the 
United Nations Security Council (1976; 1977) denouncing the violence and imposing an arms 
embargo. 
 
The 1980s brought a number of important changes to the anti-apartheid movement. Two 
important social actors – black labor unions and church organizations – threw their weight 
behind the resistance movement during these years, giving it significant economic leverage as 
well as religious authority. First were the black labor unions, which had pulled off a few 
significant victories in mid-1970s labor disputes and were now growing explosively in numbers. 
                                                 
71 Including the United Nations Security Council Resolution 134 of 1960, which among other things “Deplores the 
policies and actions of the Government of the Union of South Africa which have given rise to the present 
situation”. 
72 The above figure is from Ackerman and Duvall (2000:343); Wood (2000:135), quoting Karis and Gerhart, 
reports 575 casualties. Price (1991:48) quotes 570 as the official estimate and more than 1,000 as unofficial 
estimates of the death toll. 
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In contrast with earlier labor strikes, which had maintained a narrow issue scope, unions were 
now becoming increasingly politicized, so that “many unionists were themselves heavily 
involved in community politics and some were cooperating with the underground ANC” (Wood 
2000:138). With black South Africans vastly outnumbering whites, the apartheid regime was 
dependent on black labor and thus obviously subject to pressure (Schock 2005:63).73 Strike 
action increased dramatically throughout the 1980s, reaching a peak in 1987 with around 11% 
of the nonagricultural workforce being on strike (Wood 2000:133).74  
 
Sustained labor action had serious consequences for South African industries. Investor 
confidence plummeted,75 and in addition to the direct costs incurred by strikers the economy 
was also hit by an ever tighter regime of international sanctions. While income was decreasing, 
government expenses spiraled because of the efforts to strengthen the security forces, and it was 
gradually becoming obvious to people that the apartheid regime was unsustainable. According 
to Wood (ibid:168), “it was the rising militancy of the emerging unions and the increasing 
unrest of the townships in the 1980s that convinced business elites that fundamental political 
reform […] was necessary, and that such reform required negotiation with the ANC”.76 
 
Meanwhile, the black South African church organizations were also becoming increasingly 
politicized. From the early 1980s onwards they “intensified their overt political involvement, 
became active in the struggle to ensure the collapse of apartheid and the emergence of a 
democratic South Africa, and viewed this commitment as an integral part of their Christian 
mission” (Borer 1996:126). Besides their considerable organizational resources they also 
possessed a high degree of religious and moral authority, and charismatic church leaders like 
Desmond Tutu (1931-) mobilized support for the anti-apartheid movement and emphasized 
nonviolence as the strategy of choice. Winning a Nobel Peace Price in 1984, Tutu was highly 
respected internationally and thus largely untouchable by the regime. By the end of the decade, 
“mobilized Christians were in the forefront of the Anti-apartheid struggle, leading protest 
                                                 
73 According to Price (1991:17), “it is the South African white community’s utter dependence on black labor that 
represents the weakest link in its system of power and privilege”. 
74 Schock (2005:85) reports data from the South African government counting over 1,100 strikes in 1987. 
75 From 1977 onwards, long-term investment flows constituted an averaged outflow of capital (Wood 2000:154). 
76 And according to Schock (2005:65), the labor movement “contributed to elite divisions between capitalists and 
the state and ultimately to a shift in the balance of power in South Africa”. 
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marches, boycotting elections, and meeting in solidarity with banned organizations at home and 
in exile” (ibid:126). 
 
Strikes and other nonviolent tactics such as consumer boycotts, rent strikes and the self-
organization of local government (Price 1991:204-215; Ackerman and Duvall 2000:354-363) 
were however forced to coexist with endemic township violence. While the two forms of 
resistance were generally separate (excepting the ANC, which continued a campaign of 
sabotage and did not renounce violence until 1989), this contributed to maintaining a high threat 
level in South African society even as the threat from communism subsided in the mid-1980s.77 
 
In 1989, changes in South Africa’s political leadership and global winds of change set the stage 
for negotiations. Business leaders had already taken the initiative, holding meetings with the 
ANC leadership in Lusaka and London since 1985 (Wood 2000:174).78 By 1991, to a backdrop 
of spiraling internecine violence79, an agreement was hammered out, and in 1994 a democratic 
South Africa held its founding election. The ANC took office as part of a grand coalition, and 
proceeded to win two-thirds majorities in the subsequent national elections of 1999 and 2004. 
 
To sum up the coding of the South African cases, the per capita economic growth was 1.39% for 
the years 1958-60, 1.32% for 1974-76, -1.45% for 1985-87 and -1.08% for 1992-94 (Heston et 
al. 2006); the former two code as ‘low’ and the latter two as ‘decline’.80 Despite the post-WWII 
                                                 
77 During the mid-1980s the black townships of South Africa were undergoing a full-scale violent insurrection 
(Price 1991:190-219), and the coding of the 1987 case as ‘nonviolent’ may thus seem surprising to some. This case 
refers however to the strike activities of industrial and in particular mine workers, which were in many ways 
decisive for the eventual collapse of the apartheid regime (Wood 2000) and which, being centered on the workplace 
rather than the townships, may reasonably be regarded as separate from the violent protests taking place within 
these black communities.  This is however debatable, and if one refuses this perhaps overly neat demarcation 
between violent and nonviolent protest, the South African case of the 1980s would constitute a clear exception to 
the general findings of this study. 
78 The economic elite were clearly worried about the future. Wood (2000:171-172) quotes one ‘high-level 
executive’ as saying that “Clearly in the business community we were extremely concerned about the long-run 
ability to do business, the health of the South African economy. Equally we were concerned about preserving 
international linkages which were related to the ability to do business. Our assessment was that if left too long, the 
costs would be too high and the ability of the economy to support democratization would have been removed. And 
so it was important, to the extent that one could, to try to hasten the process”. 
79 This violence was in part a product of elements of the security forces funding the Inkatha Freedom Party to 
undermine the ongoing talks – later known as the Inkathagate scandal (Wood 2000:183-184). 
80 The World Bank (2008) has no data for 1958-60. Its averages are 1% for 1974-76, -2% for 1985-87 and -1% for 
1992-94; all generally concur with the above figures. 
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international backlash against racist politics, the National Party won 1948 elections on a 
program of reinforcing segregation and white supremacy, and institutionalized racism obviously 
had the support of many South African whites. This must nevertheless be balanced by the 
growing waves of international anti-racism and black liberation, which eventually started to 
erode domestic white support for racism. By the early 1980s South Africa’s three regional allies 
– Rhodesia and Portuguese-controlled Mozambique and Angola – had been replaced by black 
African regimes hostile to Pretoria, and South Africa was becoming increasingly isolated (Price 
1991:42). It was now the world’s only brazenly racist state, and was fast becoming an 
international pariah subject to massive public condemnation. Yet there was still some underhand 
support for the South African regime as an ally against communism.81  
4.11 Chile 1983-1988 
General Pinochet assumed control of Chile after a 1973 coup deposing the socialist government 
of President Allende.82 The coup was justified as necessary to keep Chile from succumbing to 
communist rule, and was for this reason supported both by the USA and by much of the Chilean 
bourgeoisie.83 Pinochet’s regime implemented free market economic policies that, according to 
Markoff (1996:90), are remembered for their success even by some on the left of the political 
divide; strong periods of growth were however intercepted by devastating economic collapses in 
                                                 
81 A National Security Study Memorandum during Kissinger’s tenure as National Security Advisor stated that “We 
would maintain public opposition to racial repression, but relax political isolation and economic restrictions on the 
white state” (quoted in Price 1991:24). As late as 1989 Thatcher warned “that she could not hold off further 
sanctions forever” (Wood 2000:181), and Reagan never tired of reminding people that South Africa had been a 
WWII ally of the USA – which is ironic since the ruling Nationalist Party had in fact voted against South Africa 
joining the war against Nazi Germany. Price (1991:222) describes Reagan as “a president who was adamantly 
opposed to sanctions” against South Africa but who was however forced by political concerns at home to introduce 
punitive sanctions; the underlying reason being of course the apartheid regime’s egregious human rights violations 
and utter non-compliance with the emerging Western consensus on institutionalized racism. Reagan also tried to 
veto the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act passed by the US Congress in 1985 but was overridden by a two-thirds 
majority.   
82 General references for this section are Ackerman and Duvall (2000:279-302), Constable and Valenzuela (1991) 
and Spooner (1994). 
83 Allende received only 36% of the vote in the 1971 election, and ascended to power only because the Chilean 
electorate was split in three almost equal parts. His economic policies were not very popular nor, it seems, 
particularly successful: economic growth was -2.31% for 1972 and -6.38% for 1973 (Heston et al. 2006), though 
the latter may probably in part be attributed to the September coup. Regarding the opinion in Washington, Markoff 
(1996:90) writes that “When Allende […] was installed as a president, the United States helped deepen the [social] 
crisis by supporting Allende’s enemies, cutting off aid and encouraging others to do so, and promoting Allende’s 
removal in 1973”. This may help to explain the economic downturn, though Allende’s government doubtlessly 
received the blame. 
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1975 and 1982-83.84 Pinochet bolstered his political legitimacy through referenda in 1978 and 
1980, the first on his rule and the second on “a new constitution banning Marxist groups, 
reinforcing executive power, and making the congress partly appointive” (Ackerman and Duvall 
2000:282); he won both but may have cheated. 
 
In response to the new constitution, the now outlawed communists organized armed 
insurrections that stood no chance against Chile’s powerful military but gave them a perfect 
excuse for hanging onto power.85 Violent excesses took place on both sides, and the 1983 
nonviolent protests organized by the Alianza Democrática failed to accomplish much.86 
 
As the decade progressed and Gorbachev took office in Moscow, the threat from international 
communism subsided and a primary source of legitimacy for the Pinochet regime, both 
nationally and in Washington, subsided.87 The opposition took inspiration from Gandhi’s 
campaign for Indian independence and the Solidarity movement in Poland and was supported by 
the ideals of Catholic liberation theology.88 The military regime for its part maintained a high 
level of human rights abuses, among them a widely reported story where soldiers took two 
teenagers captive after some minor skirmish, interrogated them brutally and finally doused them 
with gasoline and set the pair on fire; US Ambassador Barnes himself participated in the funeral 
                                                 
84 -15.93% in 1975, -16.34% in 1982 and -5.09% in 1983; averaged annual per capita economic growth in Chile 
was -5.78% for 1981-83 and 4.15% for 1986-88 (Heston et al. 2006). The World Bank (2008) averages are -5% for 
1981-83 and 5% for 1986-88. The strong economic performance during the mid-80s seems to have bolstered 
Pinochet’s support among the economic elite: in 1988, say Constable and Valenzuela (1991:299), “prominent 
business leaders were at work raising funds” for Pinochet’s election campaign. 
85 ”What the communist party and the extreme left refused to understand was that such violence was not only 
completely ineffective in the struggle against the government, it was also the most effective way to destroy the 
protest movement” (Arriagado, in Ackerman and Duvall (2000:288). Pinochet, according to another Chilean 
politician (ibid:281), “is a man who needs to find a daily enemy in order to subsist. Without them, he wouldn’t 
know who he is”. The communists apparently believed that the military would eventually join their fight against the 
regime, “showing again the revolutionary left’s enduring delusion that somehow soldiers would defect while being 
shot at” (ibid:289). 
86 Pinochet (in Spooner 1994:189) labeled the protest “a Soviet-inspired plan to damage the regime’s image”. A 
state of emergency was imposed and the army quelled the campaign; negotiations followed and did end with a few 
concessions to the opposition, including a right to publish books without first clearing them with the interior 
ministry. 
87 “In its second term in office, the Reagan administration was proving to be far less friendly to Chile than during 
its first four years” (Spooner 1994:206). The National Endowment for Democracy, created by the US Congress, 
later funded the opposition to Pinochet for the 1988 plebiscite (ibid:253 fn 11). 
88 ”The Church […] was the quiver for another arrow of opposition – a group of priests and nuns who staged sit-ins 
in front of known venues of official torture” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:291). In 1986 the Church sponsored the 
National Accord, a proposal “calling for free and direct parliamentary and presidential elections, along with an end 
to restrictions on political activity” (Spooner 1994:207). 
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march of the victim who died (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:292-293). The focus point for the 
opposition was a 1988 plebiscite on Pinochet’s rule, similar to that which he had won in 1978. 
The campaign in favor of the ‘no’ vote succeeded in uniting the various factions of the Chilean 
opposition89, and the carefully monitored plebiscite resulted in a win for the ‘no’ vote. Pinochet 
had lost, and his own military commanders refused to join him in imposing martial law. 
Presidential elections followed in 1989 and were won by a coalition of democratic parties. 
4.12 The Philippines 1986 
Ferdinand Marcos was first elected president of the Philippines in 1965.90 He won reelection in 
1969 as the first president in Philippine history, but was constitutionally barred from seeking a 
third term in the elections scheduled for 1973. In 1972, on the eve of his presidency, he declared 
martial law, citing the threat from communist insurgents as justification. Marcos changed the 
constitution to allow himself a legal basis for staying in power, and as martial law was lifted in 
1981 on the occasion of a visit from Pope John Paul II, new presidential elections afforded 
Marcos with a another six-year term.91 
 
Due to the perceived communist threat, Marcos long enjoyed strong support from Washington.92 
Mismanagement of the economy was however resulting in a decline,93 and several violent 
excesses eroded the regime’s legitimacy.94 In addition, of course, the threat from international 
                                                 
89 ”Even the radical Socialists renounced violence to unite behind NO. Finally, even the communists joined in” 
(Ackerman and Duvall 2000:298). 
90 General references for this section are Ackerman and Duvall (2000:369-395), Paulson (2005c), Schock (2005:56-
90) and Zunes (1999a). 
91 Most of the democratic opposition boycotted the election, and Marcos ran against a former General Santos of the 
!acionalista party; Marcos won a landslide victory but the elections may have been fraudulent. 
92 “Challenges from communists and Muslim militants were the kind of threats that made it easy for Cold War-
haunted policymakers in the United States to look the other way as Marcos strangled democracy. Moreover, a huge 
U.S. naval base at Subic Bay in western Luzon and a large bomber fleet at Clark Field, an hour’s drive north of 
Manila, were anchors of American power in the Pacific and thus reasons for Washington to want stability in the 
Philippines. By embellishing the threat of a communist takeover in the early 1970s, Marcos had won solid backing 
from President Nixon for martial law; over the ensuing four years, American military aid had more than doubled” 
(Ackerman and Duvall 2000:373). 
93 Annual per capita economic growth for the years 1984-86 was -3.42% (Heston et al. 2006); the World Bank 
(2008) reports an average of -6%. 
94 One was the assassination of the high-profile opposition leader Benigno “Ninoy” Aquino in 1983, which in 
Schock’s (2005:74) view “served as the catalyst that produced a shift from passive acceptance to active opposition 
by the middle and business classes and by mainstream elements of the Catholic Church”; another was the Escalante 
massacre in 1985 where paramilitary forces opened fire on a nonviolent demonstration, killing twenty to thirty. 
According to Zunes (1999a:130), “the tragedy at Escalante appears to have been an important chapter in the loss of 
legitimacy of the Marcos regime in the eyes of the Filipino people.” 
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communism was subsiding as Gorbachev took office in Moscow. Marcos was becoming 
something of an embarrassment to his Washington allies, and in an attempt to restore his 
legitimacy he called snap elections for 1986. This time the democratic opposition rallied around 
the candidature of Corazon Aquino (1933-), widow of the assassinated Ninoy Aquino. The 
election was marred by fraud and violence, and its outcome a close call: while poll watchers 
proclaimed a narrow win for Aquino, the official election commission declared a Marcos 
victory. Seeing a stolen election, the opposition organized a nonviolent protest movement. 
 
The opposition movement had two decisive allies. One was the Roman Catholic Church and its 
leader Jaime Cardinal Sin (1928-2005), who made nationwide appeals on the Church-controlled 
Radio Veritas. The other was a group of reformist military officers under the leadership of 
Defense Minister Juan Ponce Enrile (1924-) who, after an aborted coup, took refuge in a 
military camp and held a televised press conference voicing their recognition of Aquino as the 
legitimate winner of the election. Responding to appeals from the happily named Cardinal Sin, 
the citizens of Manila surged to surround the camp and thus protect the rebel officers; within 
two days they numbered more than a million people (Paulson 2005c:241). “Significantly,” says 
Schock (2005:78), “nonviolent discipline was maintained throughout. Soldiers were met by 
gestures of friendship rather than abuse.” A standoff ensued, with loyalist troops unable and 
unwilling to attack the rebel camp; in the end the US President Reagan, who despite being a 
friend of Marcos had earlier voiced concern with the fraudulent election, released a public 
statement urging Marcos to step down. Soon he was headed for exile in Hawaii, and Corazon 
Aquino took office as the President of the Republic of the Philippines.95 
4.13 Israel-Palestine 1987-1990 
Israel occupied the Gaza and West Bank territories during the 1967 Six-Day War.96 By 1988 the 
legitimacy of this occupation was clearly mixed: where the Palestinians saw a military regime 
ruling with an iron hand, Israelis saw a necessary buffer zone protecting the Jewish nation from 
hostile Arab neighbors. Some would also cite religious concerns and claim a right to possess the 
                                                 
95 Like several other leaders of nonviolent movements in this study, Aquino ended up on the cover of Time 
Magazine (1987) as Woman of the Year. 
96 General references for this section are Ackerman and Duvall (2000:397-420), Dajani (1999), Hunter (1991) and 
Sharp (1989). 
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holy land. On the international level, Western countries were for historical reasons sensitive to 
Jewish security concerns, and Israel had a strong alliance with the world’s dominant superpower 
the USA. The Soviet bloc – traditional allies of the Palestinian cause – was preoccupied with 
glasnost and perestroika and about to implode; the Arab world hostile but impotent. In Europe 
there was a growing concern with Israeli human rights abuses. The Israeli economy was going 
strong97, and security threats to its population ever-present. At this point in time, however, the 
Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had sufficient military strength – as well as a back-up deterrent of 
nuclear weapons – to deprive hostile neighbors any capability to challenge Israel’s survival.  
 
Against this backdrop the Palestinians launched their protest movement – the intifada – on 9 
December 1987. The struggle was inspired by advocates of nonviolent action, among them 
Mubarak Awad (1943-) who had established the Palestinian Centre for the Study of 
Nonviolence and written papers on how to implement such tactics in the Occupied Territories 
(e.g., Awad 1984).98 The nonviolent struggle seems to have enjoyed little if any support from 
religious authorities, however: while religion is never far from this conflict, it has on the 
Palestinian side apparently been monopolized by radical and violent groups like Hamas and 
Islamic Jihad. The intifada involved demonstrations, labor strikes and economic boycotts, but 
also stone throwing and the use of petrol bombs, and it incurred a quite brutal response from the 
IDF.99 The brutality of the regime clampdown did in fact succeed in alienating parts of the 
Israeli public, with soldiers sometimes refusing to serve in the Occupied Territories and civilians 
organizing numerous peace groups. The dynamic described by Sharp (1973; 2005) as political 
                                                 
97 Annual per capita economic growth in Israel for the years 1985-87 was 3.23% according to Heston et al. (2006), 
and 3% (3.3% before round off) according to the World Bank (2008). No data is available for the Occupied 
Territories, although Hunter (1991:51) states that the Palestinian economy stagnated between 1981 and 1985. To 
those who would like to question how a strong economy might legitimize an occupation, we can look at the 
statement of one Palestinian (in Hunter 1991:37-38) explaining why protests for the most part failed to emerge in 
the 1960s and 70s, when growth in the West Bank and Gaza was around 8-10%: “People benefited from the 
occupation, at least at first […]. The Jordanians had put a lot of pressure on us, and wouldn’t let anything happen. 
Then the Israelis came in and let us work in Israel. Suddenly there was more money. No one wanted to revolt.” 
98 Awad was deported from Israel in June 1988 as a threat to the state. “[D]espite Israeli rhetoric against Palestinian 
violence,” says Sharp (1989:12), “there are various signs that the Israeli officials prefer to deal with Palestinian 
violence rather than with nonviolent struggle.” 
99 Whereas the Israeli soldiers fired live ammunition, Palestinian protestors only employed non-lethal weapons. 
This resulted in a significant discrepancy in casualties between the two sides: by the time the first serious Israeli 
casualty took place in early 1988, the Palestinians had suffered 33 fatalities (Hunter 1991:81). Hunter goes on to 
state that “It was important for the success of the revolt that the demonstrators be unarmed civilians facing a 
modern army”; in the context of this study, however, the intifada’s tactics of ‘stones, strikes and civil disobedience’ 
was still violent enough to code it as a case where protest violence took place. 
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jiu-jitsu thus came into play, and the movement’s objective of “polarizing Israel from within and 
widening any existing splits in its government and society over the issue of occupation” (Dajani 
1999:61) was seeing some success. Internationally, the IDF’s brutal repression aroused 
condemnation and was a blow for Israeli public relations (Hunter 1991:82-83).100 
 
Violence on the Palestinian side did however serve to nullify the outrage over the Israeli 
violence. Besides the ubiquitous stone throwing, the Palestinians were also murdering large 
numbers of collaborators, “dashing the early perception that it was mainly the IDF that used 
egregious tactics. For every ten instances of civil disobedience, it took only one act of 
viciousness to diminish the sympathy within Israel and around the world that Palestinians hoped 
to cultivate” (Ackerman and Duvall 2000:413). The Israeli side, by contrast, started to soften 
their repressive measures, perhaps realizing, as Hunter (1991:234) contends, that their “policy of 
confronting Palestinians and using force against them had been a very important factor in the 
continuation of the revolt”. Fewer Palestinian casualties led to a reduction in ‘martyr funerals’ 
and thus fewer demonstrations and confrontations. By 1990 the intifada had lost its momentum, 
and while it may be said to have resulted in the Oslo Accords, it never came near to achieving 
its goal of ending the Israeli occupation. Its follow-up, the al-Aqsa Intifada from 2000 onwards, 
was an altogether different sort of struggle that had no pretensions to nonviolence whatever.   
4.14 Burma/Myanmar 1988-1989 
The military took control of Burma with a coup in 1962 and proceeded to install the Burma 
Socialist Programme Party as the country’s government.101 One rationale for the takeover was 
the fear that the Karen and Shan – two of Burma’s numerous ethnic groups – would secede from 
the state; Burma has seen continuous ethnic-based civil conflict since independence in 1948, and 
the military may well be the only institution that holds the country together.102 Socialist 
                                                 
100 For the first time since 1981, the USA voted against Israel in the UN Security Council, supporting resolution 
607 of January 1988. Yet the USA-Israel alliance was by no means threatened, and the USA later abstained on two 
other resolutions and vetoed a third (Hunter 1991:84). 
101 General references for this section are Beer (1999), Lintner (1990), Paulson (2005a), Schock (2005:91-119), 
Smith (1991) and Taylor (1991).  
102 Smith (1991:10) counts 25 insurgency organizations still active in 1988. There were two major blocs of 
insurgents, one headed by the Communist Party of Burma and the other being an alliance of ethnic minority groups 
named the National Democratic Front. “Cynics argue that Ne Win [the army chief] and the Tatmadaw [military] 
high command, though starting off as the defenders of Burma, have long since needed the insurgencies to justify 
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economics seemed to serve Burma reasonably well, particularly in the period from the mid-70s 
to the early 80s, but the mid-to-late 80s saw an economic collapse.103 Internationally, the regime 
had strong trade links with Thailand and Japan and an emerging strategic ally in China; at home 
its legitimacy had undergone some erosion because of the military’s habitual neglect of 
rudimentary human rights. 
 
Protests started at university campuses but soon spread to the streets of the capital 
Rangoon/Yangon. On the numerologically auspicious day 8 August 1988 (8-8-88) a general 
strike was initiated and huge demonstrations took place in cities all across the country. Among 
the protesters was a significant contingent of Buddhist monks,104 and the charismatic leader 
Aung San Suu Kiy (1945-) held flaming appeals for democracy and the use of nonviolent action 
against the regime.105 The military responded with firing live ammunition into the crowds, 
killing an estimated one to three thousand unarmed protesters (Schock 2005:95).106 This brought 
international condemnation and sanctions, although Burma’s neighbors generally remained 
unfazed.107 Violence took place on both sides, however, with mobs attacking government 
buildings and reportedly beheading three policemen (Lintner 1990:75-76, 102; Smith 1991:4-
5).108 As the weeks went by, tension mounted and violence spiraled109, throwing the country into 
                                                                                                                                                            
their hold on power” (ibid:101, emphasis in original). I share this view and do not regard it as particularly cynical 
but rather as a plain indication of how social conflict tends to legitimize authoritarian regimes. 
103 Averaged annual per capita economic growth from 1974 to 1984 inclusive was 3.45%; this turned into a decline 
of -3% for 1986, -6% for 1987 and -13% for 1988 (World Bank 2008). The Penn World Tables have no data. 
104 The regime seems to have had a large measure of control over the Buddhist sangha (spiritual community), 
however, in particular via its close relationship with the older conservative leadership who “did not overtly criticize 
the military regime and consistently disapproved of monks participating in anti-regime demonstrations” (Schock 
2005:110). Whether or not the movement had the support of religious authority is thus somewhat debatable. 
105 She was later awarded the Nobel Peace Prize and has remained the leading voice of the democratic opposition. 
106 According to Smith (1991:16), “The death toll in the year’s [1988] violence is today generally estimated to have 
passed the 10,000 mark.” 
107 In late 1988, “the Thai government [broke] the international boycott and recognise[d] the Saw Maung [post-
crackdown military] regime in return for lucrative logging concessions along the Thai border and generous fishing 
rights in the Andaman sea” (Smith 1991:408). Burma’s military did also apparently receive a vital arms shipment 
from its ally Singapore only a few weeks after the final crackdown (Lintner 1991:140). China had for its part ended 
its support for the insurgent Communist Party of Burma in the mid-1980s and has emerged as a vital strategic and 
trade partner of the Burmese military regime (Smith 1991:359-363, 405). This has among other things protected the 
regime from hostile UN Security Council resolutions. 
108 “Diplomatic estimates” of the death toll of a student protest on 21 June 1988, says Lintner (1991:77), “amounted 
to 20 policemen […] and at least 80 civilians”. 
109 According to Schock (2005:96) the regime intentionally fuelled this fire: “Agents provocateurs and saboteurs 
from the military, along with criminals the government released from prison, engaged in arson, looting, violence, 
and other destabilizing activities, such as instigating food and race riots, apparently in an effort to provide 
justification for the military’s restoration of ‘law and order’.” In one such incident, described by Lintner 
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chaos. In the end, the military deposed its own government, jettisoned the socialist ideology that 
was becoming internationally unfashionable and whose economic policies had perhaps caused 
the recession, and declared that it would hold general elections in the spring of 1990. The 
opposition won the election by a large margin, but the regime refused to step down and new 
protests failed to materialize. New economic policies brought strong growth throughout the 
1990s,110 and the military regime remains in power to this day. 
4.15 Serbia 1999-2000 
Slobodan Milošević started his political career as an apparatchik in communist Yugoslavia, but 
reinvented himself as a nationalist strongman when communism went into terminal decline.111 
Gaining office as president of the Serbian republic in 1990, Milošević oversaw the ethnic 
conflicts between Serbs, Croats and Bosnians that resulted in the Dayton agreement of 1995. 
After the war he was confronted with protests from the domestic Serb opposition, but the critical 
voices subsided as new hostilities arose in Kosovo, resulting in a NATO bombing campaign.112 
This had a devastating effect on Serbia’s economy113, and alleged human rights abuses from 
forces under Milošević’s control led to his indictment by the International Criminal Tribunal for 
the former Yugoslavia (Arbour 1999). International support for the Serbian regime was 
approaching rock bottom, and its traditional allies in Moscow were languishing under the final 
stages of Yeltsin’s chaotic government. In Serbian eyes, the loss of Kosovo furthermore 
shattered Milošević’s stature as a national savior (Thompson and Kuntz 2004:165).  
 
In early 2000, the opposition movement Otpor (“Resistance”) held its founding congress and 
laid out a plan for wrestling Serbia from Milošević based on Sharp’s (1973) Politics of 
!onviolent Action. A nationwide protest campaign was launched, and in anticipation of the 
elections scheduled for 2001 Otpor tried to influence the main opposition parties to unite their 
efforts behind one candidate. This effort was seeing some success, and in an attempt to pre-empt 
                                                                                                                                                            
(1991:122), 67 ‘looters’ revealed upon capture by members of a local citizens’ committee that they had “been sent 
as a ploy to lure monks and students to be killed”. 
110 Averaged annual per capita economic growth from 1992 to 2000 inclusive was 5.89% (World Bank 2008). 
111 General references for this section are Paulson (2005e) and Thompson and Kuntz (1994).  
112 The Kosovo Liberation Army, so the joke went, is a small guerilla army with a big air force. Milošević’ attempt 
at imposing Serbian control over Kosovo ended in failure: as I write this on 17 February 2008, the Kosovo 
parliament is declaring independence. 
113 Per capita growth was -25.53% for 1999, compared to 8.41% for 1997 and 6.22% for 1998. (Heston et al. 2006). 
The figures from the World Bank (2008) are 7% for 1997, 2% for 1998 and -18% for 1999. 
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it Milošević called early elections. His tactic failed: the opposition united behind the candidature 
of Vojislav Koštunica and proceeded to win the elections. Milošević responded with an attempt 
at stealing the election, contradicting exit polls and triggering intensified protests. His claim to 
democratic legitimacy was thus nullified, and in the face of a general strike and countrywide 
opposition rallies, the regime elite split. The army chief of staff, Nebojša Pavković, who had 
before the election been an open Milošević ally, declared that the armed forces would remain 
neutral (Thompson and Kuntz 2004:168).114 
 
In the end, even Russia turned away from Milošević, and the Constitutional Court reversed its 
earlier ruling and proclaimed Koštunica winner of the election. Koštunica served as President of 
Yugoslavia until 2003, and is today prime minister of Serbia. Milošević spent his last years 
defending himself before the International Criminal Tribunal at The Hague. 
4.16 Georgia 2003 
Eduard Shevardnadze ascended to power in Georgia in 1972, taking the office of First Secretary 
of the Georgian Communist Party.115 His reign took a pause in the mid-1980s as he joined 
Gorbachev’s cabinet of young reformers in Moscow, overseeing foreign policies that allowed 
Warsaw Pact allies to ‘do it their own way’116 and ended the Cold War. After the collapse of the 
Soviet Union, Shevardnadze returned to the now independent Georgia and was appointed acting 
chairman of the Georgian state council. This was decidedly undemocratic,117 but Shevardnadze 
restored his democratic credentials by winning presidential elections in 1995. Subsequent 
elections in 2000 saw him reelected amid claims of vote rigging. 
 
                                                 
114 Another reason why many units of the police and military stayed out of the political conflict is that Otpor and 
other opposition leaders had been contacting them in an effort to reduce tensions. According to Zoran Živković (in 
Cohen 2000), mayor of Niš and ally of Otpor, “We had secret talks with the army and police, the units we knew 
would be drafted to intervene. […] And the deal was that they would not disobey, but neither would they execute. If 
they had said no, other units would have been brought in. So they said yes when Milosevic asked for action -- and 
they did nothing.” Otpor also “sent individual ‘care packages’ of food and newspapers to soldiers and policemen” 
(Paulson 2005e:335). 
115 General references for this section are Fairbanks (2004) and Mitchell (2004). This one’s for George. 
116 Known as the Sinatra Doctrine, it removed the Red Army as a prop for Eastern European regimes and heavily 
contributed to their fall.  
117 Shevardnadze’s ascension to power followed a bloody coup against Zviad Gamsakhurdia, Georgia’s president 
elect. It is unclear whether Shevardnadze himself participated in the planning and execution of this coup. 
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Shevardnadze enjoyed great recognition in the West, and pursued several pro-Western 
policies.118 Georgia’s economy was not doing particularly well,119 however, and ordinary 
Georgians seem to have tired of his leadership: Fairbanks (2004:113) reports an approval rating 
heading towards 5% as parliamentary elections scheduled for 2003 neared. Shevardnadze tried 
to steal the election, but exit polls contradicted his claims of victory by indicating a clear win for 
one of his opponents, Mikheil Saakashvili, and election monitors cried foul. Opposition 
politicians organized a protest outside of the parliament in Tbilisi, and activists traveled to 
Serbia to learn the techniques of nonviolent action.120 Within a few weeks the protests in Tbilisi 
“swelled towards the 100,000 range – as big as the pro-independence demonstrations of the late 
1980s, but far more orderly” (ibid:116). US support for Shevardnadze was withdrawn as the 
State Department issued a statement that the election was fraudulent. 
 
In the end, Shevardnadze had to be escorted out of the parliament building by his own 
bodyguards, and though he might have intended to call in the security forces for a clampdown 
on the protests, “the army, police, and presidential guards – internally split, unwilling to attack 
civilians as Soviet troops had done in Tbilisi in 1989, and subject to U.S. lobbying – never 
moved” (ibid:117). Bloodshed was thus “avoided largely because the president was too 
politically weak to command it” (Mitchell 2004:348), and Shevardnadze was left with no option 
but to resign. Saakashvili won new presidential elections in 2004 and remains in office today. 
 
 
                                                 
118 Including an expressed desire for NATO membership. “Washington backed Shevardnadze because his 
government supported America’s major foreign policy goals, and because strong personal ties existed at the highest 
levels of the two governments” (Mitchell 2004:345). 
119 Mitchell (2004:343) speaks of Georgia’s “failing economy” and Fairbanks (2004:119) of its “economic 
distress”. According to Heston et al. (2006), per capita growth was 2.47% for 2001, 6.40% for 2002 and -0.25% for 
2003; in 2004, after Shevardnadze’s fall, they report a massive 37.47% growth. Note that the World Bank’s (2008) 
figures differ significantly, with 6% for 2001, 7% for 2002, 12% for 2003 and 7% for 2004. The World Bank 
estimates do not seem to agree with Mitchell’s and Fairbanks’ accounts, however. 
120 ”The George Soros-funded Open Society Institute (OSI) gave money for Saakashvili and a number of 
prodemocratic student activists to go to Serbia and confer with the young activists there who had helped to topple 
Slobodan Milošević […] The funding from OSI enabled the creation of Kmara (Enough), an NGO modeled on 
Serbia’s Otpor even to the degree of using the same symbol, a clenched fist. Kmara activists received training from 
Serbs in all the techniques of nonviolent protest” (Fairbanks 2004:115). 
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5 - Results 
5.1 Comparative case study 
This section sums up and discusses the differences between the successful campaigns in India, 
the USA and Poland on the one hand and the failed student-led movement in China on the other. 
All four encountered violent sanctions from their opponent, but where the three successes were 
able to weather this repression, the fourth collapsed. My analysis is that their respective 
differences with regard to regime legitimacy, protest violence, media access and religious 
authority may serve to explain this variation in outcome. 
 
The three successes all shared a strong level of support from religious authorities, with Gandhi 
being a charismatic Hindu saint, King a charismatic Baptist preacher, and Solidarity set off by a 
visit from the no less charismatic Pope John Paul II. In 1989 China, no such religious support 
was forthcoming or even conceivable.121 
 
On the level of media access, it is clear that particularly the movements in India and the USA 
benefited from a direct access to the public via open media channels. Gandhi was himself a 
journalist and newspaper editor, and he published freely throughout his career. Thus he was able 
to circulate his ideas on nonviolence and self-rule among the educated classes of Indian society. 
The Indian campaigns also made extensive use of foreign journalists to gain an international 
audience. In the USA, the Civil Rights Movement coincided with a breakthrough in televised 
journalism that allowed the protests to impact directly on viewers across the nation. In Poland, 
by contrast, the regime controlled and censored all official media, but Solidarity managed to 
compensate for this lack of media access by publishing their own widely distributed newspapers 
and thus both inform and mobilize the public. In China, however, the state controlled the official 
media and the student organizers did not establish any major independent media networks. 
While the protests were widely reported on internationally, they did not gain a national audience 
                                                 
121 Historically, of course, many of China’s grand uprisings – among them the Taiping Rebellion of 1850-64 and 
the Boxer Rebellion of 1899-1901 – had a specifically religious rationale, and the heavy-handed persecution of the 
Falun Gong from 1999 onwards may very well be an attempt to destroy such movements in the bud. It is hard to 
imagine what a religious-based political opposition movement in contemporary communist China might look like, 
but it remains one avenue of protest that might resonate well with Chinese culture and history and serve to bridge 
the differences between affluent urbanites and an impoverished countryside. 
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outside of those urban centers where demonstrations took place. The large rural population thus 
knew of the student-led protests primarily through the hostile state media, and their failure to 
support it may come as little surprise. 
 
With regard to protest violence, the Indian and US movements both had leaders of a somewhat 
pacifist persuasion who based their commitment to nonviolence on religious precepts. Both 
movements repeatedly faced violent rioting, but where the Americans were largely able to douse 
the flames the Indian campaign spiraled out of control on several important junctures. Gandhi 
nevertheless escaped the blame for this, as his principled stand on violence made it abundantly 
clear that if violent rioting erupted it was certainly not to his command. Still, the violence did 
serve to derail some of Gandhi’s campaigns. In Poland, protest organizers had learnt from 
earlier campaigns that rioting and the ritual burning of local Communist Party headquarters led 
nowhere, and that to avoid such outbursts one needed to confine the protest to inside the 
workplace rather than unleashing it on the city streets. Finally, in China the students refrained 
from violence throughout most of their protest, but did in the end arm themselves in anticipation 
of the military crackdown. It is debatable how important this change of end-game strategy was, 
but one might surmise that the military’s repression of the protest would have been far less 
violent had the students not attacked them with stones and Molotov cocktails. 
 
The most comprehensive differences between these four cases relate to the legitimacy of their 
opponents. In the USA economic growth was steady but slow, while India was stagnating and 
Poland in serious recession; China, by contrast, was undergoing an economic boom. On the 
level of political mythology, the British rule over India was undermined by the contrast between 
a steady democratization at home and the maintenance of autocratic rule through brutal military 
repression overseas. A resurgence of Indian cultural confidence and nationalism combined with 
changes in the international zeitgeist to erode the raj’s legitimacy. Those international 
developments also served to challenge the mythology of white supremacy in the US South, and 
it was difficult for the national leadership to present the USA as a leader of the free world while 
a large portion of its citizens were denied basic democratic rights. In communist Poland and 
China the political mythology was linked to an ideology emphasizing above all the working 
class, making workers – particularly those in heavy industry – its core constituency. Industrial 
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workers are both the pride of the communist nation and the means through which its destiny is 
to be fulfilled.122 A mass movement of workers organizing themselves against the state – as in 
Poland – is thus clearly toxic to regime legitimacy, while students and intellectuals, by contrast, 
are far more peripheral in this respect.123 Furthermore, where the Polish regime was imposed 
from abroad, subjecting Poles to humiliating rule from their historical enemies the Russians, the 
Chinese regime enjoyed a strong foundation in the form of a heroic myth of origins. 
 
International support for Britain’s colonial empire declined more or less in concurrence with its 
loss of political mythology. While the USA certainly supported its ally, it had itself a history of 
noble liberation from imperial domination and was thus inclined to support others in such a 
struggle. Having been propelled into superpower status by the Second World War, it also had a 
strategic interest in seeing the structures of the old global order’s superpower wither away. 
Pressure also flowed in the opposite direction, and as the European powers committed 
themselves to the dismantling of their empires, they took an increasingly dim view of colonial-
era racist institutions in the US South. The Soviet Union used the Jim Crow regime as a tool in 
the propaganda battles of the Cold War, and emerging black African states voiced their distaste 
at continued racist policies. In Poland the communist regime had the obvious support of the 
Warsaw Pact countries, and this disappeared only as Gorbachev and Shevardnadze decided they 
were no longer going to impose Moscow’s will on its European client states. The Chinese 
regime had no major allies but also no outright enemies, and its international support was if 
anything on the increase. Relations with the Soviet Union were starting to mend, and the West 
widely approved of Deng’s new approach and gradual liberalization. It would be mistaken to 
overestimate the impact of Time Magazine’s ‘man of the year’ awards, but it is striking that 
while each of the protest leaders in India, the USA and Poland won this award, its two-time 
Chinese recipient was none other than the top man of the regime, Deng Xiaoping. China’s 
regime was heavily censured by the West for its bloody crackdown on the student protesters, but 
vested business interests prevented this voicing of outrage to translate into major sanctions 
beyond an arms embargo. 
                                                 
122 In 1989 China, this role was shared with the peasants, who were both numerically superior and who played the 
role of national liberators during the revolution. According to Saich (2004:205),”Deng Xiaoping was complacent in 
1989 that there was no threat to CCP rule as long as the farmers remained faithful”. 
123 Intellectuals in particular have a history of low status in communist China, belonging to Mao’s famous “stinking 
ninth category”. 
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5.2 Qualitative case analysis 
Boolean analysis classifies cases according to the logical combination of variable values. As 
each variable must be dichotomous, the total number of such combinations is 2n; in this analysis 
there are four variables and the number of logical paths is 16. These are listed in Table 4, 
grouped by outcome. We see that there are some paths that do not correspond to any cases, and 
of these four are labeled ‘presumed impossible’ as they postulate the presence of protest 
violence yet no corresponding occurrence of regime violence. No such combination has been 
observed empirically, and this lack of data is thus in itself a finding of this study, which 
predicted that protest violence would avail the regime with an opportunity for using violent 
sanctions of their own, and that it would generally be in their interest to do so. Besides these 
four paths that are assumed never to occur, two more paths have no case data and their outcome 
must be regarded as unknown.  
 
Table 4: Boolean Truth Table 
Regime 
legitimacy 
Protest 
violence 
Regime 
violence 
Religious 
authority 
Outcome Cases 
A B C D   
 
Successes 
 
0 0 0 0 1 Nazi Germany 1943; Serbia 1999-2000; Georgia 2003 
0 0 0 1 1 India 1930-31 & 1945-47; Poland 1988-89; South 
Africa 1994; Chile 1988; The Philippines 1986 
0 0 1 1 1 USA (all cases); Poland 1980-81; South Africa 1987 
0 0 1 0 1 El Salvador 1944; Guatemala 1944 
 
Failures 
 
1 1 1 1 0 India 1919-1921 & 1942; Poland 1976; 
Burma/Myanmar 1988-1989 
1 1 1 0 0 South Africa 1960 & 1976; Israel-Palestine 1987-1990 
1 0 1 1 0 Chile 1983 
0 1 1 0 0 Russia 1905 
1 0 1 0 0 China 1989 
1 0 0 0 0 China 1978-1979 & 1986 
 
Presumed impossible 
 
0 1 0 0 -  
0 1 0 1 -  
1 1 0 0 -  
1 1 0 1 -  
 
%o data 
 
0 1 1 1 ?  
1 0 0 1 ?  
    Note: See Appendix 1 for a discussion of significance testing of this QCA model. 
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A clear pattern may be observed among those cases marked as successes: they all share the 
absence both of regime legitimacy and protest violence. Regime violence and religious 
authority, by contrast, have no relevance for outcome. Simplifying the Boolean truth table to 
obtain a parsimonious solution as to what paths leading to success have in common is thus a 
simple matter: not-A along with not-B predicts a successful protest. Using standard QCA 
notation, where not-A is coded as ‘a’, the solution is simply as follows: ab.124 
 
The conclusion from the Boolean analysis is thus that the combination of low regime legitimacy 
and no protest violence results in a successful outcome in this dataset. It should be noted, 
however, that if the path AbcD, for which this study has no data, should turn out to be a path to 
success, this would change the solution. QCA has been criticized on this account for being 
unstable (George and Bennett 2005:163), as small changes in the dataset could result in large 
changes in the analysis.125 
 
The paths labeled as failures have somewhat more complex variable combinations, though we 
may observe that all paths but one have a presence of regime violence. This seems to agree with 
the original hypothesis that violence might be an effective strategy for the regime if there is 
protest violence or if the regime possesses legitimacy. Simplifying this set of paths returns the 
following solution: AC + BC + Abd.126 The last term covers two Chinese cases where the 
regime was able to clamp down on protest without employing violent sanctions; in all other 
cases of failure, regime violence combined with protest violence or regime legitimacy. 
5.3 Statistical analysis 
Table 5 lists the results for bivariate Pearson correlations127 between the four independent 
variables and outcome. Note that these are one-tailed significance tests, and that the regime 
                                                 
124 The formal procedure for obtaining this solution is to reduce the logical paths pairwise: thus we get abcd and 
abcD combining into abc, while abCD and abCd combine into abC; finally abc and abC combine to ab.  
125 The new solution would be ab + AbcD; the resulting picture is not radically different but admittedly rather less 
neat than my solution above. 
126 In this calculation I include the path aBCD from the no data section, assuming that this would be a failure as it 
shares the general pattern of the failed cases. ABCD and ABCd reduce to ABC; ABCD and AbCD to ACD; 
ABCd and AbCd to ACd; ABCd and aBCd to BCd; AbCD and AbCd to AbC; AbCd and Abcd to Abd; and 
ABCD and aBCD to BCD. These again reduce to AC and BC, with Abd remaining as before. 
127 Spearman correlations duplicate these results with the only exception that it gives the correlation coefficient 
between regime legitimacy and outcome as -.746. 
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violence variable, which is predicted to have contradictory impact on protest outcome 
depending on the values of other variables, may require a two-tailed test; in this case its 
significance level drops to 0.1. We see that an increase in regime legitimacy impacts protest 
outcome significantly towards failure, as does the presence of protest violence. Religious 
authority impacts outcome positively but at a lower level of significance, while regime violence 
has a negative impact of marginal significance.  
 
 
The question is to which degree these causal effects are 
maintained in a multivariate analysis where each variable is 
controlled for by the other variables in the analysis. With a small 
dataset it is to be expected that the independent variables will 
tend to cancel each other out, and to alleviate this problem I 
present in Table 6 three models that gradually expand the number of variables.128 We can thus 
observe in Model 1 that protest violence and religious authority largely maintain their causal 
impact on outcome even as controlled for each other. This model has moderately strong pseudo-
R2 measures and correctly classifies 79.3% of the cases, and can be regarded as reasonably 
good. Model 2 adds regime violence to the equation but does not improve upon the first model, 
and Model 3 adds regime legitimacy which is the strongest predictor of the four independent 
variables and which serves to deprive protest violence and religious authority of any 
significance. The model as a whole improves considerably, halving the -2 Log likelihood value 
and pushing the pseudo-R2 measures to high levels. 
 
Table 6: Logistical regression 
Dependent variable: Outcome Independent variable 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Protest violence -3.253** -2.947* -1.234 
Religious authority 2.266† 2.352† 2.714 
Regime violence  -.632 -3.240 
Regime legitimacy    -1.527* 
-2 Log likelihood 24.771 24.518 11.832 
Cox & Snell R2 .377 .382 .601 
Nagelkerke R2 .513 .520 .818 
Model Chi2 13.725*** 13.979** 26.665*** 
Correct predictions % 79.3 79.3 86.2 
*** p<0.001; ** p<0.01; * p<0.05; † p<0.1; all two-tailed. Table entries are unexponentiated regression 
coefficients. N=29. Data sources: see text. 
                                                 
128 Hosmer and Lemeshow tests are highly insignificant for all three models. 
Table 5: Bivariate correlations 
Independent variable Outcome 
Regime legitimacy -.771*** 
Protest violence -.551*** 
Regime violence -.318(*) 
Religious authority .353* 
*** p<0.001; * p<0.05. N=29.  
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Based on these results I will draw the following tentative conclusions. It seems clear that the 
four independent variables of this study do in combination serve to predict protest outcome quite 
strongly. Regime legitimacy is by far the most important of these, maintaining a significant 
negative impact even as controlled for the three other variables in the analysis.129 Protest 
violence is also a reasonably strong predictor of failure, but this variable correlates somewhat 
strongly with regime legitimacy130 and its effect disappears as this latter variable is included. 
Religious authority is a predictor of success, but only at marginal significance levels and not at 
all in the final model. Regime violence, finally, has no discernible impact on outcome.  
5.4 Summary of analyses 
As we have seen, the three analyses of this study produce compatible but not unanimous 
findings. This was to be expected, and is at least in part for the reason that each offers its own 
particular perspective on the social phenomenon under scrutiny and that none of these 
perspectives captures the whole picture. Thus they may serve to complement each other. This 
section summarizes their findings with regard to the five hypotheses of the study, and discusses 
to which extent these hypotheses may be regarded as strengthened. 
 
1) Regime legitimacy. All three analyses agree on the causal impact of regime legitimacy, as 
defined and operationalized in this study, on protest outcome. In the comparative case study, we 
could observe comprehensive differences between the three successful protests and the one 
failure. In the Boolean analysis, the absence of regime legitimacy emerged as a necessary – and, 
in combination with the absence of protest violence, sufficient – cause for success. In the 
statistical analysis, an increase in legitimacy significantly impacted outcome towards failure. 
 
2) Protest group violence. There are indications from all three analyses that protest violence has 
a negative impact on protest success. While such violence did not decisively influence the 
outcome of any of the four core cases, it did derail early campaigns in both India and Poland and 
                                                 
129 For those who believe that an ordinal variable with a range of only seven values – i.e., my regime legitimacy 
variable – has nothing to do in a regression setup, I have also run the above logistical regression setup with a 
dichotomized version of this variable. The result is somewhat lower pseudo-R2 values, a dummy-legitimacy 
variable significant at the .05 level and, as an added bonus, the protest violence variable significant at the .1 level. 
130 Pearson correlation of .452 significant at the .05 level with a two-tailed test. 
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seems to have to some extent legitimized the crackdown in Beijing. The Boolean analysis finds 
the absence of protest violence equally important to protest outcome as is the absence of regime 
legitimacy. Statistically, protest violence has a consistently negative impact on protest outcome 
except when controlled for the even stronger regime legitimacy variable. 
 
3) Regime violence. All three analyses largely agree that there is no clear impact from regime 
violence on protest outcome. In the comparative case study, regime violence did at various 
occasions in the Indian and US cases improve the chances of protest success through a backlash 
of moral outrage against the regime. This dynamic is less apparent in Poland, where the 
clampdown did at least buy the regime some time, and is largely absent in China, where the 
regime crackdown effectively put an end to the protest movement. The findings from QCA 
indicate that regime violence leads to protest failure if it is in some way legitimized – either 
because the regime itself possesses high levels of legitimacy or because protest violence has 
taken place and the regime can justify its clampdown as a bid to restore law and order. In the 
statistical analysis regime violence has no clear influence on outcome. 
 
4) Mass media penetration. This variable is only part of the comparative case study, and it is as 
such difficult to conclude whether or not it fulfils its predicted role of facilitating protest 
success. It is clear that media access and international coverage helped build support in the four 
core cases, though to a smaller extent in China. Both the Polish and the Chinese regime 
attempted to clamp down on protest group media and lines of communication, but only the latter 
had much success. 
 
5) Religious authority. In the comparative case study, religion emerges as an important factor in 
all the tree successes, and as conspicuously absent from the failed protest in China. Religious 
authority gave protest leaders in India and the USA a mantle of high moral stature and 
facilitated their charisma. In Poland the protest leaders did not themselves possess religious 
authority but were strongly supported by such authorities. In the Boolean analysis, however, 
religious authority is neither necessary nor sufficient – even in combination with other variables 
– for either success or failure. In the statistical analysis, religious authority emerges with an 
impact towards protest success, albeit not of strong significance. 
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6 - Discussion 
In conclusion I will discuss some of the implications of the findings in this study for future 
protest organizers, and predict the outcome of recent protests in Burma/Myanmar and potential 
protests in the Palestinian West Bank. Finally I will briefly suggest possible ways to improve 
and expand upon this study. 
6.1 Implications for protest organizers 
I stated in the introduction to this paper that one of its aims is to aid protest organizers in 
devising efficacious campaign strategies. In this section I will follow up on this promise and 
discuss what the findings of my study may imply for budding protest movements. It should be 
kept in mind that these policy recommendations assume that my as of yet largely tentative 
findings will stand up to the scrutiny of future research. 
 
First of all it is important to recognize that this study does by no means include all important 
causal influences on protest outcome. In particular I have ignored organizational resources, 
which is a core variable for many studies on social movements. The difference is that whereas 
these studies examine the causes of a movement’s emergence, I take the movements’ existence 
for granted and study only their outcome. An underlying assumption of my study is thus that all 
protest movements have sufficient organizational resources to establish themselves as viable 
societal forces. For budding movements that have yet to succeed in mobilizing mass support, 
however, these organizational aspects are clearly of vital importance. It is furthermore the case 
that what facilitates organization may sometimes impede one’s ability to achieve results. In 
South Africa, for instance, we saw that the nascent anti-apartheid movement allied itself with 
the Soviet Union and received financial support and training from Soviet agents. This 
undoubtedly facilitated movement organization, but also supported an implicit alliance between 
Pretoria and NATO which caused significant long-term problems for the movement.131 The 
lesson is that while it may be tempting for emerging movement organizers to ally themselves 
with existing organizations, one may get more out of the deal than bargained for. 
                                                 
131 The ally of my enemy is surely my enemy; the enemy of my enemy my ally. And, to paraphrase Roosevelt, if 
they are sons of bitches at least they are our sons of bitches. 
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The most decisive variable in this study is clearly regime legitimacy. The first important thing to 
notice is that authoritarian rulers do not generally hold on to power through raw force alone. 
Rather they do, insofar as they manage to stay in power over time, invariably enjoy the support 
of at least some social groups.132 Similarly, a specific policy regime would not remain extant if 
everybody were against it; if it exists it does so for the reason that it serves someone’s interests 
and therefore enjoys their support. The second important thing for budding protest organizers is 
to know one’s opponent: identify his sources of legitimacy and support, and devise a strategy for 
attacking his weak points and counteracting his strengths. Take the example of the economy: if 
it is doing poorly, it may be a good idea to frame larger sociopolitical issues (such as regime 
change) in economic terms. This would probably resonate well with the general public, whose 
grasp of broader political questions may be limited but whose understanding of their personal 
economic worries are no doubt comprehensive. One reason why Gandhi’s salt march of 1930 
succeeded so well was that he capitalized on India’s economic woes in the aftermath of the 
global meltdown in 1929. Should the economy be doing well, however, it is probably unwise to 
emphasize economic factors as a means of mobilizing support.133  
 
Similarly, one should identify weak and strong points in the mythological-ideological and 
international support components of the opponent’s legitimacy and plan one’s attack strategy 
accordingly. This may sometimes seem obvious and even automatic: if, for instance, the 
opponent has recently lost an election but refused to step down – and thus suffered a severe loss 
of democratic legitimacy – the central demand for emerging protests is clearly that the rightful 
electoral victor should be awarded his or her fairly won prize. In other cases less obvious factors 
may be at play, one example being 1980 Poland where the communist regime had suffered a 
gradual but widespread loss of legitimacy as the protector of workers’ rights, and where 
Solidarity made the demand for such rights the core issue of their protest. Attacking the 
opponent at his weakest point, Solidarity also succeeded in demonstrating this weakness to all: 
                                                 
132 ”Fascism, in order to be successful as a political movement, must have a mass basis. It must secure not only the 
frightened submission but the active cooperation of the great majority of the people” (Adorno et. al 1950:10). While 
it is certainly an overstatement to say that authoritarian regimes in general need the support of ‘the great majority’ 
in order to stay in power, the point remains that they do need some support. 
133 The 1989 China protests emerged from a booming economy but nevertheless cited economic concerns 
(particularly inflation) as a protest issue. This did probably not resonate well with the general urban public who 
was, despite the inflation, steadily getting richer. 
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after Solidarity, the lack of popular legitimacy in Soviet client regimes was more a plain fact 
than a supposition.  
 
Threat level is somewhat different as it may legitimize but hardly de-legitimize the opponent.134 
The important thing for protest organizers is to recognize that if they ally themselves with the 
source of instability and social threat, the regime and perhaps the general populace will regard 
the nonviolent movement merely as a front for something far more sinister. Even if they do not 
ally themselves with the threat source, the opponent will likely attempt to link the two in order 
to gain a justification for clamping down on the nonviolent protest. To avoid being pushed into 
such a position, the budding movement should at least consider to proactively distance itself 
from those forces which serve to increase the social threat level. This will come at a cost, 
however, as there are probably tactical and organizational advantages in allying oneself with 
those who are already enemies of the regime. 
 
A further point is that threat level, insofar as it involves actual violent confrontations, may serve 
to legitimize not only the regime but also the very use of violence sanctions. Societies with 
protracted wars or insurgencies are brutalized on several levels, and a violent clampdown on 
nonviolent protesters may be regarded by the public as simply yet more carnage in a long chain 
of battles and massacres. In a more peaceful society, by contrast, the act of using lethal violence 
against unarmed protesters would seem far more shocking. It also seems obvious that soldiers 
used to violent conflict will be far more inclined to fire at protesters than soldiers with no real 
combat experience. 
 
From a strategic point of view, however, it may in some situations be in the interest of the 
protest movement that their opponent attacks them with violent means and thus exposes himself 
for what he is. The regime’s willingness to massacre unarmed protesters certainly changed 
public perceptions in cases such as 1905 Russia and 1919 India, effectively depriving the 
respective regimes of their air of benevolence. This dynamic is however rendered null and void 
if the regime can somehow justify its use of violent sanctions, which generally involves framing 
                                                 
134 In theory one could imagine a soft regime of pacifist leanings being de-legitimized by an increase in threat level. 
A protest campaign against Chamberlain’s sacrifice of Czechoslovakia in 1938 might for instance be subject to 
such dynamics. In practice, I know of no major case where nonviolent protesters faced an overly dovish opponent. 
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the protest movement as a menace to society. One obvious way for the protest movement to get 
pegged to this image is to employ violent means of its own. As protest violence is thus generally 
in the interest of the regime, an effective regime tactic is to introduce agents provocateurs into 
street demonstrations and thereby gain an excuse for a crackdown. 
 
Countering such tactics requires preparedness and organization. A nonviolent movement should 
at all times assume that its opponent will attempt to push it toward violence in order to de-
legitimize it and neutralize it as a threat. If nonviolent discipline and organizational control seem 
unachievable, it may be wise to follow the example of the Polish Solidarity movement which, 
observing that street demonstrations tended to get out of hand, confined their protest actions to 
the workplace area itself. This minimized the chances for violent outbursts both from hotheaded 
protesters and potential regime agents, and was instrumental to the movement’s success. 
Another option, used to great effect in 1944 Guatemala, is to organize stay-at-home strikes and 
thus paralyze society without affording the regime with a target to clamp down on.  
 
Public perception is perhaps the main battleground of nonviolent political action. To succeed, 
the movement must convert regime supporters and neutral segments of the public into active or 
passive supporters of its own cause. Accomplishing this feat requires open lines of 
communication, which are available primarily but not exclusively through the mass media. The 
Chinese students of 1989 never had a chance of converting the rural population into supporters 
of their cause because they never devised means of communicating with this population. The 
Chinese regime controlled all media channels and was free to portray the protest movement as it 
saw fit. One factor which may help the budding movement reach out to the masses is an alliance 
with traditional sources of moral and social authority – obtained primarily through religion. This 
does by no means guarantee success, but clearly facilitates public support. Religious 
organizations also generally have their own ways of communicating with the public, and might 
thus provide those lines of communication that protest movements require. 
 
Having outlined some general advice for nascent protest campaigns, I will now utilize the 
findings of this study to analyze the potential for nonviolent action in two of the world’s 
important conflict situations. The first is Burma/Myanmar, where nonviolent protests took place 
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in 2007 and, while defeated in the short term, may have long-term repercussions that have yet to 
manifest. The second is Israel-Palestine, where I will predict the dynamics and outcome of a 
hypothetical nonviolent campaign against the Partition Wall in the Palestinian West Bank.  
6.1.1 Burma/Myanmar 
Having survived the protests of 1988, the military regime of Burma/Myanmar consolidated their 
hold over the country and was able to rule relatively uncontestedly for almost two decades. The 
economy seems to have been doing well at least until 2003135, and by playing its neighboring 
giants China and India up against each other the Burmese regime managed to secure a measure 
of support from both (Green and Mitchell 2007). China has been particularly active in propping 
up its southern neighbor, vetoing a UN Security Council sanctions proposal in early 2007, and 
the two countries have important trade links (Economist 2008b). Burma’s civil war continues 
unabated, although there are signs that the rebels are gradually losing (BBC 2008).136 
 
Protests emerged in September 2007 after the introduction of new economic policies ending fuel 
subsidies and thus increasing the prices of gas and petrol (Watts 2007). Buddhist monks were 
the vanguard of this protest movement, which soon organized demonstrations with 50,000 to 
100,000 participants (MacKinnon 2007). By late September, however, a military crackdown 
ended this latest round of protests, killing scores of monks and civilians in the process (McGreal 
2007). Then, in early 2008, the Burmese regime surprised all by setting dates for a referendum 
on a new constitution in May that year and general elections in 2010. 
 
To the cynical observer, the developments in 2007-2008 may seem much like a rerun of the 
protests and regime responses of 1988-1989. Not many hold their breath in avid anticipation of a 
Burmese transition to democracy. Yet there are certain differences. China remains an enabler of 
the regime, but has become increasingly sensitive to international criticism because of its 
                                                 
135 The World Bank (2008) reports an average per capita growth of 11% for the years 2000-2003 inclusive, 
followed by 2% in 2004 and 4% in 2005. No data are available for 2006-2007. The Economist (2007) estimates 
current economic growth as “perhaps 3-4%” but also notes the endemic poverty in the country. It is not clear 
whether these are per capita figures; my best-case analysis below assumes they are not, and that a population 
growth of around 1% – which is the World Bank annual estimate for 2000-2006 – must be subtracted. 
136 According to Steinberg (in Williams 2007), the Burmese top generals see themselves as national saviors without 
whom the country would fall apart. They perceive their nation as being threatened not only by the ethnic rebels but 
also by imperialism from abroad. 
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concern about possible boycotts of the Beijing Olympics. Protests taking place during the 
summer of 2008 may rattle the Chinese sufficiently to take strong action in order to prevent any 
violent excesses from the Burmese regime. It is also the case that a new generation of military 
leaders has taken control of the regime, being somewhat at a disadvantage compared to the old 
for not possessing the same credentials as national WWII ‘war heroes’. This may translate into a 
reduction of the mythological component of the regime’s legitimacy. Some newspapers reported 
of soldiers refusing to fire on protesters during the September 2007 crackdown, and while it is 
not clear how widespread such acts of disobedience may have been, this may possibly be an 
indication of a reduction in regime legitimacy (Morset and Thorenfeldt 2007; Okkenhaug 2007). 
The regime’s clumsy and callous response to the recent Cyclone Nargis may also contribute to a 
further erosion of its legitimacy, although it is at present too early to say how this will play out. 
 
More important, perhaps, is the fact that while the 1988 protests were student-led, those of 2007 
were led by the highly venerated Buddhist monks. One Burmese opposition politician, Thet 
Pyin (in McGreal 2007) finds this a key distinction, as "the conflict is no longer between the 
government and the people, it's between religion and the government. That's important because 
80% of the population is Buddhist and the government is Buddhist. All the army is Buddhist. 
That will be its downfall". The Buddhist influence may also have contributed to the recent 
protests maintaining a higher degree of nonviolent discipline than those of 1988. Still there were 
reports of protest violence during the regime crackdown (Skjærstad and Okkenhaug 2007), 
possibly in connection with agents provocateurs.137 Finally, the international media coverage of 
the 2007 protests was at an entirely different level than was the case in 1988, and protesters 
were using digital cameras to document the debacle and mobile phones and internet connections 
to communicate with each other and the outside world. At the height of the clampdown, 
however, the regime blocked the internet and interrupted mobile phone signals, thus perhaps 
negating this advantage (BBC 2007). 
 
                                                 
137 “Burma Campaign UK claimed troops had infiltrated the demonstrated by disguising themselves as monks, 
planning to spark violence in order to justify a crackdown” (MacKinnon 2007). One monk states that "During the 
demonstrations they pulled the prisoners out of Mandalay jail and shaved their heads and put them among the 
monks to cause trouble” (McGreal 2007). 
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In sum, it seems that a best-case scenario for the present-day Burmese protests looks like the 
following: a low level of economic growth and a regime with negligible mythological claims to 
legitimacy which is also increasingly becoming an embarrassment to its northern protector,138 
and an insurgency that is becoming more of a nuisance than a genuine threat to the survival of 
the state. This combines into a total regime legitimacy score of zero. If we factor in a clear 
presence of religious authority, a possible absence of protest violence and a clear presence of 
regime violence, the Burma 2007-2008 case would in the terms of a Boolean analysis seem to 
resemble the US Civil Rights Movement cases and the rise of Solidarity in 1980-1981 Poland. 
This would bode well for success, and we could imagine for instance that the military regime 
has undermined its long-term grasp on power by using lethal violence against the venerable 
Buddhist monks and thus shocking both the public and perhaps even its own armed forces. 
Should the assumptions about the level of Chinese support or the civil war’s decline in threat 
level prove overoptimistic, however, this case looks more like that of Chile 1983, which did not 
accomplish much of anything. If the Burmese opposition fails to exploit the window of 
opportunity in the period leading up toward the Beijing Olympics, it seems probable in the terms 
of the variables in my analysis that the protests of 2007 will result in failure also in the medium 
to long term. 
6.1.2 Israel-Palestine 
The second case which I will attempt to predict is a strictly hypothetical mass campaign against 
the West Bank Wall, known variously as the Israeli West Bank barrier, the security fence and 
the apartheid wall. The imagined scenario is essentially the following: a mass group of unarmed 
protesters, numbering somewhere upwards of 10,000, descends upon the wall/barrier at a 
convenient sparsely inhabited locality and proceeds to tear it down. In order to analyze this case 
I will adhere to the customary format, starting with a discussion of the wall’s legitimacy. I will 
also make room for some tactical considerations. 
 
                                                 
138 The Economist (2008a) finds that China is beginning “to curb the nastiest of its friends”, among them the 
government of Burma. It goes on to report that “Wen Jiabao, China’s prime minister, has called publicly for 
democracy in Myanmar”. 
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The Economist (2008c) forecasts the GDP growth of Israel at 3.7% in 2008 and 4.2% in 2009. 
Factoring in a population growth of around 2%,139 this translates into a low growth level in the 
terms of this study. No forecast is available for the Palestinian territories, though the economy 
here can hardly be expected to do any better.140 Should the global economy fare poorer than 
forecast due for instance to a US recession, this might hit the relatively open Israeli economy 
hard and provide a possible window of opportunity for protest organizers.141 
 
From the Israeli point of view, the wall is primarily a security barrier erected to protect its 
citizens from terrorism. Most of the Israeli public does for this reason seem to support it (Yaar 
and Hermann 2004; Dolphin 2006:189), and in the age of the ‘global war on terrorism’ such 
counter-terrorism measures surely resonate well with people in many parts of the world. From 
the Palestinian side the wall is regarded more as a land grab: they notice that it by no means 
follows the ‘Green Line’ of the 1949 armistice, and see it as an attempt to create facts on the 
ground in anticipation of final status negotiations. This perspective thus regards the wall as an 
extension of Israel’s settlement policy whereby Israel attempts to annex permanently the 
territories that the wall envelops. The Israeli settlements are widely condemned: the United 
Nations Security Council resolutions 446, 452, 465 and 471 of 1979 and 1980 describe them as 
having “no legal validity”; Amnesty International (2005) and Human Rights Watch (2005) see 
them as “unlawful”; and in 1978 the Legal Advisor of the US Department of State opined that 
the settlements are “inconsistent with international law” (quoted at the Foundation for Middle 
East Peace 2008 website). We thus have two basic and conflicting myths or narratives regarding 
the West Bank Wall, which on the score card would seem to balance each other out. It is also 
worth mentioning, however, that the wall between Israel and the West Bank – symbolic of the 
general divide between Judeo-Christianity and Islam – will carry connotations to the much-
maligned Berlin Wall, symbolic of the Cold War divide. Popular Western culture abounds with 
references to the Berlin Wall and the exuberance over its destruction, and these can possibly 
carry over to the West Bank Wall. Like its predecessor the West Bank Wall – and in particular 
                                                 
139 According to the Word Bank (2008), Israel’s population grew by an annual 2% from 2001 through 2006. 
140 Per capita growth in the West Bank and Gaza was 2% in 2004, 3% in 2005 and -2% in 2006 (World Bank 2008). 
141 The Penn World Tables give a 2004 openness in current prices of 83.25% (Heston et. al 2006). The openness of 
the economy is defined as the sum of exports and imports divided by GDP, and a score of 83% indicates an open 
economy: the US scores 25%, China 47%, the UK 53%, Germany 71% and Ireland 150% (all in 2004). 
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the concrete wall sections dissecting urban areas – is also a remarkably ugly piece of brutalist 
architecture, and many people surely despise it solely on aesthetic grounds.142 
 
On the international level, then, Israel has strong support for fighting terrorism and weak 
support for its settlement policy. As for the wall itself, the International Court of Justice (2004) 
has issued an advisory opinion concluding that it violates international law, and the International 
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC 2004) has declared it “in clear violation of international 
humanitarian law”. Israel continues to enjoy a close alliance with the United States, although 
there are signs that the Bush administration too has less than wholehearted support for the West 
Bank Wall.143 Overall international support for the wall may thus be regarded as a mixed bag, 
though it seems clear that the level of support for those sections of the wall that cross deeply 
into West Bank territory in order to surround Israeli settlements is closer to low. These sections, 
of course, are precisely the parts of the wall that the nonviolent campaign should focus on, and 
the question for the international community will thus be to which extent they support violence 
from the Israeli Defense Forces against nonviolent protesters in order to defend a wall built on 
Palestinian land. My estimate is that this support would be quite low.144 
 
The final issue to discuss relates to threat level. Violent threats to the Jewish state are obviously 
endemic, although none of its enemies at the present day endanger the survival of the state itself. 
Regarding the threats from Palestinians, rocket fire from Gaza has replaced the earlier suicide 
                                                 
142 Shahar (2004, in Dolphin 2006:156) reports of French public relations consultants advising Israel to paint the 
concrete sections of the wall “so that it will be more aesthetic and the public relations damage will be reduced”. 
143 President Bush stated in 2003 that “I think the wall is a problem, and I discussed this with Ariel Sharon. It is 
very difficult to develop confidence between the Palestinians and the Israel -- Israel -- with a wall snaking through 
the West Bank”; and in 2005 that “The barrier being erected by Israel as a part of its security effort must be a 
security, rather than political, barrier. And its route should take into account, consistent with security needs, its 
impact on Palestinians not engaged in terrorist activities.” 
144 In the medium to long term it is also debatable to which degree the United States will be able to maintain its 
close alliance with Israel without resolving the Israel-Palestine conflict. According to the Economist (2008d), 
“whenever American unpopularity in the [Middle East] goes up due to its support for Israeli actions such as those 
against the Palestinians in Gaza, the task of pro-Western Arabs in facing down assorted rejectionists becomes 
harder”. In recent decades the USA has been the world’s sole superpower and has probably for this reason been 
able to maintain close security ties both with Israel and important Arab states such as Egypt and Saudi Arabia. With 
the rise of China as an economic superpower with an ambitious space program and increasing technological and 
military clout, however, the day may come when Arab states no longer need the American security umbrella. (It is 
worth mentioning that the missile which struck a high-tech Israeli corvette to lethal effect during combat operations 
in the 2006 Lebanon war was apparently of Chinese design (Mazetti and Shankar 2006).) The US may thus soon 
have to weigh its support for Israel against repercussions in oil deals and strategic influence in the Arab world, and 
preparing for such eventualities could influence Washington policy even in the short term. 
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bombs, and the West Bank Wall is clearly of no security value against Quassam rockets. Some 
would say, however, that the decline in suicide attacks simply proves the wall’s effectiveness 
and that those attacks would remerge if the wall is torn down. Threat level may thus seem to 
hover between moderate and low, and it would be of vital import for a potential campaign 
against the wall to petition Hamas, Islamic Jihad and similar groups to lay low while the protest 
action is taking place. Suicide bombings would for obvious reasons be particularly damaging to 
the movement’s chances of success. In fact there is every reason to believe that the Israeli 
government would find it in its interest to respond with massive force against any violent 
provocations taking place during the nonviolent campaign, as this might serve to shift the 
world’s attention away from that protest and toward the violent debacle. 
 
Having outlined the major legitimacy issues, I now turn briefly to matters of strategy and tactics. 
It rather goes without saying that any violence from the protesters campaigning to tear down the 
wall would incur a violent response from the Israeli Defense Force (IDF), and that maintaining 
nonviolent discipline is for this reason a prerequisite for success. The strategic aim for the 
movement should be to neutralize the Israeli capacity to inflict violence by offering no attacks 
that might serve to justify a clampdown, and by raising the costs for unjustified violence. The 
latter objective necessitates above all widespread media coverage, insuring that if the IDF 
chooses to crack down violently on the nonviolent protest, they will do so live on global TV 
networks. To justify such a level of coverage, in turn, the protest movement would have to be 
very large and thus qualify as unprecedented and newsworthy.145 Size matters also for the 
reason that it removes limited-violence police actions from Israel’s repertoire: one can disperse 
a small crowd with water cannons and tear gas, but not one numbering tens of thousands of 
people.146 
 
While Palestinians would have to make up the bulk of the protesters, the importance of an 
international contingent can hardly be overstated. This is for the reason that the international 
media is rather less concerned about dead Palestinians than it is about dead Europeans or 
Americans. Most important of all from this perspective is the participation of Israeli peace 
                                                 
145 The suggested objective of the protest – to actually tear down the wall – would also serve to differentiate it from 
earlier protests that aimed primarily at voicing outrage. This would increase its newsworthiness. 
146 Not, at any rate, without causing a major panic and thus setting off a stampede, which is in functional terms not 
unlike firing into the crowd with live ammunition. 
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activists. As to the question of seeking religious approval for the protest, it can be noted that this 
would probably facilitate mobilization but carries the public relations risk of linking the protest 
with radical Islamist ideology.147 
 
In closing it may be added that in order to be successful in this endeavor one would obviously 
have to work out a method for actually tearing down the wall. The vast majority of the 
participants would not be directly involved in this work; their role is to make up an impermeable 
human wall protecting those who work with tearing the concrete wall. Note also that the above 
is not an argument saying it would be easy or even possible to get ten thousand or more 
Palestinians to do much of anything, far less sustaining a disciplined nonviolent protest. What 
this argument says is that if ten thousand or more Palestinians do manage to sustain a nonviolent 
campaign directed at the West Bank Wall, that campaign would have good chances of success. 
6.2 Further research 
This study provides not so much final conclusions as tentative findings whose primary 
importance is probably to serve as a starting point for further research. In this final section I will 
briefly outline what may be profitable directions for such research.  
 
First of all, there are numerous cases of nonviolent protest that have not been included in the 
present study, among them successful pro-democracy campaigns in East Germany, 
Czechoslovakia, Mongolia, Thailand, Nepal and the Ukraine, resistance against foreign 
occupation in the Ruhr, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, Czechoslovakia, Namibia and 
Latvia, and counter-coup movements in France and the Soviet Union (Ackerman and Duvall 
2000; Schock 2005; Sharp 2005). The important Ghaffar Khan – the Gandhi of the Pashtuns – 
has not been mentioned (Gandhi 2004). And the cases of (potential) nonviolent action derailed 
by violence are almost too numerous to mention, three recent examples being the riots in 
Serbia/Kosovo, Armenia and Tibet (Balakrishnan 2008; Sengupta and Kumar 2008; Traynor 
2008).148 One obvious way of improving this study is thus to expand the data set, which should 
                                                 
147 Phrases like ‘jihad’, even if defensible from a Qur’anic perspective as a legitimate (and not necessarily violent) 
‘struggle in the way of God’, are particularly damaging to global public relations. ‘Intifada’ similarly connotes to 
the violent excesses of the al-Aqsa intifada. 
148 The Dalai Lama, apparently with a clear understanding of the dynamics of nonviolent protest, described the 
outburst of violence in the Tibetan protests as an “act of suicide” (Sengupta and Kumar 2008).  
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be possible to a factor of two or three and which would as such make the statistical analysis 
rather more reliable. This would also flesh out the Boolean truth table and perhaps provide 
added material for those logical paths that correspond to only one or two cases.  
 
It is quite possible, however, that some of those new cases would not conform to the causal 
trends observed in the current study. This is a problem particularly for QCA, and unless those 
contrary cases can be fairly regarded as outliers subject to particularistic causal dynamics and 
therefore be ignored, this might require modified coding rules. The present rules were after all 
designed with an eye to the present data set and remain as of yet essentially provisional. 
 
Regarding my current variables and indicators, one might object in particular to the use of per 
capita economic growth as the sole indicator of economic performance legitimacy. Growth 
benefiting only the political and economic elites may arguably not have much of a legitimizing 
effect – although, to its defense, growth indicates that at least the business community is getting 
richer and thus inclined to support the status quo. At any rate it would be interesting to compare 
with other indicators of social development and investigate how schemes of wealth distribution, 
welfare systems and similar policies serve to legitimize political regimes. 
 
Due to a lack of reliable data, this study has not been able to address the role of the media with a 
broad comparative methodology. It seems plausible that different movements have different 
media requirements and that a single indicator would fail to capture important nuances in the 
media’s causal impact on protest outcome. An emerging protest movement in the city-state of 
Singapore might for instance communicate sufficiently with the public simply through street 
activities and word of mouth, whereas a Chinese campaign with national ambitions could not 
rely on such measures. As a minimum, national and international coverage should be 
differentiated, and alternative media such as underground newspapers, pirate radio and internet 
blogs must be included in some way. One option may be to create an index of media access. 
 
Beyond those factors that this study has addressed – however imperfectly – awaits a large pool 
of unexamined variables. Questions of organization and resource mobilization have for instance 
been ignored entirely, working from the assumption that ‘what exists is possible’ (as Boulding’s 
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first law would have it) – or in other words that protest movements which succeed in emerging 
as viable social forces clearly have the resources they need to do so. Of course, one could easily 
surmise that movements may sometimes have sufficient resources to emerge but not to succeed 
in imposing their demands, and thus call for further work on this issue.149   
 
The role of strikes, boycotts and other means of economic leverage has been emphasized on a 
variety of occasions in this paper, but it might be interesting to explicitly compare movements 
possessing such leverage to those lacking it and see how far it goes at predicting success. More 
generally, Schock (2005) has observed from six comparative case studies that a wide array of 
protest methods – as opposed to a reliance on just one or two – seems to facilitate success, and 
this could also lend itself to investigation through Boolean or statistical comparison. Finally, it 
might seem obvious that smaller-scope protests – aiming for policy change rather than regime 
change – would have a greater chance of success as the opponent would presumably have less to 
lose by giving in to the demands. The prize thus gained is of course smaller, but may serve as 
the springboard for further protests.150 Some would argue that these two types of cases are not 
directly comparable and that a separate analysis is required for each, and with a higher number 
of cases in the study it would be possible to differentiate between such cases.  
 
These are but some of the possible improvements and extensions to this study, and unidentified 
issues no doubt remain. While the findings of this study are thus probably best thought of as 
tentative, they offer at least a clear indication that the state of regime legitimacy often affects 
protest outcome and that violent rioting from protesters regularly plays right into the hands of 
their opponent. What should also be clear from this study – and which it is by no means the first 
to point out – is that nonviolent action has significantly impacted 20th century political life. In 
closing, then, we may conclude unequivocally that nature’s old way of solving conflicts is but 
one of several methods available to contemporary man, and not necessarily the most powerful. 
                                                 
149 The regime legitimacy scores indicate at least the extent of potential resource mobilization. As for organization, 
it may be observed that the spontaneity and disorganization of movements in Burma 1988 and China 1989 probably 
hampered their bid for success (Schock 2005), whereas in Nazi Germany 1944 those same factors contributed to 
success as the Gestapo, looking for a way to decapitate the protest, could find no leader or organizer to arrest. 
150 The black labor organizations in South Africa, which during the 1980s emerged as perhaps the greatest threat to 
the apartheid regime, were able to establish themselves in the 1970s precisely because of their then non-political 
objectives. Thus a limited labor-specific victory in the short run facilitated a larger victory in the long run. 
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Appendix 1: Significance tests for QCA models 
 
It may be profitable to apply statistical tests of significance to QCA models in order to gain an 
estimate of their reliability. This appendix briefly discusses two such procedures, both of which 
are to be regarded as experimental. 
 
The first procedure is taken from Grendstad (2007), and requires that one transforms the 
Boolean truth table into a cross table by constructing a new variable that takes each logical path 
as a value. This new variable is then crossed with the dependent variable, and the resulting cross 
table is made subject to standard chi-square significance tests. Table 7 gives the cross table for 
my dataset. The paths variable has ten values corresponding to the ten logical paths in my truth 
table (Table 4 p. 83). Table entries are raw counts of cases. 
 
Table 7: Cross Table 
Paths Outcome 
0000 0001 0011 0010 1111 1110 1011 0110 1010 1000 
0 0 0 0 0 4 3 1 1 1 2 
1 3 6 6 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
The Pearson chi-square statistic for this table is significant at the 0.001 level. It must be noted 
however that the table breaks with the requirements of the test as more than 20% (in fact, 100%) 
of the cells have expected cell counts of less than 5, and the result may as such be invalid. At 
any rate, as far as it goes, it affords my QCA model with a high degree of statistical 
significance. A next step of this procedure may be to analyze the adjusted standardized residuals 
in order to “pinpoint which combinations of conditions contribute to break down the 
independence model” (ibid:128); I will leave the implementation of this step to a future version 
of this study.  
 
A second procedure for significance testing of QCA models is suggested by Goeman (2006). Its 
basic claim to validation lies in the absence of contradictions, and it calculates a p-value as “the 
probability of no contradictions if there was no relationship between variables and outcome” 
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(ibid:26). In other words, one calculates the likelihood that a randomly generated truth table 
with the same distribution as the table of the analysis has a similar absence of contradictions. 
Goeman’s procedure for determining the p-value is as follows:  
 
1. Count the number of ways to redistribute the cases over the data table, keeping the row 
and column totals equal. 
2. Count how many of these have no contradictions. 
3. Ratio = p-value. 
 
He does not explain how he counts the case redistribution possibilities, but my calculation is as 
follows: with a path corresponding to n cases, the total number of distributions over a 
dichotomous dependent variable is 2n. Of these, only 2 have no contradictions (i.e., when all 
cases have either a positive or a negative outcome). The probability that n cases should 
distribute themselves without contradiction is thus 2 / 2n = 1 / 2n-1 = 21-n. With k paths this 
becomes (in simplified notation) ∏k 2
1-ni, ni being the number of cases corresponding to path i. 
 
As an example I use Goeman’s (ibid:27) table, 
given here as Table 8. The four independent 
variables are labelled S, H, W, and G; #M gives 
the number of positive outcomes and #m 
negative outcomes. With my formula, the 
significance test of this QCA model determines 
what is the likelihood that a random truth table 
with three clusters of size two, three and five 
should contain no contradictions (paths 
corresponding to only one case can obviously contain no contradiction and are irrelevant to this 
procedure for significance testing; their contribution to the formulas below are 20 = 1). The 
probability for a random table with this distribution containing no contradictions is the 
following: 20 x 20 x 2-1 x 20 x 20 x 2-2 x 20 x 2-4 = 2-7 = 0.0078125. Goeman’s calculation, 
involving perhaps some combinatorial mathematics, results in a p value of 0.0077. In a second 
example (not shown), Goeman generates a random truth table of 15 cases spread evenly over 14 
Table 8: Goeman’s example: Truth Table 
S H W G #M #m 
1 1 1 1 1  
1 0 1 0 1  
0 1 1 1 2  
0 1 1 0 1  
0 1 0 0 1  
0 0 1 1 3  
0 0 1 0 1  
0 0 0 0  5 
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paths, with one path corresponding to two cases. My p-calculation for this table is, with 20 = 1, 
113 x 2-1 = 0.5; Goeman’s result is 0.52.  
 
We can see that this type of calculation will bestow significance at the 0.05 level upon any truth 
table with a cluster of six cases or more, or with a combination of clusters reaching the same 
magnitude of probability (with one cluster of size six, 21-n = 0.03125; this equals the p value for 
five clusters of size two). By this standard, the p value of my truth table is 2-2 x 2-5 x 2-5 x 2-1 x 
2-3 x 2-2 x 20 x 20 x 2-1 = 2-19 = 0.0000019. The main purpose of this significance testing is thus 
to cast doubt upon tables where a low number of cases spread out among a high number of 
logical paths, which is not a problem for my QCA model. 
 
The procedure becomes increasingly interesting if we reintroduce a possibility for contradiction. 
In my dataset there are three cases that I, in order to fend off doubters, recoded as contrary cases 
for the statistical analysis. What if we allowed these as contradictions in the truth table? The 
probability calculation would be as following: if we have n cases and allow one contradiction 
per path, this would occur randomly with the probability (2n + 2) / 2n. As before 2 out of the 2n 
possibilities would be without contradiction, and 2n possibilities would have exactly one 
contradiction. It is also possible to calculate probability values for paths with two or more 
contradicting cases, but this is not relevant for my truth table as the three contrary cases belong 
to three different paths. The new calculation is thus as follows, with the term (2n + 2) / 2n 
replacing the term 21-n for those paths where one contradiction is observed: [(6+2) / 23] x 
[(12+2) / 26] x [(12+2) / 26] x 2-1 x 2-3 x 2-2 x 20 x 20 x 2-1 = 1 x 14/64 x 14/64 x 2-7 = 0.00037.  
 
The resulting p value is at the order of one hundred times larger than the above figure that 
assumed no contradictions. It is still a very low figure, however, which indicates that even if we 
allow for three contradictions there is only the remotest chance that a randomly generated truth 
table would replicate the consistency of my table. (Similarly, if we add one contradiction to the 
last path in Goeman’s example in Table 8 above, the p value jumps from 0.0078 to 0.047.) Does 
the above mean that my QCA can pass as statistically significant? It must be remembered that 
these procedures are experimental and subject to further modification, or even rejection. Still, a 
tentative claim to significance can probably be made. 
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